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Review of Adjustment Board Awards Under
the Railway Labor Act
I. INTRODUCTION
TN 1934 Congress amended the Railway Labor Act creating a National
.Railroad Adjustment Board.' The purpose was to provide a forum to re-
solve minor2 disputes arising in the railroad industry.' Awards specified by
the NRAB were to be final, binding, and enforceable in the federal dis-
trict courts. 4 Two years later, the coverage of the RLA was extended to
the airline industry' but with significant exceptions. The provisions of
Section 3 of the Act were not extended to air carriers' nor was a National
Air Transport Adjustment Board immediately established.7 Instead, Con-
gress required each carrier and union in the airline industry to organize
either a system, group, or regional board of adjustment.! These exceptions
raised serious questions concerning the enforceability of local or system
board awards.9
In light of the above, this paper has been designed to furnish a clearer
understanding of two important considerations. First, to convey the pres-
'Railway Labor Act § 3 First (hereinafter RLA), 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), as amended,
45 U.S.C. § 153 First (1964).
a The terms "minor" as contrasted with "major" are used to classify types of disputes. Elgin,
J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945) defined major disputes as those concerned with
"the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them. They arise where there is no
such agreement or where it is sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the issue is not
whether an existing agreement controls the controversy. They look to the acquisition of rights
for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the past." A minor dispute,
however,
contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate,
a situation in which no effort is made to bring about a formal change in teems or to
create a new one. The dispute relates either to the meaning or proper application of
a particular provision with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case.
In the latter event the claim is founded upon some incident of the employment rela-
tion, or asserted one, independent of those covered by the collective agreement,
e.g., claims on account of personal injuries. In either case the claim -is- -ta rights
accrued, not merely to have new ones created for the future.
3 Note, Federal Enforcement of Airline System Board Awards Under the Railway Labor Act:
The Spector of Chicago River, 72 YALE 'L.J. 803, 808 (1963) (Hereinafter cited as Federal
Enforcement).4 RLA § 3 First (m) & (p), 44 Stat. 578, as amended, 48 Stat. 1189, 80 Stat. 208, 45 U.S.C.
S 153 (m) & (p) (1964).5 RLA § 201, 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1964).
. Id.
1RLA §205, 49 Stat. 1190, 45 U.S.C. S 185 (1964).
'RLA S 204, 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1964).
o International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963), rev'sq 295
F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1961).
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ent status of an airline system board award. Second, to explore the en-
forceability of both system and NRAB awards. Or, stated another way,
what areas of judicial review are available for board awards? In hopes of
providing some insight to the decisions discussed, a brief review of the
history preceding passage of the Railway Labor Act together with a sum-
mary of the steps generally included in a grievance procedure is presented.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Review
Reflecting the strategic importance of the railroad industry in the na-
tional economy and its peculiar problems, Congress in 1926 enacted the
Railway Labor Act"0 in an attempt to avoid interruptions to interstate
commerce resulting from unsettled labor disputes. Although the Act as
passed in 1926 included proposals from representatives of both labor and
management, the road leading to passage of the RLA was far from a
smooth one. 1
As early as 1888 there were laws passed as a result of labor relations
problems in the nation's railroads."2 In 1898 an attempt was made to reg-
ulate railroad management-labor relations with the passage of the Erdman
Act"-stressing mediation and voluntary arbitration when mediation
failed. However, probably one of the most significant developments prior
to 1920 was non-statutory. In 1917 the carriers and unions agreed to a
means of settling disputes by submitting them to a "Commission of Eight"
composed of representatives from each side. The success of the Commis-
sion encouraged the creation of railway adjustment boards soon thereafter.
One of the prime contributions from the Commission of Eight and the
railway boards was the idea of an adjustment agency with representatives
from each side who, by understanding the subject matter, could better
resolve difficulties by applying the appropriate rules.14 In 1920 came the
Transportation Act, but the dissatisfaction of both unions and manage-
ment with this Act led to the Railway Labor Act of 1926.'
Congress, therefore, had accumulated considerable experience in railroad
labor legislation and disputes prior to the enactment of the Railway Labor
Act of 1926.'° Even though the Railway Labor Act of 1926 established a
Board of Mediation to provide mediation and arbitration services, sub-
mission of a controversy to arbitration was not mandatory. Instead, private
boards that were bipartisan and required the consent of both parties for
their existence could be established to settle grievance disputes. Certain de-
fects which became apparent in the 1926 Act motivated the passage of
several amendments in 1934.1 One of these amendments, prompted bv
1044 Stat. 577 (1926).
1 32 NMB Ann. Rep. 2 (1965-1966).
1Shils, Industrial Unrest in the Nation's Airline Industry, 15 LAB. L.J. 153 (1964); Act
of 1888.
1330 Stat. 424 (1898).
14 Kroner, Minor Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act: A Critical Appraisal, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 41, 42 (1962)
1 Shils, supra note 12 at 153.
eS. MUELLER AND A. MEYERS, LABOR LAW AND LEGISLATION 593 (3d ed. 1962).
"A. COx AND D. Box, LABOR LAW 116 (6th ed. 1965).
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the failure of the voluntary arbitration system, led to the creation of the
National Railroad Adjustment Board."8 The NRAB consists of eighteen
representatives selected by the carriers and the same number chosen by
the employees. The Board is divided into four separate divisions, each hav-
ing jurisdiction over disputes involving different occupations. If the initial
private grievance procedure fails to settle a dispute, the Board's jurisdiction
can be invoked by either party. The Board is required to give notice to
any employees or carriers involved in a dispute being heard by them. In
the event of a tie vote among the Board members, a neutral referee will be
selected, either by the Board or, if they cannot agree, one will be as-
signed by the National Mediation Board. Awards of the Board are enforce-
able in the federal district courts. 9
As a result of the 1934 amendments, the Railway Labor Act assumed
the framework existing, with only slight changes, today.' Nevertheless,
even though the basic form of the Act has not been substantially altered,
its scope was dramatically broadened in 1936 when air carriers were in-
cluded under its coverage by the addition of Title II.1
The procedures of Title I of the Act, except Section 3 pertaining to
NRAB procedure, were extended to airlines engaged in interstate com-
merce or transporting mail for or under contract with the United States
Government." Hence, provisions for the handling of disputes arising out
of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of an existing col-
lective bargaining agreement were made somewhat different for the airline
industry. Instead of creating a National Air Transport Adjustment Board
at the time airlines came under the scope of the RLA, Congress left this
authority to the discretion of the NMB.' Although this authority has
never been exercised, Congress did require carriers and their employees to
establish a board of adjustment with jurisdiction limited to one carrier, a
group, or a region.' Thus far, airlines and their employees have relied on
system boards to resolve grievance disputes and neither side has made an
attempt to have the NMB create a national board for the industry."
B. Grievance Procedure
The RLA requires that grievances over interpretations of contracts cov-
ering existing pay rates, rules, and working conditions for both railroads
and airlines be processed in the "usual manner" up through the highest
company officer appointed to hear such disputes and, if necessary, on to
an adjustment board." In order to have some idea of the steps usually taken
prior to a grievance reaching the adjustment board level, a typical ap-
1848 Stat. 1189 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
19 Id.; see also Kroner, supra note 14 at 45.
"°COX AND Box, supra note 17 at 117.
2 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1964).
2 Id.
23RLA §§ 204, 205, 49 Stat. 1189-90, 45 U.S.C. §§ 184-185 (1964).
24RLA 5 205, 49 Stat. 1190, 45 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
25RLA 5 204, 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1964); See also, J. BAITSELL, AIRLINE INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS: PILOTS AND FLIGHT ENGINEERS 287 (1966).
2"BATSELL, supra note 25 at 287.
27RLA § 3, 44 Stat. 578, as amended, 48 Stat. 1189, 80 Stat. 208, 45 U.S.C. S 153 (1964);
RLA § 205, 49 Stat. 1190, 45 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
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proach used by the airlines is discussed.
Generally, the grievance procedures used by the air carriers involve four
steps. First, is the initial hearing, followed by an appeal, a four man
board, and finally the board with the addition of a neutral referee. It is
not uncommon though, that prior to filing a grievance an employee will
have an informal discussion with his supervisor."' Procedures to be fol-
lowed are normally found in the collective bargaining agreements. Either
the employees or the carrier can institute the required steps."' Generally,
the employee initiates the process by stating his grievance in writing to-
gether with a request for a hearing before the appropriate company of-
ficial. The official in turn acknowledges in writing receipt of the grievance
and sets a time for a hearing which typically is of an informal nature."0
The authority invested in hearing officials for the settling of grievances
is not consistent from one airline to another."1 Usually, a written decision
by the hearing officer must be rendered within a specified period of time.
If the employee is dissatisfied with the decision he has a right to appeal to
a more senior company official. If the employee is still not satisfied with
this second decision, he then has a right to appeal to his system board of
adjustment." Strict adherence to the rules as set out in the company-union
contract is a requisite for either side to invoke the powers of the board.'
Either with or without a neutral arbitrator, a board may review the entire
record in a case, and in addition, may request any additional witnesses and
evidence it deems necessary. The parties involved may be allowed addi-
tional witnesses or evidence at the discretion of the board. A majority of
the system board is competent to make a decision.'
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. A Jurisdictional Question
It is significant to note that when Congress amended the Railway Labor
Act in 1936 to extend its coverage to the airline industry, Section 3,
which provides that board awards are final, binding, and enforceable in
the federal courts, was not included.' Consequently, an important ques-
tion had to be answered. Did Section 204' of the Act make system board
awards final and binding? On its face, Section 204 does not indicate
whether, an gward from an airline system board may be enforced by in-
stituting legal action in a federal district court."7 However, the decision of
the Supreme Court in 1963 in Int'l. Assn. of Machinists v. Central Airlines,
28 BAITSELL, supra note 25 at 286.
29Tsamoutales, Grievance Settlement in the Aviation Industry, 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 50, 56
(1964-1965).
S"BAITSELL, supra note 25 at 288.
s'Id. at 289.
a2 Tsamoutales, supra note 29 at 57.
"Id. at 59; The author comments on several conflicting Board decisions determining whether
they could assert jurisdiction.
"RLA S 3, 44 Stat. 578, as amended, 48 Stat. 1189, 80 Stat. 208, 45 U.S.C. S 153 (1964);
RLA § 205, 49 Stat. 1190, 45 U.S.C. S 185 (1964); Tsamoutales, suPra note 29 at 59.
33RLA S 3(m) & (p), 44 Stat. 578, 45 U.S.C. S 153(m) & (p) (1964); RLA § 201, 49
Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1964).
"RLA § 204, 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1964).
sId.
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Inc.," one of the most significant cases decided in the field of labor arbi-
tration since Lincoln Mills,3 appears to have rendered moot the question
concerning authority for federal jurisdiction in enforcement proceedings
of system board awards.
Int'l. Assn. of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc.,' involved the dis-
charge of six employees for their refusal to attend disciplinary hearings
unless a union representative was present. Grievances initiated by the
union and employees over the discharges eventually reached the system
board of adjustment. After the four man system board deadlocked and a
neutral referee was appointed, an award for reinstatement without loss of
seniority and with back pay was rendered for the employees. The airline
refused to comply with the award, and suit to enforce the award was insti-
tuted by the employees in a United States district court. The district
court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, holding there was
no diversity of citizenship and the case did not arise under the laws of the
United States as required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1331.41 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed" on the ground that the fact that federal law
required the establishment of the system board was not by itself sufficient
to confer federal question jurisdiction on a federal court in a suit to en-
force awards of the board. The court also stated that "this suit is nothing
more than a state-created action to construe a contract."' In affirming, the
court considered their decision in Metcalf v. National Airlines, Inc." con-
trolling. In Metcalf, as in Central, an aggrieved employee brought suit in
a federal district court to enforce an award of a system board established
under the RLA. The court held that an airline employee could not sue
under 45 U.S.C. Section 153 (p)
since Congressional design was to grant to those winning arbitration awards
the right to sue on them in federal courts only when and if the Mediation
Board creates a National Air Transport Adjustment Board whose award is
ignored or not complied with by the carrier and then only does § 153(p)
become operative in the air industry.'
3 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963).
39Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
concerned a collective bargaining agreement between union and company where it was stipulated
that the last step in the grievance procedure would be arbitration. The Supreme Court held that
§ 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act not only provides jurisdiction for the federal
district courts, but also, that the "substantive law to be applied in suits under S 301(a) is
federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws."
'0372 U.S. at 682.
4'28 U.S.C. § 1331:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive of interests
and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the
United States, where the plaintiff is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less
than the sum or value of $10,000, computed without regard to any setoff or counter-
claim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of
interests and costs, the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition,
may impose costs on the plaintiff.
42 295 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1961), revd, 372 U.S. 682 (1963).
43 372 U.S. at 682-84.
44271 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1959); Note the important distinction between Metcalf and Central.
Metcalf was brought under Section 3 of the RLA which does not apply, at p. 818. Whereas,
Central was based on federal question jurisdiction, see note 46 infra.
4 271 F.2d at 817-18.
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Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court in Cental to consider the
important question of "whether a suit to enforce an award of an airline
system board of adjustment is a suit arising under the laws of the United
States under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or a suit arising under a law regu-
lating commerce under 28 U.S.C. § 1337."" The Supreme Court held that
such a suit did arise under the laws of the United States, and therefore
the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 if the
jurisdictional amount was satisfied, and, in any case, under Section 1337. 7
The Supreme Court said that the aim of Congress in 1936 in extending
the Railway Labor Act to the air transportation industry was to provide
air carriers and their employees the "same benefits and obligations" appli-
cable to the railroad industry. In lieu of immediate establishment of a
national board, Section 204 of the Railway Labor Act made mandatory
the existence of system, group, or regional boards of adjustment by pro-
viding that"
[i]t shall be the duty of every carrier and of its employees, acting through
their representatives, selected in accordance with the provisions of sections
181-188 of this title, to establish a board of adjustment of jurisdiction not
exceeding the jurisdiction which may be lawfully exercised by system, group,
or regional boards of adjustment, under the authority of section 3, Title I of
this Act.4
The Court went on to say that this duty "was more than a casual sugges-
tion to the air industry . . . . The obligation which § 204 fastened upon
the carriers and their employees cannot be read in isolation. '
Furthermore, Section 204 must be interpreted in light of the history
surrounding the RLA. This includes the many attempts by Congress to de-
vise effective procedures in order to minimize interruption in the trans-
portation industries by strikes and labor disputes.5' The Supreme Court
cited Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley"5 for comments on the weaknesses of the
RLA prior to the 1934 amendments. Accordingly, since adjustment boards
were not necessarily formed following the 1926 Act, nor was there a
means for breaking deadlocks of a board, the Act was amended in 1934."3
Besides creating the National Railroad Adjustment Board"4 and providing
for a neutral referee in case of deadlocks," provision was also made that
"the awards of the several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall be
stated in writing . . . and the awards shall be final and binding upon both
parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award
46372 U.S. at 684; 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 28 U.S.C. § 1337: "The District Courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any act of Congress regulating
commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies."
47 372 U.S. at 696.4 81d. at 685-86.
.. RLA § 204, 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1964).
5 372 U.S. at 686.51 Id. at 687.
52 325 U.S. 711; The Court there said, "The contention that an award of the National
Railroad Adjustment Board under the Railway Labor Act amounts to nothing more than an
advisory opinion is inconsistent with the terms, purposes and legislative history of the Act and
with decisions of this Court construing it."
5348 Stat. 1189 (1934).54 RLA § 3, 44 Stat. 578, as amended, 48 Stat. 1189, 80 Stat. 208, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
55RLA S 3 First (e), 44 Stat. 578, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (e) (1964).
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. ... "In addition, provision was made for the enforcement of certain
awards in the United States district courts." With the above thoughts in
mind the Supreme Court went on to say:
In view of the clearly stated purposes of the Act and of its history, reflecting
as it does a steady Congressional intent to move toward a reliable and effective
system for the settlement of grievances, we believe Congress intended no
hiatus in the statutory scheme when it postponed the establishment of a
National Air Transport Adjustment Board and instead provided for compul-
sory system, group, or regional boards. Although the system boards were
expected to be temporary arrangements, we cannot believe that Congress
intended an interim period of confusion and chaos or meant to leave the
establishment of the Boards to the whim of the parties. Instead, it intended
the statutory command to be legally enforceable in the courts and the Boards
to be organized and operated consistent with the purposes of the Act.58
At this point the Supreme Court referred to other duties imposed on the
carriers and employees by the RLA that were deemed under the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts. The duty to bargain was discussed in Virginia Ry.
v. System Federation,"9 and the duty to represent all members of a union
without discrimination was discussed in Steele v. Louisville &. N. R. ° As a
result, a similar view was taken by the Supreme Court of the duty to
establish adjustment boards under Section 204, explaining that: 1
It is therefore the statute and the federal law which must determine whether
the contractual arrangements made by the parties are sufficient to discharge
the mandate of §204 and are consistent with the Act and its purposes. It is
federal law which would determine whether a §204 contract is valid and
enforceable according to its terms. If these contracts are to serve this function
under §204, their validity, interpretation, and enforceability cannot be left to
the laws of the many states, for it would be fatal to the goals of the Act if a
contractual provision contrary to the federal command were nevertheless
enforced under state law or if a contract were struck down even though in
furtherance of the federal scheme. The needs of the subject matter manifestly
call for uniformity . ... . A union agreement made pursuant to the Railway
Labor Act has, therefore, the imprimatur of federal law upon it ....
The Court related the Section 204 contract to a Section 301 contract
under the Labor Management Relations Act by saying that it "is a federal
contract and is therefore governed and enforceable by federal law, in the
federal courts. ' 4 Again citing Elgin, J. & E. R. v. Burley," the Court said:
"Congress has long since abandoned the approach of the completely unen-
forceable award which was used in the 1920 Act.""
The effect of the decision in Central has already been experienced in
'9 Id. at S First (m). The language "except insofar as they shall contain a money award" was
deleted by the 1966 amendments discussed infra.
1 RLA § 3 First (p), 44 Stat. 578, 45 U.S.C. 5 153 First (p) (1964); 372 U.S. at 688.
58372 U.S. at 689-90.
59300 U.S. 515 (1937).
so323 U.S. 192 (1944).
6' 372 U.S. at 690.
'lid. at 691.
S6 Id. at 692; see similar reasoning in Lincoln Mills, supra note 39.
04 372 U.S. at 692.
65 32 5 U.S. 711 and note 52, infra.
66 372 U.S. at 694.
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several subsequent cases. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
thought the reasoning in Central was relevant to a specific contract for
joint ownership and management of a railroad terminal approved by the
Interstate Commerce Commission and authorized by federal statute."7 A
case arising under the Labor Management Relations Act that has prompted
considerable legal discussion, Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,"5 also refers
to the language in Central. The Supreme Court in Maddox commented on
the effect of federal law by saying that it recently made it clear "that
substantive federal law applies to suits on collective bargaining agreements
covered by Section 204 of the Railway Labor Act . . . and by Section
301 (a) of the LMRA ... ."" Maddox involved an employee who sued his
employer for severance pay under a collective bargaining agreement be-
tween his union and employer. The state courts decided that state law did
not require the employee to exhaust contract grievance procedures before
bringing suit. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court held that in
light of the federal policy reflected in the LMRA, "contract grievance pro-
cedures, which apply to severance as well as other types of claims, must,
unless specified as nonexclusive be exhausted before direct legal redress is
sought."7 The result in Central should answer most questions regarding fed-
eral court jurisdiction for enforcement of system board awards. Yet, it was
not made clear if the courts could also interpret company-union contracts.
B. Review Of The Award
Whether the company had to comply with the award, or whether it was
impeachable, were "questions controlled by federal law and [were] to be
answered with due regard for the statutory scheme and purpose."71 Several
significant court decisions, along with key amendments, provide assistance
in responding to such questions.
Prior to Central or Lincoln Mills there were Supreme Court decisions
manifesting the exclusive position of an adjustment board under the RLA.
In Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney,"5 the Supreme Court said that the
agreements between the company and union should not have been inter-
preted by the district court in order to settle a dispute, but instead, pur-
suant to the RLA, they should have allowed for the interpretation by the
adjustment board." Another case, Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawana & W.
R.R.,'4 decided in 1950 involved a declaratory judgment action brought in
67 Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 328 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1964).
'8379 U.S. 650 (1965); Two articles discussing this case are, Lurie, Introduction: Fair
Representation--Current Problems and Current Questions, I8TH N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LABOR
328 (1966); Wells, Collective Bargaining and the Interests of the Individual, 18TH N.Y.U. ANN.
CONF. ON LABOR 351 (1966).
69Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 655 (1965).
70379 U.S. 650; cases referring to Central include: Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. A.L.P.A.,
Int'l, 373 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1967); Flight Eng'rs Intn'l Ass'n v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 359
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
71 372 U.S. at 695.
71 Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946).
73 id.
74 339 U.S. 239 (1950); for a similar case decided the same day, see Order of Ry. Conductors
v. Southern Ry., 339 U.S. 259 (1950).
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a state court by a company instead of invoking the jurisdiction of the Ad-
justment Board. The state court interpreted the agreements prior to grant-
ing the declaratory judgment." The Supreme Court, relying on the theory
expressed in Pitney that uniformity of approach to rail agreements was a
primary concern of the framers of the statute, stated in Slocum that this
purpose supports "a denial of power in any court-state as well as federal
-to invade the jurisdiction conferred on the adjustment board by the
Railway Labor Act."76 Therefore, the Board's jurisdiction "to adjust grie-
vances and disputes of the type here involved is exclusive."
'
,
In 1957 the Supreme Court held in Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v.
Chicago River & Indiana R.R.8 that since Congress had provided an
exclusive administrative remedy for the settlement of minor disputes
under the RLA, a union could be enjoined from striking over a pending
dispute that had been submitted by a carrier to the NRAB. In another
injunction suit to bar a strike with the dispute being submitted to the
NRAB, Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas
R. R.,"9 the Supreme Court upheld the granting of an injunction and also
held that the district judge could attach conditions in the exercise of his
equitable discretion."
The Supreme Court in Chicago River did not pass on the question of
whether an injunction would be granted to stop a strike that was called for
the purpose of enforcing a board award in favor of the union."1 However,
this question was answered in Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs. v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R. R.,82 a case decided about two weeks after Central.
The case arose over the interpretation of an order by the NRAB sustain-
ing an employee's claim for reinstatement "with pay for time lost as the
rule is consrtued on the property."8 The difficulty was whether this order
entitled the employee to full pay for lost time without deduction for out-
side income. The Board failed to clarify its award and the union set a
strike deadline. Subsequently, the district court issued an injunction," and
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed." In affirming the two
lower courts the Supreme Court in effect extended the doctrine of Chicago
River to such strikes on the ground that the judicial procedure provided
in the RLA is the exclusive means for enforcing awards of the NRAB.
Therefore, the union could not "legally strike for the purpose of enforc-
ing its interpretation of the Board's money award; it must utilize instead
the judicial enforcement procedure provided by § 3, First (p) of the
7" 3 39 U.S. at 239; 83 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1948).
70 339 U.S. at 244.
77 Id.
783 53 U.S. 30 (1957).
' 363 U.S. 528 (1960).
so Id.
"1 Note, Federal Enforcement of Airline System Board Awards Under the Railway Labor Act:
The Specter of Chicago River, 72 YALE L.J. 803, 811 (1963).
82373 U.S. 33 (1963).
8 1Id. at 34.
84 190 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Ky. 1961).
'5 297 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1961).
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Act."" Again, referring to its reasoning in Chicago River, that Congress
intended the grievance procedures of Section 3, First to be a compulsory
substitute for economic self-help, not merely a voluntary alternative to
it,8 7 the Court decided that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not bar injunc-
tive relief against a strike under such circumstances."8
An observation that can be drawn from the injunction cases is the
Court's interpretation of the RLA that when an adjustment board makes
an award, if compliance is not voluntary, then, in order to have the award
enforced, the favored party must resort to judicial help. In other words,
self-help for enforcement purposes is not allowed. This raises an impor-
tant question as to what extent in enforcement proceedings may the courts
go into-the merits of an Adjustment Board award. The recent Supreme
Court decision in Gunther v. San Diego & Arizona Eastern Ry. Co.,8
provides an excellent starting point.
In Gunther, an employee was removed from active service shortly after
reaching the age of seventy-one. The railroad based its decision on physi-
cal reports made by company physicians that the employee was not physi-
cally qualified to continue to do the work of an engineer. The employee,
after having his own doctor conclude that he was qualified physically to
continue, requested that the company allow a board of three doctors to re-
examine him. After the company refused this request a claim for reinstate-
ment and back pay was filed with the NRAB. The Board upheld the
claim, including back pay, when a majority of a three man medical com-
mittee appointed by the Board found the employee physically qualified."
The district court refused to enforce the award on its conclusion that there
were no provisions in the agreement between the company and union that
limited what it considered to be the "absolute right of the railroad . ..
to remove petitioner from active service whenever ...plaintiff was phy-
sically disqualified from such service."'" The court of appeals, agreeing
with the interpretation of the contract by the district court, affirmed.
Thus, both lower courts in interpreting the contract disagreed with the
Board's decision on the merits." The Supreme Court declared: "Certainly
it cannot be said that the Board's interpretation was wholly baseless and
completely without reason." Thereupon, in a unanimous decision, the
Supreme Court held that the lower courts "went beyond their province
in rejecting the Adjustment Board's interpretation of this railroad collec-
tive bargaining agreement."'" Strikingly similar reasoning had been ex-
pounded earlier in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel &Y Car
Be 373 U.S. 33 (1963); In an earlier case, Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen, 290 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1961), the Supreme Court denied cert., 368 U.S. 873
(1961), after lower courts enjoined a strike called by the union to gain compliance with the Board
award.
87353 U.S. at 40.
88 373 U.S. at 42.
"382 U.S. 257 (1965).
90Id. at 258-59.
9'Id. at 260; 198 F. Supp. 402 (S.D. Cal. 1961); 192 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Cal. 1961). The third
opinion written by the court is not reported.
9'382 U.S. at 260; 336 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1964).
93382 U.S. at 261.
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Corp., where it was said that "The refusal of courts to review the merits
of an arbitrary award is the proper approach .... , In disagreeing with
the courts below that the Board went beyond its jurisdiction in appoint-
ing the medical committee, the Supreme Court in Gunther said: "The Ad-
justment Board, of course, is not limited to common law rules of evidence
in obtaining information .... This Court has said that the Railway Labor
Act's provisions dealing with the Adjustment Board were to be consid-
ered as compulsory arbitration in this limited field."" The Court com-
mented that it has emphasized many times the intent of Congress that Ad-
justment Board decisions in minor disputes were to be final-quoting the
provision of Section 3, First (m) of the RLA that adjustment board
awards "shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except
insofar as they shall contain a money award.""
In May, 1966, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to reaffirm its
decision in Gunther. It did so by granting a writ of certiorari in the case of
Hanson v. Chesapeake Eg Ohio Ry. Co.,' then vacating the judgment of
the court of appeals"a and remanding it to the court for reconsideration in
light of its decision in Gunther. That case involved an award by the
NRAB in favor of the employees saying that the railroad, when it trans-
ferred work from one seniority district to another without consulting the
union, violated the collective bargaining agreement. The transfers re-
sulted in an increase of new positions in one district and an abolishment
of positions in another. The agreement contained a provision that estab-
lished seniority districts should not be changed without mutual agreement
between union and management. On remand, the court of appeals held
that the NRAB was justified in its determination, and that the Board's in-
terpretation of the contract involved was not "wholly baseless and com-
pletely without reason.""
Up to this point, we have seen examples of the lack of authority in the
courts to review a nonmonetary award by the Board. But, what about a
monetary award? At the time of Gunther there existed an exception to
94 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Enterprise concerned the interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement by an arbitrator who had been provided for in the contract as authorized under the
NLRA. The Court in Enterprise said: "An arbitrator is confined to interpretation and applica-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial
justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only
so long as it draws its essence from the collective bagraining agreement. When the arbitrator's
words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement
of the award." 363 U.S. at 597. Though expressed differently, a comparison between the above
quote and the "wholly baseless and completely without reason" language in Gunther reveals that
the substantive affect could most likely be the same.
Another significant point made in the Enterprise decision was that it is the award that is
binding and not the arbitrator's analysis of it. Thus the Court remarked it was not sufficient
reason to refuse enforcement of an award merely because the accompanying opinion was slightly
ambiguous. 363 U.S. at 398.
95 382 U.S. at 262; The Court cited its decision in Chicago River, 353 U.S. 30 (1959); see
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960),
especially at 581-82 where the Court said: "The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined
to the express provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law-the practices of the
industry and the shop-is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not
expressed in it."
98 382 U.S. at 263; amended in 1966, discussed infra.
97 384 U.S. 211 (1966).
9351 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1965)..
99367 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1966).
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Section 3, First (m) of the RLA that Board awards were to be final and
binding "except insofar as they shall contain a money award."" ° Recogniz-
ing this, the Supreme Court said this exception still does not allow a fed-
eral district court to review a Board's determination of the merits "mere-
ly because a part of the Board's award, growing from its determination
on the merits, is a money award."' However, the Court also said that the
district court under the RLA had the authority to "determine the size of
the money award."'' The Supreme Court in Locomotive Eng'rs. v. Louis-
ville &q Nashville R. R. stated that in effect Congress has "decreed a two-
step grievance procedure for money awards, with the first step, the Adjust-
ment Board order and findings, serving as the foundation for the sec-
ond.".... In addition, the Court discussed the distinction between court re-
view of the merits of a dispute and the size of a money award. It said that
the computation of a time-lost award is "an issue wholly separable from
the merits of the wrongful discharge issue."'0 4
However, in 1966 Congress passed an amendment to the Railway Labor
Act that directly affects what the Court called a "two-step grievance pro-
cedure."'' 1 The sections amended had been the subject of several legal ar-
ticles' plus a vigorous dissent in Locomotive Eng'rs. v. Louisville & Nash-
ville R. R."' Prior to the 1966 amendments, Section 3, First (m) of the
RLA made awards of the NRAB final and binding to the dispute "except
insofar as they shall contain a money award.""0.. Yet, Section 3, First (p)
virtually enabled the adverse party to secure a trial de novo by resisting
a petitioner's suit for enforcement of the award. Before 1966, subsection
(p) stated that when a carrier refuses to comply with an award, that the
union could then request enforcement in a federal court, wherein, the
Board's award was to serve as prima facie evidence for the union.' Con-
sequently, even though federal jurisdiction was clearly established, this
subsection also allowed a much broader scope of review than would have
otherwise been available, and, therefore, would have undercut the finality
provided by subsection (m) to NRAB awards."'0
In light of the above and other reasons, Congress was prompted to make
several changes to the Railway Labor Act."' Pertinent to our topic were
the following that, in effect, further limited the scope of judicial review
of awards: (1) Section 3, First (m) was amended by deleting the words
"except insofar as they shall contain a money award.""2.. (2) Section 3,
I RLA § 3 First (m), 44 Stat. 578, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m) (1964).
'o' 382 U.S. at 264.
102 Id.
13 373 U.S. at 41.
104 1d. at 40-41.
'o 373 U.S. at 41.
100See Kroner, supra note 14, esp. at 67-71; also, Federal Enforcement, supra note 3, esp. at
809-11; and MUELLER AND MEYERS supra note 16 at 654-62.
'o' 373 U.S. at 42-48.
1O RLA 5 3 First (m), 44 Stat. $78, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m) (1964).
'0"Id. at 5 (p).
" 0 Federal Enforcement, supra note 3 at 810.
". Act of June 20, 1966 Pub. L. No. 89-456, 80 Stat. 208; for additional reasons for amend-
ments see notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
"' Id. at S 2(a).
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First (p) was changed to read "the findings and order of the division of
the Adjustment Board shall be conclusive on the parties .... .".3 (3) An-
other sentence was inserted at the end of subsection (p) which reads,
"Provided however, That such order may not be set aside except for failure
of the division to comply with the requirements of this Act, for failure of
the order to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the scope of the
division's jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption by a member of the di-
vision making the order. 1 . (4) A new paragraph, (q), was added to
Section 3, First, providing any aggrieved party the right to petition a dis-
trict court for review of an Adjustment Board decision, and further pro-
viding that, "On such review, the findings and order of the division shall
be conclusive on the parties, except that the order of the division may be
set aside, in whole or in part, or remanded to the division, for failure of
the order to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the scope of the
division's jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption by a member of the divi-
sion making the order.""11
A cursory review of the Public Law 89-456 reveals that it allows for the
establishment of special boards in settling disputes in the railroad indus-
try and judicial review of board orders relating to minor disputes would
be available to both parties but "limited to the determination of questions
traditionally involved in arbitration legislation-whether the tribunal had
jurisdiction of the subject, whether the statutory requirements were com-
plied with, and whether there was fraud or corruption on the part of a
member of the tribunal."1
The primary reasons for the amendment were summarized in Senate
Report No. 1201, 2 June 1966.11" One purpose was to eliminate the large
backlog of undecided claims pending before the National Railroad Ad-
justment Board, inasmuch as under the then existing procedures "railroad
employees who have grievances sometimes have to wait as long as 10 years
or more before a decision is finally rendered on their claim.."1 . Another
reason was the fact that even though an employee had obtained an award,
the carrier concerned could refuse to pay. As a result, the employee was
either forced to forego the award or invoke judicial proceedings where he
would be required to try his case again and face the normal delays and
uncertainties associated with litigation. "9 In addition, the provisions of
Section 3, First (m) and (p)1' resulted in an "incongruous situation that
if an employee receives an award in his favor from the Board, the Railroad
affected may obtain judicial review of that award by declining to comply
with it. If, however, an employee fails to receive an award in his favor,
"' Id. at § 2 (c); Previously, the findings and orders, instead of being conclusive were
"prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
4 1d. at S 2(d).
1d. at 5 2(e).
116 U. S. Cong. &5 Admin. News, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2285 (1966).
1d. at 2289.
8 Id. at 2286.
119 Id.
"O RLA § 3 First (m) & (p), 44 Stat. 578, 45 U.S.C. S 153(m) & (p) (1964). The sub-
section (p) provision had allowed for court enforcement of awards rendered in favor of em-
ployees.
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there is no means by which judicial review might be obtained..... This was
considered unfair to employees; therefore, an equal opportunity for ju-
dicial review was provided. Additionally, because the NRAB is referred to
by the courts as an arbitration tribunal, the grounds for review "should
be limited to those grounds commonly provided for review of arbitration
awards.' 2. Finally, it was assumed that a federal court would have the
"power to decline to enforce an award which was actually and indisputed-
ly without foundation in reason or fact, and the committee intends that,
under this bill, the courts will have that power.""'
One of the first decisions relying on the recent 1966 amendments was
in Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
R. R."' The suit was for the enforcement of a NRAB money award. The
court of appeals held that in light of the 1966 amendment limiting review
of Board awards to matters "within scope of jurisdiction of board's divi-
sion, defenses other than jurisdictional are not subject to judicial review,
that board's determination of amount of award was final absent jurisdic-
tional defect, and that measure of damages offered no jurisdictional ques-
tion.""' Another suit subsequent to the 1966 changes in the RLA was
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association, Itn'l." This action
was brought to enforce an arbitration award reinstating two pilots. The
basic issue presented on appeal was whether the trial court erred in deny-
ing the company a trial de novo. After reviewing the 1966 amendments
the court of appeals held that Northwest Airlines was not entitled to a
de novo review of the Board's decision, and, moreover, the award was not
"arbitrary nor capricious."" The court cited Gunther" as to the finality
of Adjustment Board awards, except for money awards that had allowed
courts the opportunity to consider new evidence. The court in Northwest
Airlines, Inc., then went on to say that a primary aim of the 1966 amend-
ments to the statute relating to the effect of awards of system boards is to
attach finality to the money award as well as to other parts of the award."'
The court in Keay v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,"m held that where a system
board merely determines an employee was physically disabled but did not
also require that the carrier pay damages, the courts were without juris-
diction to require the carrier to make payments. 2 ' The question of whether
the statute of limitations provision contained in Section 3, First (r) was
applicable to airline system boards concerned the court in Gordon v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc."' which held that it was applicable to similar dis-
12' U.S. Cong e Admin. News, supra note 115 at 2287.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124370 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1966).
125Id. at 833; at 834 the Court cites Gunther, 382 U.S. 257 (1964), as to additional review
authority before 1966 amendments.
26 373 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1967).
121Id. at 142.
12"382 U.S. at 141; also the Court quoted from Central, 372 U.S. at 694, "that the federal
law would look with favor upon contractual provisions affording some degree of finality to
system board awards."
"9 373 F.2d at 141.
'0267 F. Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 1967).
"'I d. at 78, citing Central, 372 U.S. 682, and Slocum, 339 U.S. 239.
1"2268 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Va. 1967).
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putes in the airline industry. Even if it did not, the grievant in Gordon
was not much beter off since his grievance had been turned down by the
system board. 3'
C. Other Review Considerations
In late 1966, the Supreme Court pondered the problem of what duty
an adjustment board has in settling the "entire dispute." In Transporta-
tion-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pacific R. R.," the tele-
graphers' union complained to the railroad adjustment board that the com-
pany had assigned certain jobs, created by automation, to the clerks'
union, rather than the telegraphers as required by their agreement. Auto-
mation actually had combined two functions, one previously performed
by the clerks, and the other by the telegraphers. Given notice of the pro-
ceeding, the clerks' union declined to participate, but expressed their read-
iness to file a similar proceeding if required to protect its members' jobs.
The Board decided that the telegraphers were entitled to the jobs, without
considering the contract between the railroad and the clerks' union, and
directed the company to pay them. Suit was filed by the telegraphers in
the federal district court to enforce the award. On the ground that the
clerks' union was an indispensable party, the district court dismissed,"
and, the court of appeals affirmed." The Supreme Court in a seven-to-two
decision held that the adjustment board "must exercise its exclusive juris-
diction" in a single proceeding in deciding a dispute over job assignments.
Both interested unions should be present, unless one defaults, and consid-
eration has to be given to the collective bargaining agreements of both
unions in order to settle the "entire dispute....7
The Court in Transportation-Communication rejected the contention
that it was appropriate for the adjustment board to consider only one
union's contract with the employer in a dispute over work assignments,
saying: "A collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract for
the purchase of goods and services, nor is it governed by the same old
common-law concepts which control such private contracts ... ." In
order to interpret such an agreement it is necessary to consider the scope of
other related collective bargaining agreements, as well as the practice,
usage and custom pertaining to all such agreements. This is particularly
true when the agreement is resorted to for the purpose of settling a juris-
dictional dispute over work assignments."1"' The main thrust of the dis-
133 1d. at 213; court cited Woolery v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.2d 86, 90 (1957).
134385 U.S. 157 (1966).
13231 F. Supp. 33 (D. Colo. 1965).
136349 F.2d 408 (10th Cir. 1965).
137 385 U.S. at 160 and 164-66.
13
.d, at 160; the court also quoted from John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550
(1964), which in turn had quoted from United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav.
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-579 (1960):
[I]t is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot
wholly anticipate. . . . The collective agreement covers the whole employment rela-
tionship. It calls into being a new common law-the common law of a particular
industry or of a particular plant.
139385 U.S. at 161; cf. Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946); also, Slocum
v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239 (1950); Court also in note at 167 refers to the 1966
amendment empowering district courts to remand proceedings to the Board. See Public Law 89-456,
Sec. 2 (e).
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sent was directed at the power of an adjustment board to convert a dis-
pute, between one union and a railroad, into a proceeding involving more
parties in order to "settle the entire dispute," saying, that the statute does
not "require or empower" the Boards to do it.'"
In connection with a discussion on the duty of an adjustment board to
resolve the "entire dispute," it should be noted that Section 3, First (j) of
the RLA,"4' requires that the adjustment board "give due notice of all hear-
ings to the employee or employees and the carrier or carriers involved in
any disputes submitted to them." '42 Also, the Supreme Court in 19 5 6 denied
certiorari in a case where the court of appeals refused to enforce a board's
award for not giving notice to an indispensable party.43 The Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decided in May, 1967, that they could not properly
perform their limited function of review of a board's order, directing
a company to compensate affected members of a union for work they
might have done, without a clear record as to "whether the Board con-
sidered the contract of a competing union."'" The appeals court liberally
quoted and referred to the decision in Transportation-Communication. On
13 November 1967 the Supreme Court refused to grant a writ of cer-
tiorari in the Fourth Circuit case." Actually, there were two separate dis-
putes. One involved the company contracting out work normally per-
formed by men of the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen or by men of an
electrical union-both contracts indicating that either of the two unions
could do the kind of work involved. The company contended that the
particular work needed to be accomplished within a short period of time
and that neither union was available. Only the signalmens' union com-
plained to the NRAB, who in turn, held that the company violated its
contract with the signalmen. It did not appear that the electrical union
had been notified of the proceeding.'" The other dispute was the result of
the railroad assigning maintenance of a newly installed electrical system to
men of another union, other than Signalmens'. Even though the signalmen
normally did that type of work, the company contended that it really was
a different system from that referred to in the Signalmens' agreement.
Also, since it was installed entirely within the repair shop area, it fell with-
in the "Scope Rule" of the Shop Crafts Agreement. 47 The union of shop
craft employees had been notified of the complaint, but decided not to ap-
pear. Thereupon, the Board decided the shop craft union was not a neces-
sary party, and again, held for the signalmen.4 ' Consequently, the court of
appeals concluded that since the record had only a scant reference to a com-
140 385 U.S. at 169.
141 RLA § 3 First (j), 44 Stat. 578, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (j) (1964).
14 Id.
1. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. New Orleans, T. & M. R. Co., 229 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.).
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 997 (1956).
144Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen v. Southern Ry. Co., 380 F.2d 59, 65 (4th Cir. 1967).
'See 389 U.S. 958 (1967); Three judges would grant certiorari based on the dissent in
Transportation-Communication, 358 U.S. 157 (1966).
146 380 F.2d at 62.
147 Id.
1491d. at 63-64; in note 3 of that case it was pointed out that the shopcraft employees re-
served a right to institute separate proceedings if the Board's decision was adverse to them.
For a discussion of this practice see Transportation-Communication, 385 U.S. at 1 59, n. 2.
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peting union, and none at all to its contract, then sufficient basis to settle
the "entire dispute" did not exist. In addition, the Supreme Court's view
in Transportation-Communication was illustrated as having made known
that a union's failure to complain will not be deemed sufficient reason for
ignoring its contract.49
If advocates for liberal judicial review of adjustment board awards
thought they could at least have the protection or defense of estoppel, then
they probably became dejected after the decision in Hodges v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. R. This was an action by a discharged employee and his
union against the railroad to enforce an adjustment board award. But,
before going to the adjustment board, the employee had instituted a
suit in state court under the Federal Employer's Liability Act alleging total
and permanent disability resulting from an injury caused by the com-
pany's negligence. A favorable verdict was rendered, and the railroad paid
the judgment. Four months after the above verdict, the company removed
the employee's name from the seniority list, advising him that since he
had established his inability to carry out his duties, the railroad had no
more employment obligation to him. Later, a doctor's report was submit-
ted to the railroad stating that the employee was now capable of working.
After receiving no subsequent satisfaction from the company, a claim for
reinstatement was presented to the NRAB based on the contention that
the railroad violated its contract with the union by not allowing the em-
ployee to come back to work. The railroad contended that by the em-
ployee's allegations at the trial, of his being totally and permanently dis-
abled, he was estopped to have his union bring this claim. The Board
found that the employee was wrongfully withheld from service and di-
rected that he should be examined by three doctors. After determining
that he was able to return to work, the Board ordered reinstatement with
back pay from a certain date.'' The district court granted the railroad's
motion for summary judgment.' The court of appeals, recognizing that
the question of estoppel did not appear in Gunther,""3 nevertheless, con-
cluded that the similarities and rationale of Gunther, along with its hold-
ings, disposed of the present issues. The Board, having found that the
railroad violated a pertinent part of the collective bargaining, i.e., that "a
trainman will not be discharged without an investigation,' ' " thus favored
the employee with an award. Consequently, the court of appeals held that
Gunther prohibits any determination on the part of the disability issue,
and also, "precludes the analogous estoppel argument.''. The court also
stated that the "Award of the NRAB must stand as the result of 'compul-
149 380 F.2d at 65; see recent district court case allowing company to amend answer in an
action to enforce an order of the Railroad Adjustment Board in light of the decision in
Transportation-Communication, System Federation No. 152, Ry. Employees v. Pennsylvania R.R.
Co., 272 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
'50363 F.2d 534 (sth Cir. 1966); cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
'ld. at 35-36.
15Id. at 537; 238 F. Supp. 42 5 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
153382 U.S. 257 (1965).
154 363 F.2d at 538.
155 Id.
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sory arbitration in this limited field,' and it must be enforced.""" It is sub-
mitted that the 1966 amendments to the RLA passed about three weeks
prior to the decision in Hodges, would further support the result and
might have influenced the Supreme Court in denying certiorari."'
The RLA sets forth in Section 3, First (i)"15 that an aggrieved employee
"may" take his claim to the appropriate adjustment board. The use of the
word "may" instead of "shall" might possibly imply that the employee
may take his claim to court. It had been considered by many that the
availability of this forum was exceedingly remote because of the doctrines
of "primary jurisdiction" and "exhaustion of administrative remedies,"
administrative procedures to be followed being found in the collective
bargaining agreement. " ' However, the December, 1966 decision in Walker
v. Southern Ry. Co.'" has tended to obscure the effect of these doctrines.
Walker dealt with a suit brought in state court by an employee against
the railroad for damages, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of the
collective bargaining agreement. After the action was removed to the
federal district court the company questioned the district court's jurisdic-
tion. The district court overruled the jurisdictional challenge and found
for the employee.' 1 The court of appeals, by reason of the decision in
Maddox, reversed." 2 A majority of six on the Supreme Court, relying on
the 1941 decision in Moore v. Illinois Central R. R.,0" decided that
employees had alternative methods of pursuing such claims. They could
utilize the administrative procedures set forth in the company-union con-
tract, including the right of review before an adjustment board. Or, "if he
accepts his discharge as final, [he] may bring an action at law in an ap-
propriate state court for money damages if the state courts recognize such
a claim."' ' As a result, the employee was held not barred by his failure
to pursue the available administrative remedies."' The majority, in dis-
tinguishing Maddox and Moore, stated that grievance procedures resulting
in binding arbitration under the LMRA, or in Maddox, were voluntary.
Contrawise, under the RLA, arbitration of minor disputes is mandatory.
In addition, following a review of the purposes for the 1966 amendments,
156 Id. at 540; precedents supporting the result in Hodges exist in many workmen compensa-
tion cases. See especially, another of the steelworkers trilogy, United Steelworkers of America v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), where the company refused to arbitrate an employee's
claim by contending the employee was estopped from bringing such a grievance after settling a
workmen's compensation claim. The court announced that the bargaining agreement required
the submission of "all grievances to arbitration, not merely those the Court will deem meritorious."
at 508. In note 6, at $68, the Court quotes an interesting passage from Cox, Current Problem
in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RocKY MT. L. REv. 247, 261 (1958); of interest also
is Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
1,7 See notes 110-122 and accompanying text; Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Denver and
Rio Grande Western R.R., 370 F.2d at 836, underscores this by pointing out that the affirmative
defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel, even before the 1966 amendments, were doubtful
subjects of judicial review---citing Hodges.
ISS RLA S First (i), 44 Stat. 578, 45 U.S.C. S First (i) (1964).
. Tsamoutales, supra note 29 at 52-53; see also notes 68-70 with accompanying text, and,
note 74 with accompanying text.
"0'385 U.S. 196 (1966).
... 237 F. Supp. 278 (W.D.N.C. 1965).
1.354 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1965).
'
03 312 U.S. 630 (1941).
i04 385 U.S. at 196.
115 id. at 199.
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the majority declared: "Of course the new procedures were not available
to petitioner, and his case is governed by Moore, Slocum and Koppal......
This statement may prove significant in similar cases in the future.
In a forceful dissent, the minority asserted that the result in Maddox
overruled the decision in Moore. The dissent explained that even though
at the time of Moore state law was applicable to employment contracts
under the RLA, subsequent decisions have held "labor contracts governed
by the Labor-Management. Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act are
subject to federal substantive law, not state law....7 The minority believed
that the distinction between contractual arbitration under the LMRA and
arbitration compelled by the RLA, indicated even more, the intent of
Congress that adjustment board jurisdiction under the RLA was to be
exclusive."" To support this view, portions of the opinion in both Gunther
and Transportation -Communication were quoted."'
At least two courts of appeal have had an opportunity to reflect upon
the recent decision in Walker. In Pacilio v. Pennsylvania R. R.,"' the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Walker as limiting the rule in
Maddox of requiring the "attempted exhaustion of administrative remedies
prior to the institution of legal proceedings, to cases arising under the La-
bor Management Relations Act of 1947 ... ."' The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Stumo v. United Air Lines, Inc., 75 did not construe
Walker as allowing a discharged employee to pursue a court action for
"damages for wrongful discharge and at the same time seek to maintain
his status as an employee.... Furthermore, it appeared to the court that
the decision in Walker would have been different if the 1966 amend-
ments had been available to the employee."'
The equity powers of a district court, insofar as they exist for the issu-
ance of injunctions based on contract interpretation, seem to have been
sharply limited by the result in Aaxico Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots
56
"1d. at 197-98; Moore, 354 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1965); Slocum, 339 U.S. 239 (1950);
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1963). To this writer the Walker
decision is surprising. The result exhibits an amazing disregard for the development of federal
substantive law as proclaimed in Lincoln Mills and Central. The opinion suggests that the majority
dwelled upon and limited almost entirely their analysis to the procedural question of exhaustion
of remedies. Consequently, inadequate consideration was given to the growth of 'substantive
federal labor law subsequent to the decisions in Moore, Slocum and Transcontinental. Additionally,
the majority seemed to slight the experience and decisions under the NLRA, as demonstrated by
their treatment of Maddox. Also, very little was said to support the decision. The effect of the
distinction raised by the majority between Maddox and Walker, arbitration being voluntary versus
mandatory, appears to be misplaced. As connoted by the minority, if there is any effect of such
a distinction, shouldn't it be the other way around? In a future "Walker" situation it will not
be unexpected to see an outcome more in line with the reasoning of the dissent. To do so, the
court, instead of completely overruling Walker, will probably seize on the opening left by the
majority pertaining to the 1966 amendments.
"7 385 U.S. at 199.
"a 1d. at 201.
'" Id. at 202; The dissent quoted from Gunther, 382 U.S. at 261-62, "This court time and
again has emphasized and re-emphasized that Congress intended minor grievances of railroad
workers to be decided finally by the Railroad Adjustment Board."
"0o381 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1967).
171 Id.
'7 382 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 88. Sup. Ct. 779; The issue involved in this
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Association, Intn'l. 7 A primary issue was whether the agreement be-
tween Aaxico and ALPA had terminated. ALPA contended that it was
still in effect; the airline argued that it was not. The district court,
after finding that the agreement was still in effect, granted the injunctive
relief requested by the Pilots' Association for enforcement of certain rights
under the contract.' However, the court of appeals determined that the
controversy could only be resolved by interpreting the agreement, thus
making it a minor dispute. Consequently, the holding was that the trial
court did not have jurisdiction to determine this dispute of whether the
contract had terminated, since it was in the class that must be submitted
to the grievance procedures where final decision may lie with the system
board of adjustment. The court of appeals did add, though, that the lower
court would have authority to require the company to utilize the grie-
vance procedures if it was found that they were impeding the association's
use of such procedures.' Subsequent to this decision, the Supreme Court
denied a petition for certiorari.' 8 Two years later this case was again at
the court of appeals. This time it was held that the trial court could make
a "preliminary interpretation of the contract in order to determine . ..
whether there has been a waiver or estoppel of rights;" but, finding "no
waiver, abandonment, acquiescence, or estoppel" it must order the dispute
involving the contract submitted to the Board.'
It has been held, in Union Pacific R. R. v. Price,'s that an employee
can not resort to a common law action for wrongful discharge after the
same claim has been rejected on the merits in a proceeding before the ad-
justment board. The decision in that case was based upon the conclusion
that, when revoked, the remedies provided for in Section 3, First were in-
tended by Congress to be the complete and final means for settling minor
disputes.181
The provisions of the RLA have been held valid.' It has also been
held that the Constitutional right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sev-
enth Amendment may be waived, which is the result when parties under
the RLA provide for final determination of minor disputes by a system
'7 331 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964).
78 Id. at 435-36.
1771Id. at 437; Although the requirement for a system board is mandatory, it is possible not
to have a collective bargaining contract. Quaere: What function would a board perform if there
is no contract to interpret?178 See 382 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1967); also, St. Louis, San Francisco and Texas Ry. v. Railroad
Yardmasters of America, 328 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1964).
'79358 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); The System Board, with Harry Platt as the neutral
referee, finally having the opportunity to hear the issues involved in this controversy, incorporated
into one portion of its award some of the language of the Fifth Circuit, 47 Lab. Arb. 289, at 316
(1966); only a few months earlier the Fifth Circuit, although a different panel of judges, delivered
their opinion in United Indus. Workers of Seafarers Int'l. Union v. Board of Trustees of the
Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183 (1965); Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. M-K-T R.R.,
363 U.S. 528 (1960), has said that courts in equity jurisdiction may require some contract
examination and to do whatever is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board,
thus conditions could be imposed.
880360 U.S. 601 (1959); in this case the Court said at 611, n.10, that under the rationale
of Chicago River, a strike against an adjustment board award denying a grievant's money claim
could be enjoined.
181 Id. at 608.
182 See, Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R. Co., 305 U.S. 177 (1938); Washington Terminal Co.
v. Boswell, 124 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1941), aff'd 319 U.S. 732 (1942).
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board. 3 Nevertheless, even though board awards are to be "final and bind-
ing," it is accepted that a court may look at the administrative proceedings
to see if "due process rights have been violated.""..4 Needless to say, in this
area of compulsory arbitration, the courts have "laid down a rather strict
test . .. to apply in making such a limited review."'.. For example, Gun-
ther states that a district court should not set aside a decision of a board
unless it is "wholly baseless and without reason."" And, in Edwards v.
St. Louis-San Francisco R. R.,"7 an employee was denied the right to
collaterally attack the board award, alleging his Constitutional rights were
violated because of less than due process, when the only possible failure of
due process came at the initial hearing stage. At the initial hearing, the
dispute is between private parties, procedurally being governed by the
contract between them."' The court in Edwards also held that an employee
could not complain that a board award was "based on insufficient evidence
or that the Board incorrectly interpreted or wrongfully applied a provision
of a collective bargaining agreement......
IV. CONCLUSION
The ostensible purposes of the Railway Labor Act, promoting the col-
lective bargaining relationships of the parties while at the same time avoid-
ing interruptions of commerce, were bolstered by the outcome in Central.
The Supreme Court expressed the view in Central that federal law gives
life to the collective bargaining contract. Inasmuch as having been decided
sufficiently after Lincoln Mills, wherein it was determined that federal
courts had the responsibility of developing a federal common law of col-
lective bargaining,'" the court had little difficulty in reaching this view-
point or arriving at its decision. Thus, the courts have utilized, once again,
the experience gained under one set of national labor laws td resolve a
question under another."' Furthermore, the fact that Section 204 requires
the parties to agree to a substitute for a national board and is not dis-
cretionary in any sense, makes it a violation of the RLA itself if a substi-
tute is not agreed upon. Consequently, the availability of a tribunal to en-
force system board awards has been clearly established.
On the other hand, authoritative criteria explicitly outlining the extent
judicial review of the award is permitted, is not so definitive. To be sure,
"a' 373 F.2d at 142.
.. Gordon, 268 F. Supp. 210 (1967).
1"5 Id.
'' 382 U.S. at 261.
... 361 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1966).
"' Id. at 947.
189 Id. at 952, cases cited at 953 of that case may be of assistance in determining if some
act of a Board invests a court with jurisdiction to review the award because of denial of due
process.
"'353 U.S. at 456-57.
'1 See, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967), a case arising under the NLRA but relying
in part on Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); and Tunstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944), cases controlled by the RLA; or, the RLA case of
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 347 (1944), where the Court
refers to the applicability of the opinion in J. I. Case v. National Labor Relations Board, 320 U.S.
64 (1944).
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Gunther, Chicago River, Union Pacific, Northwest Airlines, Inc., and the
1966 amendments denote the conclusiveness of a board's award. However,
there are also decisions that allow some degree of review, albeit limited.
Transportation-Communication and M-K-T R. R. are examples where
courts explored the merits of the controversy. And, of course, the decision
in Walker seems to make it possible for some disputes to bypass entirely
the authority of a board. In addition, limited review would be available
to insure that the statutory requirements are obeyed. This includes the
preservation of due process rights and the protection against fraud or
corruption by members of a board.
Nevertheless, the purposes of the Act and the trend of subsequent
amendents supplying additional supremacy to board awards manifests an
unequivocal mandate by Congress that review of board awards be rigid-
ly confined.
John F. Foster*
Mr. Foster, a 1968 degree candidate at Southern Methodist University School of Law, was
awarded a J.D. degree posthumously after his tragic death in the crash of the Braniff airliner on
which he was co-pilot on 3 May 1968. Professor Charles Morris, for whose course this outstanding
paper was prepared, brought it to the attention of the Board of Editors who are pleased to present
it for our readers at this time. A memorial scholarship named for Mr. Foster is being established
at the School of Law.
[Vol. 34
Air Traffic Control: Hidden Danger in the Clear Blue Skies
I. INTRODUCTION
The room [air traffic control center] is dark, there's much chatter back
and forth and supervisors are constantly looking over his [controller] shoulder
giving advice and making 'criticisms. He's working 15 to 25 airplanes in
the sure knowledge that another 15 or 25 are descending on him from out
there someplace.
At least eight of them are novice pilots who will ask for a repeat of
every instruction. One is not where he says he is, another doesn't know
where he is. The controller thinks one is letting down at 500 fpm, but he's
on the step at So fpm, and the guy approaching at 160 knots just cut his
speed to 80 knots to get his gear down. There's a guy low on fuel, one who
turned to two nine zero instead of two one zero, and heaven knows how many
sneaking through not on a flight plan.
As frosting on the frost, a 172 has just told him his max approach speed
is 130 knots and the following DC-8 captain says he can't reduce below 180.
The chances of mistake are ever present; the consequences of mistake are
growing ever more catastrophic.1
Air Traffic Control (ATC) is a highly sophisticated system of terminal
and route control provided by the Federal Government for the avowed
purpose of ensuring safety in the utilization of the nation's airways. There
are presently 21 en route Air Traffic Control Centers scattered about the
United States, but the declared objective is to so centralize the system that
in the near future all pertinent navigational information may be directed
throughout the country from regional complexei. When the en route and
terminal systems are completed there will be an interconnected nation-
wide system, the first phase of which should be operational in the early
1970's. By the late f970's, the system should be automated to the extent
that an aircraft entering a terminal area will be electronically interrogated,
positioned by priority and automatically steered into the approach pattern.
The use of such integrated equipment will permit the optimum degree
of spacing and speed, utilizing the system to its full extent relatively
independent of sophisticated inplane instrumentation.!
Although such attempts are presently being made by the Federal Gov-
ernment to ensure the realization of an adequate system for the future,
the control of aircraft remains as one of the paramount problems which
has historically confronted aviation planners. There are those who would
suggest that present and even future, plans are inadequate. In 1966 a re-
spected authority predicted, "The nation's vital airport system is headed
for a breakdown. of catastrophic proportions." How is it possible that
' FLYING, Jan. 1968, at J-4.
2International Air Transport Association, IATA in the 1970s: A Symposium on the Future of
World Air Transport (Dec. 1967).
3 AMERICAN AVIATION, Aug. 1966, at 18.
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this could be said of an industry in which, in 1966, the scheduled airline
segment carried 109,387,000 passengers 79,889,245,000 miles at a net
profit of $427,572,000? 4
Air safety is a term which has been applied to the myriad problems of
aviation's tremendous growth in a limiting environment. Although many
of its manifested aspects have long been most familiar to those intimately
associated with aviation, the term now finds itself on the lips of increasing
numbers. In the summer of 1967 air traffic control and air safety first
began to gain wide-spread public attention when, only a few days after
82 persons were killed in a mid-air collision between a Piedmont Airlines
727 and a Cessna 310 under ATC guidance, the House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee held lengthy public hearings on the question
of safety in the operation of the nation's airways. It is now apparent that
there is some question as to whether the present rate of supporting facility
development has the capacity to keep from being outdistanced by the
growth of private and commercial aviation.
While the concept of air safety encompasses such vitally important areas
as airport planning and financing, ground transportation and aircraft
systems development, at the very center of the controversy exists the most
troublesome problem: Air Traffic Control. Because of the vastness of the
larger and more general question of air safety, it is necessary to restrict
the scope of this study to the effect of ATC on the system as a whole.
In the early 1930's, when serious commercial aviation began, airlines
recognized the problem which continues to plague ATC today. Because
all airlines desired to utilize the best routing schedules, they found that
their flights were arriving at airports at the same times, creating the prob-
lem of air control and the serious possibility of mid-air collision. Although
many terminals were equipped with towers, no adequate form of area con-
trol or coordination was present. In an attempt to alleviate frustrating
conditions, several carriers (American, Eastern, TWA, and United) form-
ed a corporation aptly named Air Traffic Control, Inc. After selecting con-
trollers from dispatchers, radio operators and copilots, each participating
carrier secured $60,000 of insurance and the first ATC system went into
operation. In 1936, the Government acquired the private corporation and
placed it under the control of the Department of Commerce, along with
other regulatory aspects of aviation. ATC did not function adequately
under the aegis of the Department of Commerce for the same reasons
that aviation, generally, found its growth stagnated: lack of organiza-
tional leadership and insufficient funds.
The potential problems inherent in ATC first aroused concern when
in 1956 two airliners collided in mid-air over the Grand Canyon while
under ATC guidance. Ensuing Congressional hearings resulted in the crea-
tion of the Airways Modernization Board; and shortly thereafter the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958 removed aviation and ATC from the "basement"
of the Department of Commerce and established them in an independent
'Air Transport Association of America, Air Transport Facts & Figures (1967).
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agency (FAA).
ATC as originally conceived provided assistance only during periods of
inclement or marginal weather; but demand for the service grew in direct
proportion to the tremendous growth of aviation. Today the greatest
"inadequacy" of the system is its seeming inability to handle safely the
increasing demands on its service. Reflective of this increasing demand is
the growing investment which is annually made by the airline industry
in new equipment. That investment has risen from $3 billion in 1960 to
nearly $9 billion by 1966. Committed orders will increase this figure to
$13 billion by 1970.' Perhaps most indicative of the present and future
growth of the industry's reliance upon ATC is the increasing flow of
IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) traffic. Last year, IFR traffic reached
approximately 14 million operations; FAA forecasts a figure of 22 million
by 1971, increasing to 31 million by 1977. But the most troublesome
problem represented by these figures is that while commercial aviation
makes a general practice of using IFR, regardless of weather conditions,
particularly in mixed-traffic or high density areas, general aviation, the
fastest growing segment of the industry, does not. A Senate Committee has
recommended, "General aviation must get prepared to follow the airline
practice. The areas in which wandering aircraft can be tolerated are dis-
appearing. '"
Closely akin to IFR-related problems is Positive Air Control, the con-
trol of those areas from which uncontrolled aircraft are restricted. With
the increased use of jet aircraft, particularly in high density areas, the use
of the old "see-and-avoid" procedures alone for collision avoidance is
unrealistic. Positive Air Control is presently provided by the FAA between
24,000 feet and 60,000 feet over all of the contiguous 48 states. Stuart
G. Tipton, President, Air Transport Association of America (ATA), has
offered certain recommendations for the extension of this service into
areas previously not served.
a. Positive control service be extended down to and including 18,000 feet
over the entire 48 contiguous states by January, 1968.
b. Positive control service be extended further by lowering it to 10,000
feet within the "Golden Triangle" area (New York, Washington and Chi-
cago) by January, 1969.
c. Positive control service be lowered down to and including 10,000 feet
along the West Coast between San Francisco and Los Angeles (to encompass
all routes used by traffic operating. between these two cities) by January,
1970.
d. Positive control service be extended from 10,000 feet down to the ground
in certain critical high density terminals. Terminals which should receive
initial consideration are New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, the San Francisco
Bay Area and Washington, D.C. Action to obtain positive control service
should be started immediately with implementation" dates no later than July,
1970.8
5Hearings on H.R. 11456 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on APPropriations,
90th Cong., lat Sess., at 652 (1968).6 Id.
7 id. at 658.
a id.
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The need to expand positive air control has been recognized for many
years. As early as 1952 it was recommended that:
10. Maintain positive air traffic control. Certain air traffic control zones in
areas of high air traffic density should be made the subject of special regula-
tions to insure that all aircraft within the zone are under positive air traffic
control at all times regardless of weather.'
While similar recommendations have continually been made for the inter-
vening fifteen years, some continue to oppose extension of the present
positive air control system, and their arguments are often of considerable
merit. Representing the interests of general aviation, Frank K. Smith,
Executive Director, National Aviation Trade Association (NATA), re-
cently commented on ATA's new recommendations regarding positive
air control.
I do not know of anyone in representing general aviation who is not inter-
ested in solving the problem [safety] in a spirit of cooperation with the air-
lines and airline pilots. It is most difficult for us to create this atmosphere
when we are faced with demands by ATA/ALPA that controlled VFR be
eliminated, that VFR minimums be raised to 1500 feet and five miles, that
positive control be lowered to 10,000 feet in all parts of the country and
down to the ground in terminal areas, particularly when "positive control"
includes the requirement for an instrument rating and transponder equip-
ped aircraft. We believe that such requirements and recommendations are
impractical, unfeasible and, in many areas, technically impossible."0
The economic contribution made by general aviation to the industry can-
not be denied but, as it continues to be the fastest growing arm of -the
industry, it must be recognized that the problems it has brought to the
forefront are some of the most serious."
Certain inadequacies in today's ATC system have manifested themselves
due to the increased demands made of it. Often, the practical result of
the inadequacies or fallibility of the system has been liability. Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co.,'2 established early that the Government
is responsible for the negligent acts or ommissions of its tower controller
employees, as provided by the Federal Tort Claims Act. It is the purpose
'D. BILLYOU, AIR LAw 43 (2d ed. 1964).
'AIRLINE MANAGEMENT & MARKETING, Dec. 1967, at 13.
"1 FLYING, Jan. 1968, at J-10.
The system is from the World War II era. It's based on 1945 ideas, technology and
hardware. But here's what's happened over the years:
Air carrier growth is the smaller part of it. In 1945 there were 37,358 general
aviation aircraft; today more than 100,000.
In 1946 the number of miles flown by general aviation was 874,740,000; by 1965
that had increased to 2,562,380,000.
But we ain't seen nothing yet. According to FAA forecasters . . . the number
of general aviation aircraft will grow to 180,000 in the next ten years.
To put all these numbers in meaningful perspective, in the five years from 1962
to 1967 general aviation flying increased 40 percent causing a 75 percent increase
in ATC workloads. If this trend continues, by 1977 the pressure on ATC will be
450 percent greater than it is today.
t2221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 911 (1957).
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of this study to investigate the growing liability of the Government, as a
result of its ATC operations.
II. DEFENSES GENERALLY
The courts of the United States have, as the volume of ATC operations
has increased, enunciated certain rules which have served to increase Gov-
ernmental liability as a result of the actions of tower operators. Such de-
fenses include the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act," the defenses of no duty, misrepresentation, primary respon-
sibility of the pilot, and finally a defense on the facts."'
The Federal Tort Claims Act does provide an exception to Government
liability whenr an employee performs at a discretionary level, but air
traffic controllers handle operational details; therefore, the Government
is liable for their negligence. That this bald statement is the law was de-
cided in Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co.," and this decision stands
fast despite subsequent Government efforts to overturn it.
When an accident occurs where the controller has performed his func-
tions in the manner set out in the Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual"
or when an accident occurs because the controller did nothing and the
Manual was silent on the point, the standard complaint is failure to warn,
and the standard defense is no duty. For example, in United States v.
Weiner' the Government contended that tower personnel were under no
legal duty to warn or inform a United Airlines aircraft of the hazards
created by Air Force navigation maneuvers along the carrier's intended
flight path. The same defense was urged in Ingbam v. United States8
where the Government contended that the tower personnel had no duty
to report weather changes to aircraft within the control zone and traffic
pattern.
The defense of no duty has not been accepted by the courts and under-
standably so in light of the well-known "Good Samaritan" doctrine of
tort law. The doctrine was held to apply to the Government in Fair v.
United States9 where it was stated, "[I]f the Government undertakes to
perform certain acts or functions thus engendering reliance thereon, it must
perform them with due care; that obligation of due care extends to the
public and the individuals who compose it .... "
In both Weiner and Ingham the Government, in raising the defense of
no duty, was met with the "Good Samaritan" doctrine. In Weiner the
Government went on to contend that not only was there no duty but
that there was no undertaking upon which to predicate application of the
"Good Samaritan" rule. The Weiner court agreed that there was no under-
1562 Stat. 984 (1946), 28 U.S.C. S 2680 (a) (1964).
'" The present viability of these several defenses will be subsequently considered in the detailed
treatment of mid-air, weather and turbulent air-related crash cases.
"* Supra note 12.
"e Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual (12 Nov. 1964).
"335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), Petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
1s373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3190 (U.S. 7 Nov. 1967).
'9234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956).
"
0 Id. at 294.
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taking such as in earlier cases where the doctrine had been applied to the
Government,"' but went on to state:
We cannot accept the government's assertion that the CAA deliberately
adopted the policy of refusing to give out information concerning known
hazards likely to be encountered by commercial passenger flights in order
not to dilute Air Traffic Rules requiring pilot vigilance during flight in
VFR conditions. We are directed to no evidence which even suggests that
the CAA operated under such a policy and we do not agree that the rule
requiring pilot vigilance "logically and necessarily negated and precluded
any and all alternative rules, practices or customs for the reason that, any
such alternative would detract from the effectiveness of the rule."
22
In the Ingham case, the Government claimed that since its initial de-
cision to provide weather information was a gratuitous one, it was not
liable for the negligent providing of such information. This argument was
not accepted by the Ingham court which replied:
Assuming, arguendo, that in the absence of FAA regulations approach
controllers would not have to advise incoming aircraft of weather conditions,
the decision to provide such information would lead carriers and their pilots
normally to rely on the government's performance of this service."
Closely allied to the defense of no duty is that of "primary responsibility
of the pilot." The Government typically contends that, even if it has some
duty, ATC only gives "suggestions" and, therefore, the primary control
of the aircraft is with the pilot. This argument has been raised in cases
involving mid-air collisions, wake turbulence, and accidents caused by
weather-wherever the pilot was in a position to make any decision about
the operation of his aircraft.
The courts originally accepted this defense. In Smerdon v. United
States,2 the pilot, having been told by the tower that he could not be
given a ground controlled approach, professed ability to see the airport
from his position and requested clearance for a VFR landing. The tower
granted the clearance and the plane crashed. 'The plaintiff charged the
tower operator with a breach of his duty to provide advice and informa-
tion for a safe landing. Absolving the controller of negligence because the
pilot had been warned of weather conditions, the court enunciated a gen-
eral principle that Controllers' duties are limited to maintaining control
of the airways to prevent collisions between aircraft within the control
area and to prevent danger arising from obstacles on the movement area.'
In cases where the pilots were flying under VFR conditions, the courts
have been receptive to the Government's argument that at the time of an
accident the pilot was primarily responsible for his plane and, therefore,
the tower should be absolved of liability. A case involving the primary
21 See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 3 5$0 U.S. 61 (195 5); United States v. Rayonier,
Inc., 352 U.S. 315 (1957); Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951);
United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1962).
25335 F.2d at 397.
23373 F.2d at 236.
24 135 F. Supp. 929 (D. Mass. 1955).
251d. at 932.
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responsibility argument in a VFR situation is Tilley v. United States."
The plaintiff-passenger brought an action against the United States for
injuries sustained when a Delta aircraft came to a sudden and jolting
stop when the pilot attempted to immediately clear the runway. The
Delta pilot had been given clearance by the local controller to proceed
into take off position on the runway in question, at which time he ob-
served a Sabina jet in the process of landing on the same runway and an
Air France 707 on final. The Delta pilot, having been directed into take
off position, could no longer see Air France continuing its final approach.
The Sabina jet continued its roll down the runway but did not exit from
the runway at eitherof the first three available taxiway turnoffs. As a re-
sult, the spacing between the Delta and Air France aircraft was then
rapidly decreasing. A local controller, with a tone of emergency in his
voice, directed Delta to immediately clear the runway to the left. In his
attempt to do so, the Delta pilot ran the nosewheel of his plane off the
runway causing the plaintiff's injuries. At all pertinent times the Sabina,
the Air France, and the Delta aircraft were under the "control" of the
tower.
The trial court entered judgment against the United States in accord-
ance with its finding that the acts of the 'ontroller amounted to negligent
performance of his duties in light of the following regulations which
were in effect on the date of the accident:
[Civil Air Regulations] Section 60.190-No person shall operate an air-
craft contrary to AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS in areas
where AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL is exercised.
[ATC Procedure Manual] Section 419.3-Because of possible restrictions
to the pilot's field of vision while taxiing aircraft, AIR TRAFFIC :CON-
TROLLERS shall be alert to provide. information which, in theiiKjudgment,
will assist the pilot in taxiing.
[ATC Procedures Manual] Section 421. 1-Separation shall be effecied by
establishing the sequence of arriving and departing aircraft and advising the,
pilot thereof to make such adjustments in flight or ground operations as are
necessary to accomplish the desired spacing between aircraft.'..
The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment against the United States in
light of case decisions to the effect that a pilot has primary responsibility
for the control of his aircraft and Section 91.3 (a) of the Civil Air Regula-
tions," which describes the duties of a pilot in command of the aircraft
and invests him with final authority as to operation of the same. The court
determined that the plaintiff's injury was not attributable to anj negli-
gence of the controller or to any breach of a duty owed by the Govern-
26 375 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1967).
2'The section which was previously 60.190 is now S 91.75(b) and now reads: Except in an
emergency, no person may, in an area 'where air traffic control is exercised, operate an aircraft
contrary to an ATC instruction.
ATC Procedures Manual S 419.3 is presently an unused section of the Manual.
ATC Procedures Manual § 421.1 now reads: Separate a departing aircraft from other aircraft
using the same runway by ensuring that it does ,not begin take-off run until one of the following
conditions exists * * *
s The section quoted in the opinion, 60.2, is now § 91.3 (a) and reads: The pilot in command
of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that
aircraft.
1968 ]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ment to the plaintiff."' The implication of the court's decision is apparently
that Section 91.3 (a) overrides the regulations relied upon by the district
court.
The "primary responsibility" defense has, however, been unsuccessful
in some cases. One court conceded that the pilot has a high duty of care,
but then noted that a reciprocal duty devolves upon other persons, such as
the controllers of the Traffic Control Center. "Negligence of two or more
persons may concur in causing an accident, and in that event each is
liable for the result."3
A district court opinion in Hocbrein v. United States31 treated the
"primary responsibility" defense as one that only arises, after the controller
has wholly fulfilled his duty to warn. In a mid-air collision case, after
agreeing that the deceased pilot was primarily responsible for the safety
of his aircraft even after receiving his clearance to land, the court went on
to hold that, nevertheless, the controller failed in his obligation to pass on
information which was necessary for the pilot to discharge his responsibility
for his own safety."2
The defense that the primary responsibility for the control of his plane
rests with the pilot is perhaps not a valid one. Sec. 91.3 (a) of the Civil
Air Regulations does state that the pilot is primarily in control of his
aircraft, but when this regulation is juxtaposed to the regulations de-
lineating controller responsibility and specifically to the regulation which
provides: "Except in an emergency, no person may, in an area where air
traffic control is exercised, operate an aircraft contrary to an ATC instruc-
tion,"' the primary responsibility argument appears strained. Rare indeed
would be the pilot, who, acting on the Government's contentions that
tower directions are meant only for guidance, would determine that pri-
mary responsibility for the aircraft was his and would proceed to operate
his plane in accordance with his own personal desires, particularly in one
of the all-too-busy terminal areas. Not only would the Government view
his acts with disfavor," but there would be risks involved in an attempt
to survive his errant excursion.
When the defenses of "no duty" and "primary responsibility of the
pilot" have been raised to no avail, the Government has occasionally raised
the defense of misrepresentation-an additional exception to Governmental
liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act." Specifically, this defense has
been raised in relation to ATC liability in cases where controllers have
given inaccurate information to pilots. Weiner and Ingham were two such
cases.
In Weiner, the Government claimed misrepresentation because the flight
had received approval of its IFR plan from ATC, which implied that the
'9 375 F.2d at 684.
"
0 State of Maryland v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 678, 773 (D.D.C. 1966).
3' 283 F. Supp. 317 (E.D.Pa. 1965).
' This position was also taken in Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968).
33SSupra note 35; 14 C.F.R. 5 91.75 (b). (1967).
"See 14 C.F.R. 5 91.75(a) (1967). "When an ATC clearance has been obtained, no pilot in
command may deviate from that clearance, except in an emergency . . ."
862 Star. 984 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1964).
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airway was clear and in fact it was not. Misrepresentation was claimed in
Ingharn because the wrong visibility information was given by ATC be-
fore the tower lapsed into silence for twelve minutes. The defense was
unsuccessful in both cases. The point was answered in the Weiner case
when the court stated:
The government's reliance upon 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) relating to exemp-
tion from the Tort Claims Act of causes of action predicated upon mis-
representation is misplaced. This section applies to claims arising out of
misrepresentation. . . . Here, the gravamen of the action is not misrepre-
sentation but the negligent performance of operational tasks, although such
negligence consisted partly of a failure of a duty to warn.'
The point made by the Weiner court is well taken. Were the question to
have been resolved in any other way, the decision in Eastern and every
other decision where the Government has been held liable for ATC negli-
gence would stand for naught.
The Government often contends that on the facts of the case that the
controller discharged his duty as set out in the Procedures Manual. In
Furumizo v. United States" the court decided that a "simple slavish pur-
ported" following of the book was not enough 8 because the regulations
themselves required the exercise of judgment. It seems that even though
the Manual prescribes certain procedures, a controller must use his judg-
ment to determine the amount of care that is necessarily dictated by the
risks and hazards of each situation.
III. CASES-MORE SPECIFICALLY
A. Mid-Air Collisions
As defined by the bench, the bar, and the law schools, negligence is the
breach of a duty owed to another that results in his damage, and actions
are adjudged negligent when they fall short of the standard set by the
"reasonably prudent man" test. One doubts that a reasonably prudent
man would be an air traffic controller.39
Whatever may be the standard, in 1955 it was used to adjudge the
actions of ATC negligent in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co.,
4 0
where there was a collision between a DC-4 passenger plane and a P-38
military aircraft. The court held that ATC, having had in mind the re-
spective positions of the planes in relation to each other, and their speed
of approach and descent, failed to issue a timely warning to the Eastern
plane concerning the P-38 on final approach, failed to warn the P-38
that the DC-4 was on final aproach, cleared both planes on the same run-
way at approximately the same time, and failed to keep both planes ad-
vised of the activities of the other. ' Even though the evidence was meager
on the trial court's finding that the tower cleared both planes for the same
36335 F.2d at 398.
37 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii 1965), aff'd, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967).
38 245 F. Supp. at 992.
39 Supra note 1.
40 Supra note 12.
41 221 F.2d at 79.
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runway at the same time, the finding was sustained by the appellate court.'
The major defense in Eastern was that of the discretionary function excep-
tion.
Following Eastern, in the early case of United States v. Scbultetus,0
the Government succeeded on an argument of primary responsibility.
In Scbultetus, a Cessna 170 and a Cessna 140, owned and operated by two
flying schools, collided over an airfield at Fort Worth, Texas. The trial
court found that the tower operators negligently failed to warn the Cessna
170 to alter its course so as to avoid the collision and negligently failed to
direct the Cessna 140 to give way. The Cessna 170 had been warned of
the Cessna 140's presence; it was a day on which the sun was shining, and
the Cessna 170 had acknowledged the presence of the 140.
The appellate court reversed and held that the warning given to the
Cessna 170 of "Traffic, Cessna crossing in front of you" was in full dis-
charge of the responsibility of the tower's duty to give information for
preventing collisions between aircraft. The court reasoned, "The theory
followed by the district court would place upon the operators of control
towers the primary responsibility for the operation of aircraft at the field.
Governmental regulations, having the force of law, have assigned this
responsibility to the operators of aircraft." The facts that the day was
clear and the planes were flying under VFR conditions were decisive factors
in the court's decision that the primary responsibility for the operation of
aircraft at the field lay with the pilots. The court recognized that under
IFR conditions there might be a greater duty and responsibility upon the
control tower and a lesser responsibility placed upon the pilot. The dis-
tinction between visual and instrument flight rules responsibility was at
one time expressly set out in the Manual,' but now appears in less straight-
forward terms.'
In 1964 the Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Weiner7 and found
both parties negligent on the ground that ATC breached its duty to warn
and that the pilot was primarily responsible for his aircraft. An Air Force
jet fighter and a United Airlines commercial carrier collided while the
jet fighter was executing an instrument navigation maneuver. The United
carrier was flying in a regular route for commerical traffic after having
42 Id.
48277 F.2d 322 (5th Cit. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828 (1960).
"277 F.2d at 327.
'At one time the language of 14 C.F.R. 5 60.2 (1967) was:
When flying in visual flight rule weather conditions it is considered the direct
responsibility of the pilot to avoid collision with other aircraft. Under such condi-
tions, the information and clearances issued by the control tower are intended to aid
pilots in avoiding collisions.
The revised second edition of the Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual S 3.011 read:
When flying in instrument flight rules weather conditions it is obviously impossible
for the pilot to assume the responsibility of avoiding collision with other aircraft
except as directed by the ground control agency. Therefore, it is of the utmost im-
portance that all clearances issued by a control tower to pilots of aircraft under its
jurisdiction be adequate, concise and definite inasmuch as the pilot has no other
means of ascertaining the proximity of other aircraft.
4See, e.g., ATC Procedures Manual §§ 431.5A, 442.1, 523.1, and 834.9 (12 Nov. 1964).
41 Supra note 17..
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received an IFR clearance from the control center at Los Angeles to proceed
to Denver in accordance with the proposed flight plan. A copy of the
flight plan was teletyped by the Los Angeles Center to the center at Salt
Lake City, Utah. These two centers subsequently received a report from
United's radio communicating facility that the carrier had estimated its
time of arrival over the airfield at Las Vegas at 8:31. The planes collided
near Las Vegas at about 8:30 at an altitude of approximately 21,000 feet,
within the confines of the commercial route, and while the skies were
clear with visibility of thirty-five miles.
The appellate court affirmed the district court's finding of ATC negli-
gence on the ground that the controller failed to give notice to United
of the simulated instrument penetration procedure being practiced under
visual flight rules in the Las Vegas area, though giving United a clearance
under instrument flight rules through the area." Relying on Schultetus
and United States v. Miller," the court also sustained the trial court's find-
ing that United was negligent. "The legal obligation of the DC-7's crew
was to see and avoid the jet, and under the optimum visibility conditions
• . . responsibility for the separation of two aircraft flying in visual flight
rule weather, regardless of the type flight plan or air traffic clearance, rests
directly upon the operating personnel of the respective aircraft."'
In Weiner the primary responsibility argument had sufficed to sustain
the finding of pilot negligence, but did not absolve the Government of
its duty to warn. The end result of the court's findings of ATC negligence,
Air Force negligence, and United negligence was an award of indemnity
over against the Government in favor of United in the non-Government
employee cases on a theory that the Government's negligent acts occurred
from start to finish of the incident."1
The Miller case, cited by Weiner to find the United pilot negligent, was
a mid-air collision of privately owned aircraft flying in VFR weather.
There the court in support of the contention of primary responsibility
held, "The focal point of ultimate responsibility for the safe operation of
aircraft under VFR conditions rests with the pilot. Under such conditions
he is obligated to avoid traffic, even if he is flying with a traffic clearance.
The function of tower personnel is merely to assist the pilot in the per-
formance of the duties imposed, not relieve him of those duties.""'
State of Maryland v. United States" and Stanley v. United States"' are
cases at the district court level. State of Maryland, a case brought by the
state for the use of Mary Jane Myer, resulted in a judgment against the
Government in spite of its contention of pilot primary responsibility.
Stanley, on the same issue, reached the opposite result. Stanley absolved the
Government of any liability by holding that in VFR weather the function
48335 F.2d at 397.
"303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 995 (1962).
50335 F.2d at 389.
51 id. at 402.
5" 303 F.2d at 710.5, Supra note 30.
"4239 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
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of the control tower operator is advisory, and the primary responsibility
for avoiding mid-air collisions is upon the pilots."5
State of Maryland involved facts which were similar to those in Weiner.
The State of Maryland court based its opinion upon a reciprocal duty
theory. A commercial airliner was flying under an IFR flight plan in a
regular controlled airway when a T-33, being flown in the the same direc-
tion under VFR rules, overtook the airliner and a collision occurred. The
planes were within radar contact of the control tower. In speaking to the
Government's argument that the primary duty for the safety of his air-
craft lay with the pilot, the court made the statement that the obligation
of the pilot to use a high degree of care and vigilance in navigating his
airplane, does not detract from the reciprocal duty devolved on other
persons, such as the controllers of the Traffic Control Center." The failure
to warn allegation is a continuous thread which runs through the cases
where ATC negligence is alleged and is consistently overcoming the pri-
mary responsibility defense.
The factor which has been the pivotal point for determining liability in
all cases was apparently "control," with some courts holding fast to the
position that the pilot is ultimately responsible for the control of his air-
craft. An interesting case on this point is Stratmore v. United States.
In that case, a pilot was attempting to land after having radioed ATC
that one of his engines was out. ATC cleared runways for the pilot and
proceeded to monitor his descent. In observing the plane, ATC noticed
that the plane's landing gear was not down. This information was radioed
to the pilot. As the plane came in closer this information was again radioed
to the pilot along with the advice that he had better "go around." In the
meantime, the pilot had been furiously "pumping" his landing gear down,
and all of the instruments inside his plane indicated that the landing gear
was working properly. The evidence was confused on the point of whether
or not ATC had, subsequent to its warning of "go around," radioed the
pilot that the landing gear could at that time be seen gradually coming
down. The evidence was clearer that ATC had, after its initial advice to
go around, radioed the pilot that if he wished to go around all runways
were clear. The court held that a pilot in an emergency is in absolute
control of his plane; that even if ATC had advised him to go around, at
that point in time the plane was so far over the runway that it was com-
mitted to a landing; that had the pilot used his own judgment he could
have executed a safe landing; that the pilot should have used his own
judgment; that his failure to do so was negligence and was the sole proxi-
mate cause of the crash; and that none of the actions of ATC were negli-
gent nor were they a proximate cause of the accident. 8 The pilot's argu-
5 id. at 679.
56 Supra note 38.
17 206 F. Supp. 665 (D.N.J. 1962).
58 Id. at 672, 675. A rather strange argument, was adavnced by the Government in the "near
miss" collision case of Cattaro v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 889 (E.D.Va. 1964), on
the point of no duty, primary responsibility, and "control." The argument becomes readily discerni-
ble to the reader when the courts answer to the argument is seen:
The Government undertook such duty whether it had it or not and in so doing
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ment that ATC had created the emergency with its advice and "control"
was to no avail.
When either one of the planes involved in a mid-air collision is flying
under Instrument Flight Rules, ATC is controlling the plane and will be
liable for any damage caused by its negligence in so controlling. The split
in the court opinions arises when the planes are flying under VFR rules.
In Scbultetus, Miller and Stanley both planes involved in the respective
collisions were flying under visual flight rules. The courts have spoken of
"primary responsibility of the pilots" in this type of situation, but the
rule that has evolved seems to be that if ATC in fact assumes control or
should have reasonably assumed control of a plane (duty to warn), then
any negligent performance or failure to perform relevant operations will
result in Government liability. The VFR distinction, with nothing more,
seems to be valid only in those instances where the planes, having made
no contact with the tower, have an accident before ATC can, acting with
due dilligence, react.
B. Weather
'It is common knowledge that bad weather, rain and thunderstorms,
fog, snow and windstorms account for a large percentage of airplane acci-
dents."'" A true statement or not, plaintiffs would rather allege that it is
not the weather but the failure of ATC to warn of the weather conditions
which accounts for such accidents.
This was the plaintiff's theory in Ingham v. United States" and in
Stork v. United States" where the plaintiff did recover against the Govern-
ment; this was the plaintiff's theory in DeVere v. True-Flight, Inc."5
where the plaintiff was denied recovery against the Government. ATC
failed to report weather information to the Eastern crew for a period of
twelve minutes in the Ingham case. During this time, visibility had fallen
from one mile to three-quarters of a mile. The landing minimum of the
Eastern aircraft was one-half mile and in its attempt to land, the plane
crashed. The court held that the failure of ATC to report weather condi-
tions for twelve minutes in view of the rapidly declining visibility was
negligence and a proximate cause of the accident." ATC had last advised
the Eastern crew that visibility was one mile in spite of the fact that a
minute previous to this announcement it had been verbally announced
to the controllers that visibility had fallen to three-quarters of a mile.
The duty of ATC to report weather conditions was held by the district
court to be determined by the Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual,
which provided:
became chargeable with the negligence of its employees in the premises.
A Government Air Traffic Controller cannot authorize an airplane to fly a
collision course with another airplane then being monitored by another Government
controller and escape liability by claiming neither controller had a duty to separate
them.
'9 DeVere v. True-Flight, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 226, 229 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
60 Supra note 17.
61 Mem. opinion (S.D. Cal. 1967).
62 Supra note 59.
63373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3190 (U.S. 7 Nov. 1967).
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At locations where official weather reports are obtained by the controllers
through routine procedures and the ceiling and/or visibility is reported as
being at or below the highest "circling minima" established for the airport
concerned, a report of current weather conditions, and subsequent changes as
necessary, shall be transmitted as follows:
B. By approach control facilities, to all aircraft at the time of the first
radio contact or as soon as possible thereafter ....
The Government contended that the above regulation required the ap-
proach controller to advise pilots of changed conditions only when the
controlling visibility fell below the aircraft's minimum landing require-
ment. The court, in refusing to accept the Government's contention, re-
ferring to the view as inordinately narrow and determined that the words
"as necessary" should reasonably be interpreted to require the controller
to report those subsequent changes which, under all circumstances, the air-
liner crew would have considered important both in determining whether
to attempt a landing, and in preparing for the weather conditions most
likely to be encountered near the runway under the facts of the case."
The pilot in DeVere had obtained clearance from the control tower to
take off and was told that VFR conditions existed. Several minutes after
take off the aircraft flew into thick clouds and, in the attempt to re-
establish visual contact with the ground, the pilot and his one passenger
crashed in a swamp. The plaintiff, the passenger, alleged that the tower
was negligent because it failed to give accurate information to the pilot
when he asked if the flying conditions were VFR and because the tower
did not initiate search and rescue operations when the aircraft failed to
return.
In absolving the controller of negligence, the court found that the latest
information available had been given to the pilot, that this information
did indicate that VFR conditions existed, and that though the tower opera-
tor called the weather bureau to confirm that VFR conditions existed but
could get no answer, this latter fact was of no importance because the
meterologist testified that had she been reached she would have told him
that VFR conditions existed."
The Stork case involved facts similar to DeVere. Allegedly, the pilot of
the aircraft was given information regarding weather conditions by ATC
which was misleading or erroneous. As a result, the pilot lost his bearings
upon take off, lifted prematurely, and the aircraft crashed to the ground.
The plaintiffs complained of erroneous information given regarding lights
on the runway, the controller's failure to prevent take off, and the failure
to warn the crew of lack of visibility and other deteriorating conditions.
The Government contended that the controller, at the time of the crash,
had no right, power, or duty under the then existing regulations to deny
take off clearance, and under the regulations there was no provision re-
"ATC Procedure Manual 5 262.8 (12 Nov. 1964). This current section has been slightly
reworded but without substantial change.65373 F.2d at 235.
"268 F. Supp. 226, 228 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
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quiring or authorizing tower personnel to warn pilots not to take off
because of weather. The Government went on to admit that in the interest
of safety to the aircraft, the controller should have advised the pilot of
the decrease in visibility, but contended that this omission could not be
said to have been a proximate cause of the crash inasmuch as the pilot
was in a position to make the same observation as the controller. This latter
position brings us back full circle to the primary responsibility argument
which can be met by the reciprocal duty argument or 'by the theory that
only when the pilot has been fully informed can he discharge his responsi-
bility. The court held that a review of the evidence under the regulations
compelled the conclusion that the controllers were negligent in failing to
deny clearance, and in failing to warn the pilot not to take off and that
if he did, he would be breaking the law."?
Obviously, on the facts Ingham and DeVere can be distinguished. Con-
trary to Ingham, in DeVere the latest information was given and there
was not the time gap in relaying information existent in DeVere which
was present in Ingham. In Stork, though the information given to the
pilot by the controller was apparently the latest at the controller's dis-
posal, it was misleading and with due diligence the controller could have
availed himself of more correct information. The Stork opinion on duty
to warn is not startling but the holding of the court 'on the point of re-
fusal to allow take off is. Although the court's opinion is couched in
language of "failure to warn the pilot not to take off," the implication
of that statement would appear to be that the controller should have
absolutely refused the pilot permission to take off. If this is true, who
has the ultimate and/or primary responsibility for these planes?
A fair statement of the present law relative to aircraft accidents, weather,
and ATC thus would seem to be: When the latest correct information is
reported accurately and as necessary, ATC will not be liable for accidents
occuring because of the weather because it will have fulfilled its duty to
warn. "As necessary" can be taken to mean, if a general rule can be
gleaned from Ingham, a reporting of changes in the weather which, under
all the circumstances of a given case, an airline crew would consider im-
portant in making decisions necessary to the safe operation of a flight.
This duty to warn may even include a duty to give the pilot the controller's
opinion about the feasibility of a landing or take off under then existing
weather conditions. ATC could then feasibly be liable for giving a bad
opinion if the pilot relied on it or was bound to do so.
C. Turbulent Air
1. Technical Description
Many accidents and near accidents have been caused by light planes en-
countering the wakes [turbulent air] of large airplanes during landing and
take-off even though normal separation times' were observed. The two typical
difficulties generally reported by the pilots of the light planes were: a sudden
violent roll (in either direction) accompanied by a sudden large "apparent"
67 Stork, mem. opinion at 7.
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loss of lift characterized by rapid loss of altitude. These accidents have been
generally attributed in some way to the prop wash from and/or to the
turbulence created by the large airplane."
The increasing demand upon existing facilities and available airspace
creates a new hazard, long recognized though only recently understood, for
the pilot-particularly the general aviation pilot. When the solid mass of
an aircraft passes through surrounding airspace, turbulent air is left in
its wake. If another aircraft, particularly a lighter aircraft, encounters
this turbulent air before it has an opportunity to dissipate or decay,
complete loss of control is likely to occur. Because of the increasing num-
ber of aircraft accidents which have occurred, at least in part, as a result
of encountering turbulent air, the phenomenon is important in all of its
aspects: its technical nature, its effect upon aircraft generally, and its re-
lationship to Air Traffic Control and to the larger question of air safety.
The wake of turbulent air produced behind an aircraft in flight is caused
by a number of phenomena, including: the skin friction and interference,
the propulsion system, and (most significant) the production of lift on the
wing and tail surfaces. The turbulence created by the lifting surfaces of
an aircraft may be characterized by a sheet of air originating in and flow-
ing from the vicinity of the trailing edge of the wing, which then trails
aft and downward. As a result of the distribution of lift along the wing
surface and the instability of the vortex sheet, the edges of the airstream
tend to roll up, in a counter-rotating manner, in the vicinity of the wing
tips and to form trailing spirals, often referred to as "horizontal tornadoes."
"A transfer of vorticity from the sheet to the spiral accompanies this
rollup. A short distance aft of the wing, essentially all of the vorticity
contained in the sheet is transferred to the two trailing vortices and the
sheet no longer exists. Beyond this distance, the effect of the wake can
be considered due only to the two trailing vortices."' This phenomenon
may be best understood by considering that any lifting surface, in produc-
ing lift, creates low pressures above it and higher pressures below it. Because
of the tendency of air to flow from high pressure to low--outward below
the wing, around the tip, and inward above the wing-a rotational motion
is initiated and, ultimately, the vortices.
In recent years, a number of highly technical studies of the nature of
air turbulence have been completed" but for the purposes here a few
6' Z. Ble'viss, Theoretical Analysis of Light Plane Landing and Take-off Accidents Due to En-
countering the Wakes of Large Airplines, Douglas Aircraft Rep. No. SM-18647 (1954) at 1.69 Boeing, State-of-the-art Survey for Minimum Approach, Landing, and Takeoff Intervals as
Dictated by Wakes, Vortices, and Weather Phenomena, Re. No. RD-64-4 (Jan. 1964) at 2.
" Andrews, A Flight Investigation of the Wake Behind a Meteor Aircraft, With Some Theo-
retical Analysis, Aeronautical Research Council Technical Report C.P. No. 282 (1956); Beech
Aircraft Corp., Safety Suggestions No. 8 (1952); Z. Bleviss, Theoretical Analysis of Light Plane
Landing and Takeoff Accidents Due to Encountering the Wakes of Large Planes, Douglas Rep.
No. SM-18647 (Dec. 1954); C.A.B. Aircraft Accident Report, Piper Model PA-22, N2945P,
Near Dover, Delaware, 23 Sept. 1948, File No. 2-0124, adopted 5 Oct. 1959, released 10 Oct.
1959; J. Campbell, Ground Proximity Effects Associated With VISTOL Aircraft, Eighth Anglo-
American Aeronautical Conference (1961); W. Castles, H. Durham, & J. Kevorkian, Normal
Component of Induced Velocity for Entire Field of a Uniformly Loaded Lifting Rotor with Highly
Swept Wake as Determined by Electromagnetic Analog, NASA TR-41 (1959); J. DeYoung &
W. Barling, Prediction of Downwasb Behind Swept-Wing Airplanes at Subsonic Speed, NACA
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general descriptive comments will suffice. In general terms, the twin vor-
tices tend to settle downward and, as they near the ground, to move out-
ward or laterally. "The intensity of the air disturbance created by the
trailing vortices, i.e., the magnitude of the air velocities induced at given
radial distances from the centers [of the vortices], is proportional to the
weight of the airplane and inversely proportional to the span, the air
density, and the forward speed, other things being equal."" Large, heavily
loaded aircraft tend to produce more intense disturbances than smaller,
lightly loaded aircraft. Also, disturbance will be most severe at lower
speeds-that is, in take off and landing. Studies have indicated that the
rolling up process is essentially completed when the aircraft has traveled
one or two span lengths from the point of generation and that at the
point of generation the lateral separation of the pair of vortices is roughly
80 percent of the span of the aircraft. The composition of each trailing
vortex may be described as a cylindrical core rotating in the manner of
a solid body, but in a counterrotating relationship with the other vortex.
Hence, between the pair of trailing vortices there is a downward flow of
Tech. Note 3346 (Jan. 1955); J. DeYoung, Theoretical Symmetric Span Loading Due to Flap
Deflection for Wings of Arbitrary Plan Form at Subsonic Speeds, NACA Rep. 1071 (1952);
D. Dosanjh, E. Gasparek, & S. Eskinazi, Decay of a Viscous Trailing Vortex, 13 The Aeronautical
Quarterly pt. 2 (May 1962); R. Djorup, Proposal for Vehicle Attitude and Velocity Instrumen-
tation, Basic Devices Incorp. (Sept. 1963); D. Ekstedt, Laboratory and Flight Test of Chemical
Tracking Aids Performed for Project 6785, AFMDC TR 58-2, AD 123736, Project 6785, Sys.
590R, Air Force Missile Development Center, ARDC USAF, Holloman AFB, N.M. (July 1958);
A. Gessow, Review of Information on Induced Flow of a Lifting Rotor, NACA Tech. Note 3238
(Aug. 1954); R. Gray,- Experimental Smoke and Electromagnetic Analog Study of Induced Flow
About a Model Rotor in Steady Flight Within Ground Effect, NASA Tech. Note D-458 (Aug.
1960); E. Hahn & J. Rogers, The Development and Digital Programming of a Subsonic and Super-
sonic Elastic Airload Solution, The Boeing Co., Airplane Div., Do. D6-3393 (Oct. 1960); R.
Head & W. Byrd, Report of Project NR AVN 2656 Effect of Wing Tip Vortices and Sonic
Shock on Army Aircraft in Flight, U.S. Army Aviation Bd., Ft. Rucker, Ala. (May 1957); H.
Heyson, Preliminary Results From Flow Field Measurements Around Single and Tandem Rotors
in the Langley Full Scale Tunnel, NACA Tech. Note 3242 (Nov. 1954); H. Heyson & S. Katz-
off, Induced Velocities Near a Lifting Rotor with Nonuniform Disk Loading, NACA Rep. 1319
(1957); R. Jordinson, Flow in a Jet Directed Normal to the Wing, Brit. R&M No. 3074 (Oct.
1956); H. Kaden, Aufwicklung einer Unstabilen Unstetigkeitsflache, Ing. Archiv, II Band, at
140-68 (1931); T. Kerr, A Flight Investigation into the Persistence of Trailing Vortices Behind
Large Aircraft, Royal Aircraft Establ. Tech. Note No. AERO 2649 (Sept. 1959); C. Kraft,
Flight Measurements of the Velocity Distribution and Persistence of the Trailing Vortices of an
Airplane, NACA Tech. Note 3377 (March 1955); R. Kuhn, An Investigation to Determine Con-
ditions Under Which Downwasb From VTOL Aircraft Will Start Surface Erosion From Various
Types of Terrain, NASA Tech. Note D-56 (Sept. 1959); H. Lamb, Hydrodynamics (6th ed.
1945); W. McGowan, Calculated Normal Load Factors on Light Airplanes Traversing the Trailing
Vortices of Heavy Transport Airplanes, NASA Tech. Note D-829 (May 1961); R. Monical,
A Survey of Helicopter Wake Information and Extension of the Vortex Ring Wake Representa-
tion, The Boeing Co., Airplane Div., Doe. D6-6612TN (1963); H. Panofsky & V. Rao, Structure
of Atmospheric Turbulence Close to the Surface Over Smooth Terrain, Final Rep. Cont. AF
19(604)-2252, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, OTS, Washington, D.C. (1958); P. Payne, Helicopter
Dynamics and Aerodynamics, The MacMillian Co. (1959); J. Sanders, Thrust-Control Problems
in a Turbojet Engine, NACA Conf. on Some Problems of Aircraft Operation, Tech. Papers pre-
sented at the NACA Conf. (Nov. 1954); R. Scorer, Natural Aerodynamics 149 (1958); P. Smith
& R. Fetter, Remote Measurement of Wind Velocity By the Electromagnetic-Acoustic Probe, Pro-
ceedings of the 5th Military Electronic Conf., Washington, D.C. (1961); H. Squire, The Growth
of a Vortex in Turbulent Flow, Fluid Motion Sub-Comm. Aeronautical Research Coun. (1954);
of a Vortex in Turbulent Flow, Fluid Motion Sub-Comm. Aeronautical Research Coun. (1954);
J. Spreiter & A. Sacks, The Rolling Up of the Trailing Vortex Sheet and Its Effect on the Down-
wash Behind Wings, J. AEROSPACE Sc. 21-32, 72 (Jan. 1951); The Supersonic Transport-Industry
Accepts a Challenge, AMERICAN AvIATION, Oct. 1963, at 18.
71 J. Wetmore, Aircraft Trailing Vortices-A Hazard to Operations, ASTRONAUTICS & AERO-
NAUTICs 45 (Dec. 1964).
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air, and outside the vortices, an upward flow."'
As the twin vortices settle downward and closer to the ground, the
interaction of the turbulent air and the ground causes the vorticity fields
to begin to move laterally or parallel to the ground. The effect of the
ground and its relationship to the vorticity fields, then, play a large part
in the understanding of the nature of wake turbulence. As the vortices
settle to a point two to three span lengths above the ground, their initial
vertical velocity first begins to slow and normally ceases all vertical move-
ment approximately one-half span above the ground. At this point of
zero motion the twin fields of turbulence begin to further separate and to
move laterally along the ground. Accelerating from the point of zero
motion, the vortex centers move laterally and soon attain a speed of the
same value as the initial settling velocity. 3 When the vortices are generated
closer to the ground, their initial vertical velocity is less, they settle to a
level somewhat closer to the ground, and spread apart more rapidly: about
3 5 0 feet per minute for a heavy transport and about 150 feet per minute
for a light transport or light personal aircraft.'
Although a field of turbulent air may continue as a hazard for a period
in excess of three minutes in still air, certain factors affect the field of
turbulence so as to hasten its normal decay or to decrease its danger. The
natural decay of these trailing vortices is a result of the internal develop-
ment of tangential shear forces which cause the core to grow and its
velocity to decrease; but atmospheric turbulence due to wind or convec-
tional effects, friction between the ground and the vortex airflow when
the vortices are near the ground, and irregular span loading hasten the
decay process and ultimate dissipation of the vortices."5 Because the fields
of turbulent air generated in the wake of an aircraft in flight are enveloped
by surrounding air, the movement of the turbulent air mass is affected
by existing atmospheric conditions. That is, if a cross-wind is present on
a runway at the time the wake vortices are generated, they will tend to
be carried with the cross-wind eventually off of the landing and take off
area. In order for a vortex system to be carried off a runway in as little
as thirty seconds, a normal wind component of approximately ten miles
per hour would be necessary. '  However, a light cross-wind component
could also increase the chances of an aircraft encountering wake turbulence
because each half of the vortex system spreads outward and away from
the center-line point of generation symetrically; and if the cross-wind is
equal and opposite to the lateral spread rate of one of the vortices, this
vortex may maintain a fixed position above the runway until it dissipates."
In fact, so great is the effect of surrounding atmospheric conditions that
if the lateral travel of a vortex system is reinforced by a cross-wind, the
72 Id.7
3 Supra note 69, at 20.
" j. Wetmore & J. Reeder, Aircraft Vortex Wakes in Relation to Terminal Operations, NASA
Tech. Note D-1777, at 5.
72 Id.
76 Supra note 68, at 34.
7Supra note 74, at 12.
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field of turbulence may even cross to a parallel runway with sufficient
strength to constitute a hazard. The closer together the adjacent runways
lie, the greater the chance there is of an aircraft encountering a strong
transient vortex."
Although wake turbulence offers the greatest threat to light aircraft,
other forms of turbulence add to the complete aircraft wake. The primary
influence of the velocity field created as a result of the propulsion system
of a jet aircraft occurs at low altitudes, low airspeed, and high engine
thrust-during take off. However, studies have revealed that at distances
greater than 400 feet aft of the engines, the turbulent effect is negligible."
Insofar as propeller or ducted fan systems are concerned, one study has
found that "for distances in excess of 500 feet behind a typical current
transport aircraft's propellers, the propulsive velocity field has decayed to
15 knots or less and can be ignored as a hazard to nearby aircraft."" Vortex
configurations are also produced by VTOL, STOL and rotar aircraft of
varying intensity according to hovering flight, vertical ascent and descent,
low-speed or transitional flight and high-speed forward flight.
There are, basically, three situations in which wake turbulence may be
encountered and each has a different effect upon the penetrating aircraft:
Cross-Track: The penetrating aircraft crosses the wake transversely. The
effect on it is felt as pitching and vertical motion with load factors going
from positive to negative and then positive again in a matter of one second
or less, depending on aircraft size and speed.
9. * *
Along-Track, Outside Core: The penetrating aircraft experiences a downdraft
between the cores and an updraft outside the cores with associated rolling.
This normally does not induce appreciable loss of altitude.
Along-Track, Through Core: The result of penetrating the core in flight
parallel to it is a violent rolling action. This rapid rolling could result in the
aircraft becoming uncontrollable with an appreciable loss of altitude."
The vortex encounters with the greatest possibilities of serious conse-
quences are those which occur during the landing and take off phases of
operation, for during this period departing and arriving aircraft are con-
strained to flight paths in essentially the same vertical plane. The hazard
of an encounter during this period is increased by high traffic density,
low airspeed margins, and low altitudes. Should an encounter occur during
this period of a flight, the pilot could experience a rapid loss of lift and
settling or a violent rolling motion of such, magnitude as to prevent cor-
rection by available control surfaces at an altitude at which control prob-
ably could' not be regained."
As a result of the studies that have been done, certain observations can be
made: (1) since the vortex trails are invisible no appropriate evasive action
78 Supra note 69, at 29-32.
79 Supra note 69, at 24.
so Id.
81 Supra note 69, at 29-32.
82 Supra note 74, at 12.
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can be taken by the pilot except to be alert on calm days in high-density
traffic areas whether or not another airplane is in sight, (2) reducing speed or
flying either above or below the path of an airplane should reduce the magni-
tude of the load factors, (3) either entering perpendicular to or quartering
the vortex trails will result in approximately the same magnitude of load
factors . . . and (4) the effect of elevator motion on the load factors could
either be cancelling or aggravating, depending upon the phasing of the
elevator motion with the impulses from the vortices."5
Proper spacing is the only precaution which can eliminate the hazard
posed to pilots by wake turbulence. Accordingly, and for other reasons,
FAA regulations stipulate minimum separation standards." However, pres-
ent spacing provisions have not always proved adequate and certain "rules
of thumb" have evolved concerning the avoidance of an encounter with
wake turbulence, viz., pilots are advised to take off short and to land long
and at slightly excessive speeds so as to retain the aircraft's stability should
an encounter occur.
2. Turllent Air-Related Cases
Franklin v. United States85 is a decision illustrative of the importance of
the use of expert witnesses and the technical aspect of turbulent air-
related crash cases. Plaintiff, an experienced pilot, purchased a new Beach
Bonanza and the next day flew it to Meigs Field, Chicago. While on final
approach and some three-quarters of a mile from the runway threshold,
according to air traffic control's estimation, a helicopter was cleared to
land and was permitted to pass across plaintiff's intended flight path.
The light aircraft crashed during landing, allegedly as a result of en-
countering wake turbulence generated by the rotorcraft. Judgment was
entered for the plaintiff by the trial court in his action against the Govern-
ment, alleging negligent acts on the part of ATC proximately resulting
in the crash. The appellate court reversed and remanded as against the
Government. Both plaintiff's and defendant's experts conceded that
turbulent air reacts in a predictable manner: it has a tendency to settle
downward from the point of generation and to move with any existing
atmospheric winds. The parties stipulated that at the time of the crash
there was a cross-wind of eight knots, resulting in a lateral movement
component of 13.5 feet per second. If Air Traffic Control was correct
in its estimation that plaintiff was three-quarters of a mile from the run-
way threshold at the time the turbulence was generated, twenty to twenty-
four seconds would have elapsed before plaintiff's aircraft could have
reached the point in question, and the field of turbulent air would have
been moved completely off of the runway by the cross-wind. The court
therefore concluded that the crash was a result of a low-speed stall, i.e.,
pilot error.
Although the Government has a number of complex legal defenses
available in the trial of a turbulent air-related crash case, a defense on
85 W. McGowan, Calculated Normal Load Factors on Light Airplanes Traversing the Trailing
Vortices of Heavy Transport Airplanes, NASA Tech. Note D-829 (May 1961), at 2.
84 Supra note 27.
' 342 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1965).
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the facts will be made if at all possible. For example, if the Government
can establish that there was no encounter, i.e., that plaintiff's aircraft
passed above the point of generation or that atmospheric conditions moved
the turbulent air from the plaintiff's flight path, then other defenses are
unnecessary.
A basic theory of recovery against the Government in the performance
of ATC functions for turbulence-related accidents is the failure to estab-
lish adequate separation between aircraft, so that turbulent air may have
an opportunity to dissipate with the passage of time or the effect of atmos-
pheric conditions. Minimum standards of separation are outlined in the Air
Traffic Control Procedures Manual:"
422.2-
Between departing aircraft, sufficient separation [shall be effected] so that:
The preceding aircraft has either crossed the opposite end of the runway or
turned away from the projected path of the succeeding aircraft before the
latter begins take-off run.
423.1-
Separate an arriving aircraft from another aircraft using the same runway
by insuring that the arriving aircraft does not cross the approach end of the
runway until one of the following conditions exists:
A. A preceding, arriving aircraft has taxied off the runway.
B. A preceding, departing aircraft has crossed the opposite end of the
runway. * * *87
Another theory upon which recovery has been predicated is the failure
to discharge a duty to warn of the possible presence of turbulent air.
Unlike the separation theory of recovery, duty to warn is not based on an
examination of the phenomenon itself, but rather an examination of the
obligations of the air traffic controller. The Federal Air Regulations and
the Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual provide:
437-PHR-ASEOLOGY
Phraseology shall be employed as set forth below.
43 9.1 8-To issue cautionary information regarding possible rotocraft down-
wash, thrust stream turbulence, and/or wing tip vortices: CAUTION,
TURBULENCE (traffic information).
EXAMPLE: CAUTION, TURBULENCE, DEPARTING AMERICAN
ELECTRA. s9
This quoted section does not, in and of itself, imply the existence of
a duty to warn, but only outlines the language to be used should a warning
be given.
One of the least complex of turbulent air cases is the relatively early
case of Wenninger v. United States." In that case an action was brought
86 ATC Procedures Manual (12 Nov. 1964).
87 Id. at 4-7, 4-8.
88Hartz v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 119 (N.D.Ga. 1965), rev'd, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.
1968).8 9 Supra note 102, at 4-2 [now sections 410.6-412.1].
90234 F. Supp. 499 (D. Del. 1964).
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under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the death of a pilot whose aircraft
encountered vortex turbulence generated by an Air Force aircraft in
close vicinity to a navigational aid, used extensively for practice by Air
Force personnel from a nearby base. Plaintiff alleged that both the com-
mander of the base and the Civil Aeronautics Authority were negligent
in failing to warn civilian fliers of such activities, either by the issuance of
a NOTAM ("Notice to Airmen"), or by some other appropriate means.
The action was dismissed because plaintiff failed in his burden to estab-
lish that the defendant's negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of the
crash in question, and more specifically, because plaintiff failed to show
that in all likelihood the accident would not have happened had the
CAA or the commander issued such warnings. While the holding of
Wenninger does not shed a great deal of light upon the consideration of
ATC's involvement in similar cases, the case is important for what it does
not say. That is, the case does not involve an attempt on the part of the
Government to assert the primary responsibility or other more involved
defenses, available and predictably present in other cases. Wenninger, like
Franklin, demonstrates the obvious fact that the Government will rely
upon common negligence or fact defenses before turning to more in-
volved defenses.
The primary responsibility defense in early decisions seemed to become
almost absolute in nature. However, more recent decisions, particularly
those involving turbulent air-related crashes, indicate that the success of
this defense has been greatly limited. The evolution of the no duty defense
has followed a similar path-first one of expansion and then limitation.
Johnson v. United States" was a relatively early wake turbulence case
in which many of the issues regarding Governmental defenses, only re-
cently resolved, were first considered in depth. In that case, the pilot of
a light Cessna aircraft followed an Air Force B-47, which was executing
an instrument low approach, into the landing pattern at Omaha Municipal
Airport, encountered wake turbulence and crashed. An action was brought
against the Government pursuant to the F.T.C.A. alleging negligent acts
on the part of controllers in their failure to take the wake turbulence
hazard into consideration when issuing clearances. The Government an-
swered that "to impose such a duty upon the control tower would impede
the flow of traffic . . . [and] that such duty [determination of safe separa-
tion] rests solely with the pilot of the following plane." In ruling against
the Government the court concluded:
The same delay in traffic would result whether the duty is imposed upon
the control tower or the pilot of the plane. In any event, the safety of those
using air lanes is not to be sacrificed to traffic expediency. I therefore hold
that control tower employees, in the exercise of reasonable care, do have a
duty to take into consideration turbulence hazards when giving clearance
to land."
91 183 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Mich. 1960), aff'd, 295 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1961).
11 Id. at 493.
93 183 F. Supp. at 493.
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Furuinizo v. United States94 was the first turbulent air-related crash case
to go against the Government in such a manner as to seriously question
the present viability of defenses previously relied upon by the Govern-
ment with a great measure of success. On 19 June 1961, at Honolulu
International Airport, plaintiff's decedent, a student pilot, was practicing
take off and landing when he was denied take off clearance by ATC be-
cause of the imminence of the take off of a Japan Air Lines DC-8 on an
intersecting runway. Furumizo came to a stop on the runway intersecting
the one being used by the commercial jet and, shortly after the jet aircraft
cleared the intersection, Furumizo's aircraft was given clearance in the
following manner:
Piper Nine Nine Zulu Caution Turbulence Departing DC-8 Cleared For
Take-off."
The Piper immediately began its take off run and was observed lifting-off
in an apparently normal manner; but its right wing suddenly dropped to
a perpendicular attitude as it crossed above the intersection of the run-
ways. The aircraft crashed and burst into flames, killing both plaintiff's
decedent and his instructor. It was determined that the Piper encountered
the left wing vortex of the departing DC-8 and that the turbulence was
"so violent that the little Piper once caught in it had no chance of avoiding
a crash-in other words, that the strength of the turbulence was so great
as to overcome any ability of the Piper to overcome it."" In an action
brought against the Government pursuant to the F.T.C.A. alleging negli-
gent acts on the part of ATC in failing to prevent the take off of de-
cedent's aircraft into a known hazard, or one which should have been
known, by the tower controller, the Government answered with the de-
fenses of primary responsibility and lack of duty, i.e, having followed the
Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual, the controllers owed no additional
duty to decedent.
A lengthy and detailed trial followed with a district court decision
against the Government. The primary responsibility defense was initially
overcome by plaintiff on the ground that decedent's instructor was in
actual control of the aircraft and that decedent, who had yet to solo,
could not be found cognizable of the hazards of wake turbulence."' The
Government's defense regarding lack of duty was not as easily overcome.
The Government urged that, having given the turbulence warning, as
required by procedures prescribed by the Administrator of the FAA, no
further duty was owed. The Furumizo court noted that the earlier decision
in Johnson, holding that:
The fact that variables prevent the fixing of limits with certainty does not
absolve the control tower from a duty to take the turbulence hazard into
consideration, but this is merely one factor that may be considered in de-
94245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii 1965), aff'd, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967).
1 Id. at 988.
96 245 F. Supp. at 990.
"1 245 F. Supp. at 991.
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termining whether under a given set of facts the employees of the control
tower did meet the standard of reasonable care.98
In agreeing with Johnson, the Furumizo court observed "that control
tower employees in the exercise of reasonable care do have a duty to take
into consideration turbulence hazards when giving clearance to take off,
as well as to land."99 Countering the Government's argument that it owed
no duty to decedent in addition to that set out in the Procedure Manual,
the court reviewed all existing air regulations and the Procedure Manual,
and in so doing clarified the Government's duty. It was determined that
at the time of the accident certain Federal Air Regulations"® were in force,
adopted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act,"' and
that the Administrator had also issued Air Traffic Control Procedures not
adopted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act for the use
of its employees, the controllers.' 2 Although the court found that the
Procedures do not have the force and effect of law, as do the regulations,
the Government contended that the duty of its controllers is limited by
the former. After a detailed consideration of the provisions of the Pro-
cedural Manual, such as:
Section 100.7 ...
Therefore, when situations arise which are not provided herein, personnel are
expected to use their best judgment, both as to the procedure employed and
the phraseology in which it is expressed [Emphasis added.].'
the court determined that the regulations and directives in question did
not leave the tower controllers devoid of any duty to exercise judgment
in the interest of safety. The court observed:
that these regulations did contemplate, permit and authorize the exercise of
discretion and judgment on the part of tower control operators to lengthen
separation if the danger of air turbulence appeared eminent . .. ."
The plaintiff contended that the Government had previously acknowl-
edged its special obligation, by publications and directives made available
to its tower personnel, to alert pilots of the possible hazards of wake
turbulence and to give warning information coupled with lengthened
separation wherever advisable. However, the plaintiff went on, pursuant
to a circular letter of 29 December 1959, the Government had attempted
to shift the obligation to the pilot. After considering the circular in ques-
tion, the court concluded:
Thus, for the first time, possibly due to previous lawsuits against the
government claiming negligence on the part of tower control operators, the
98 245 F. Supp. at 998.
99 Id.
'00 Part 60 Civil Air Regulations, which were in effect on the date of the accident.
'0'60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 10.01 (1964).
102 245 F. Supp. at 999.
103Section 60 of the ATC Procedure Manual in effect at the time of the crash in question,
cited at 1000.
'0424S F. Supp. at 1002.
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aviation authorities appear to attempt to protect controllers from negligence
as to the obligatory safety factor, by disavowing any responsbility whatsoever,
except for possible cautionary warning, without additional action such as
longer separation, etc., even when the same might be certainly or well calcu-
lated to prevent reasonably anticipatable disaster to small planes from trailing
vortices, as in this case. It is to be noted that all this is done with no changes
in the basic provisions of the statutes and regulations having the force of law,
that existed when the previous directives and instructions were issued
acknowledging some power and responsibility on the part of tower controllers
to protect life and property by more action than the minima prescribed or
directed by the Administrator.0'
The court found that the Government's agent was guilty of "a complete
and callous disregard of any duty to exercise judgment whatsoever," and
that "no judgment was exercised"--that "[t]here was simply a slavish
purported following of the 'book,' with no attempt to exercise a judgment,
which under the circumstances it was the duty and within the power of
the controller to exercise, and which would and could have avoided this
accident."'"8
On appeal Furumizo was affirmed"' but the "follow the book" theory
urged by the Government in the trial court was neither accepted nor re-
jected by the appellate court. The court declined to pass upon this ques-
tion, basing the affirmance on the single ground that when it became ap-
parent that previous turbulence warnings had been disregarded by plain-
tiff's decedent, it became the duty of the controller to take additional
measures to attempt to avoid the encounter, i.e., the Government was re-
quired to fully discharge its duty. Failing to take such additional measures,
the Government was found negligent, such negligence amounting to a
proximate cause of the resulting crash.
It is submitted that it is doubtful the Government's "follow the book"
theory will be successfully asserted again. Although the appellate court
did not pass on the question, had a less complex means of affirmance not
been available it seems apparent that this approach would have been taken.
The theory of this case is but another example of the Government's in-
creasing liability for its ATC functions, as a result of the application of
common negligence principles to determine the existence and breach of a
duty owed to the flying public.
Hartz v. United States"8 is the most recent, and certainly the most im-
portant, wake turbulence case to have progressed as far as the appellate
courts. The case serves to re-define and extend much of what had previ-
ously been considered ATC's responsibility, and it is, therefore, one of the
landmark decisions of aviation law. Plaintiff's decedent, pilot of a Beach
Bonanza, taxied into position and requested take off clearance from a
point just short of the intersection of an approach and runway at Atlanta
Municipal Airport. While Hartz awaited clearance, an Eastern Air Lines
" 245 F. Supp. at 1007.
106 245 F. Supp. at 992.
107381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1965).
108249 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1965), rev'd, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968).
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DC-7 was cleared and took off on the intersecting runway, passing directly
in front of decedent's aircraft. Approximately thirty seconds after the
DC-7 acknowledged its take off clearance, the controller gave Hartz the
following warning: "November 96 Delta cleared for take-off, watch for
prop wash."'' 9 Shortly after Hartz turned onto the intersecting runway and
took off, witnesses saw the lights of the Bonanza apparently wobble at a
height of 50 to 75 feet; the aircraft violently crashed to the runway in
an inverted attitude, skidded and came to rest. Both pilot and passenger
were killed. An action was brought against the Government under the
F.T.C.A. alleging negligence on the part of the controller for failure to
allow sufficient separation and for breach of common law duty. The dis-
trict court" ' found, as the United States contended, that the controller
had no legal duty, statutory or otherwise, to do anything more than
maintain separation between the aircraft sufficient to avoid a collision.
The court also found that although no duty was owed to Hartz to warn
of turbulence, the warning which was given was sufficient to apprise him
of any possible danger: "once having knowledge of the possibility of the
existence of turbulence, it became the responsibility of the pilot to con-
duct the take-off in the safest possible manner."''. While the evidence indi-
cated that the turbulence which the Bonanza encountered was a trailing
vortex, shed by the right wing of the departing DC-7, the court held that
the controller breached no duty owed to plaintiff's decedent and that the
crash proximately resulted from the negligence of Hartz."' The trial court
accepted without question that the Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual
has the force and effect of law (contrary to the finding in Furumizo)
and, in setting forth the responsibilities of a controller, is the standard
against which his acts should be compared. No violations were found. Also,
it was determined that the controller owed Hartz no common law or in-
dependent duty of care, for the State of Georgia had enacted all federal
civil air procedures as its own;"' there was no other body of law to -look
to for an additional duty. The controller discharged the whole of his re-
sponsibility and owed no further obligation to Hartz who, the court be-
lieved,' committed an act of negligence when he requested an "inter-
sectional" take off, such request contributing to a substantial shortening of
the runway distance between himself and the departing aircraft. How-
ever, it is apparent that the district court primarily based its decision
upon the Government's primary responsibility defense:
The ultimate responsibility for the take-off at that or any other time rests
with the pilots; the pilot, not the controller, was in the position to delay his
take-off if he felt it would be to his benefit to do so. The main responsibility
for the safe conduct of an aircraft in the control zone under Visual Flight
Rule conditions rests with the pilot of each aircraft.
109Id. at 121.
""Supra note 108. The trial court accepted the Government's "follow the book" defense prior
to the Furumizo appellate decision.
.". 249 F. Supp. at 126.
112 Id.
'" 249 F. Supp. at 124.
'"'Supra note 111.
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The theory asserted by plaintiff's counsel would place upon the operators of
control towers the primary responsibility for the operation of aircraft at the
field. Governmental regulations having the force of law, have assigned this
responsibility to the operators of the aircraft.1 '
Although the trial court's opinion, in most respects, seemed to predict-
ably follow existing case law, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded."'
The controlling issues upon appeal were the following:
(1) Did the controller have a duty to give Hartz a warning which would
include possible danger from wing tip vortex?
(2) If the controller did owe Hartz such a duty, was the warning which
he gave Hartz sufficient to discharge that duty?""
In its attempt to determine whether there was a duty to warn of wing
tip vortices, the appellate court recognized that Governmental regulations
have placed primary responsibility for the movement of an aircraft in the
pilot but stated, "Nonetheless, before a pilot can be held legally responsible
for the movement of his aircraft he must know, or be held to know, those
facts which were then material to the safe operation of his aircraft
[Emphasis added.]."' The significance of this statement may prove to be
tremendous, for by introducing such a question of fact as a material con-
sideration, the effectiveness of the primary responsbility defense may be
completely lost. That this was the intent of the court seems apparent from
its further statement that:
Hartz was down below . . . studying his cockpit instrument panel and await-
ing take-off directions. . . .Clearly, the controller was one better qualified
by training, experience and vantage position to estimate time and distance and
it was his duty to direct and guide the Bonanza .... 119
Though dictum, this statement is irreconcilable with what had previously
been the 'defense of primary responsibility, and it clearly represents an
extension of the responsibility of the air traffic controller. Although pre-
viously stated in Schultetus,"2° Tilley may be thought of as standing for the
proposition that "the air traffic controller has a duty to all aircraft in,
near and over the airport and cannot devote his undivided attention to a
single aircraft"'' but the appellate court in Hartz apparently found to
the contrary, relying on the reasoning of Ingham."' In so doing the Fifth
"1S 249 F. Supp. at 125.
116387 F.2d 870 ($th Cir. 1968).
"'Id. at 872.
"s 387 F.2d at 873.
sloId.
"20277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828 (1960).
'' 375 F.2d 678, 684 (4th Cir. 1967).
122 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 1967).
While air travel in this jet age has become commonplace, we know too well that
there is always lurking the possibility of tragic accidents capable of snuffing out
the lives of hundreds in a mere matter of seconds. Much of the success in preventing
such disasters can be attributed to the federal government's assumption of the super-
vision of commercial flying; and public confidence in air travel has been fostered
in large measure by knowledge that our government, recognizing the high stakes
involved, is constantly overseeing the carrier's operations in order to promote safety.
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Circuit followed reasoning also similar to that in Furuinizo and used
language which must be viewed as an extension of ATC's duty:
[T]he controller gave Hartz a warning which was neither sufficient under
the manual nor adequate to caution Hartz of the possible danger which was
then known to the controller. The failure of the controller to properly
caution Hartz of the possible danger of wing tip vortex imposed upon the
controller an additional duty to delay take-off clearance for the Bonanza for
such a period as was reasonably necessary to permit such turbulence . . . to
dissipate. The controller's breach of duty clearly was a proximate cause of
the crash of the Bonanza [Emphasis added.].l"
The Fifth Circuit in Hartz concluded by determining that the warning
which was given was insufficient. The Manual provides the precise phrase-
ology which should be used by a controller when communicating with a
pilot requesting take off clearance.12 ' Instead of following the phraseology
required by the Manual, the controller warned Hartz of "prop wash;"
the court was of the opinion that, prop wash being less severe than wake
turbulence, Hartz might have been misled to believe he would encounter
only minimal disturbance. The trial court had found the warning which
was given to be satisfactory on the ground that it was sufficient to warn the
pilot of all forms of turbulence.
Although Controller . .. warned only of prop wash, information concerning
various type turbulences . . . had been well tabulated in the publications
available to Hartz . . . and this warning . . . should have made the Bonanza
pilot cognizant of all types of turbulence. 1'
Although Hartz did not cite Franklin in support of this proposition, it is
interesting to note the language which appears in this latter case regarding
knowledge of the phenemenon.
While information had been issued in 1959 by the CAA, and by the manu-
facturer . . . which warned pilots of the effect of turbulence generated by
"large, multi-engined or jet aircraft" there was no such information available
concerning the effects of turbulence generated by helicopters.'
The question immediately arises whether the appellate Hartz language
that "he must know, or be held to know, those facts which are then
material to the safe operation of his aircraft," coupled with the Franklin
implication that knowledge of conventional aircraft wake turbulence may
be imputed, may bring about another defense--contributory negligence-
to replace defenses now challenged. The general availability of information
concerning the phenomenon, i.e., FAA, manufacturers, special interest
groups, cannot be questioned.12 It should be recognized, however, that
cognizance of the phenomenon would surely be imputed to a pilot involved
in an encounter today. The rationale of Furumizo and Hartz must be
123 Supra note 118.
124 387 F.2d at 874.
125 249 F. Supp. at 126.
126342 F.2d 581, 585 (7th Cir. 1965).
17See, e.g., Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981, 1002-008 (D. Hawaii 1965) for a
survey of such material.
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viewed as reflective of the state of art in the early 1960s when both
crashes occured.
The question still remains whether the Procedures Manual has the force
and effect of law. Furuntizo reasoned that it does not, but the Hartz court
accepted without question that it does. However, by requiring ATC to
provide a pilot with information "material to the safe operation of his
aircraft" before he can be held solely responsible for its operation, the
Hartz court eliminated the importance of the distinction. That is, even if
the Procedures Manual has the force and effect of law, ATC cannot dis-
charge the whole of its duty simply by "following the book."
IV. A SURVEY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
An examination of the extent of Government ATC liability, although
a necessary element of any consideration of the larger question of air
safety, serves only to reflect the "exposed" inadequacies of the system.
Having demonstrated that complex defenses have failed to stem the grow-
ing tide of expanding liability, the authors suggest that this trend toward
some ultimate form of absolute liability can be reversed only by a de-
tailed modification of the entire system of air safety in general and ATC
in particular. Numerous suggestions of varying value have covered the en-
tire spectrum from optimism to pessimism. Department of Transportation
Secretary Alan S. Boyd said, "I can assure you that we will act, and act
in time to solve airport congestion.. 2. At the other extreme is Walter
Binaghi, International Civil Aviation Organization Counsel President, who
has to deal with the world-wide problems of aviation. After recalling that
airport-aircraft coordination had not been very well handled when jet
transports were first introduced, he commented to the International Avia-
tion Club of Washington, "It is too late to try to do it with respect to the
jumbo jets and the SST.. 1. 9 While such exchanges were once important
only to the aviation community, general public interest is now being
generated by way of mass media, such as a recent newspaper opinion
survey of the commercial pilot view of air safety.' The survey reflected
three main trends in opinion: the need for the immediate development of
modern support facilities, the development of a collision avoidance system,
and the alleviation of the congestion problem:
Closely linked with the collision problem is the mixing of commercial and
general aviation planes.
While the pilots respected or were even boosters of general aviation, they
seemed to prefer some separation of the large and fast commercial liners
from the smaller, lighter, slower private planes."'
A trade magazine recently proposed what must be the broadest of all
recommendations for a "clean sweep."1 ' In addition to urging the de-
velopment and adoption of a great many sophisticated and expensive in-
128AMERICAN AvIATION, Aug. 1967, at 22.
129 Id.
1'0Dallas Morning News, 4 Feb. 1968, at 12A, col. 1.
131 Id.
82 FLYING, Feb. 1968, at F-I.
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ternal navigation systems, the editors proposed that:
(1) Aircraft to ATC communication be simplified through the de-
velopment of a computerized data link system, eliminating the problems
inherent in voice communications;
(2) Consideration be given to certification and widespread adoption of
commercial "automatic" (computerized) landing systems;
(3) The entire air control system under 24,000 feet be revised by adopt-
ing a dual system of corridors or "flyways," off limits to uncontrolled air-
craft, one at an upper level above 8,000 feet connecting major terminal
areas, and another for the high-density airport security zone, shaped
similar to a "mushroom" whose base extends 10 nm from the airport up
to 2,000 feet where it extends outward to 20 nm and up to the "moon,"
leaving unrestricted all other areas and
(4) A nationally-coordinated scheduling system be developed in order
to reduce existing congestion problems, to be controlled by an agency simi-
lar to the CAB.
While there seems to be general agreement that the present Airways
system is inadequate as a result of its complexity and that some new system
is vitally needed, certain aspects of the proposal failed to take overall
system needs into consideration. It was proposed by the trade magazine
that with the implementation of "automatic" landing systems and a com-
mon landing speed for all approaching aircraft, present separation mini-
mums could be reduced, thus increasing the number of aircraft using a
runway during peak traffic periods:
Takeoffs from a departure runway should be at the pilot's discretion. In any
event they need not be more than 30 seconds apart, for we shall also have a
departure speed, which, along with the scatter headings, will make conflicts
much less likely than they are now [Emphasis added.]."'
These recommendations would lessen the possibility of mid-air collisions,
but this is not the only hazard present in terminal areas; the wake turbu-
lence phenomenon may remain as a threat to the safety of encountering
aircraft for as long as several minutes. If light aircraft are to continue to
share the same runways with larger aircraft, separation minimums must
be maintained. The danger of turbulent air encounters at significantly
lower landing speeds, resulting in more difficult separation, argues for the
restriction of light, slow general aviation aircraft from terminal areas.
The deficiencies of the present system must receive priority in any
modification of ATC. A nationally coordinated scheduling system, at this
point, seems to be the most reasonable solution. The majority of travelers
today prefer to travel at the beginning and end of the business day, and
most airliners are therefore scheduled to arrive at or depart from terminal
areas at peak demand times. The system has become one of "first come-
first serve" with late arrivals left hanging in holding patterns, while in-
creasing numbers of passengers and faster aircraft can do nothing other
than increase present scheduling polarization. The present extent of polari-
13 FLYING, Feb. 1968, at F-15.
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zation and delays exists at a time when the scheduled airline industry is
operating at a 50% load factor; but if trends continue, at 90% of the
theoretical system capacity, delays will be as much as nine times as great
as those presently experienced.'34
Recently, Congress has considered the problem of airline scheduling
practices. Recognizing the preference of airlines to schedule for peak de-
mand periods, the Committee observed that, "A balance must be struck
between the convenience of passengers and the massive cost to State, local,
and Federal Governments to provide terminal area facilities adequate to
cope with the sudden surges of traffic at peak hours.""'3 The hope was
expressed that airlines will voluntarily effect changes in scheduling practices
for the good of the entire system, as well as their own financial welfare.
However, the Committee concluded by suggesting that the CAB should
consider whether it should have specific statutory authority over scheduling
practices of airlines, and that future hearings will be held on this matter.
The authors suggest that a national scheduling system will surely become
a reality, and urge that some means must also be found by which the
general aviation fleet can also operate within the system-perhaps by way
of confirmed flight plans. No longer should an aircraft be permitted to
depart without it first being determined that its arrival will be expected
and provided for.
The development of a workable and relatively inexpensive collision-
avoidance system (CAS) is something almost all elements of the aviation
industry favor. The trade magazine proposal recommends the development
of an internal (inplane) system which would function independently of
ATC supervision:
Any new air traffic control system should have as one of its primary goals
to reduce the pilot's dependence on the controller as the source of all truth.
The controller should become more a monitor, back stopping the pilot's
skills and alerting him to any deviation from the programmed flight, or any
unforeseen hazard.1
36
It was further proposed that aircraft be equipped with a television re-
ceiver to reproduce ATC's central radar scope so that, each aircraft being
equipped with a transponder, a pilot could serve as his own controller:
"[W]e will have relegated the controller to the role of observer. Pilots
could simply fly along the paths, keeping their own spacing from the plane
ahead, looking out for conflicting traffic and in general minding their own
business."''.. This suggestion seems most inconsistent with other aspects of
the proposal. If data link, automatic landing, flyways corridors, national
scheduling and other highly coordinated systems are to be recommended,
it seems unwise and illogical to place such a degree of control in the pilot.
A noted systems authority recently pointed out that such a degree of
114 ASTRONAUTICS & AERONAUTICS, Sept. 1967, at 13.
'35 Hearings on the National Airport System Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1968).
13
6 Supra note 132, at F-13.
13 Id.
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self-contained control is both unworkable and unwise."' In observing that
one of the principle problems facing air safety in general and ATC in
particular is the lack of a modernized electronic system, it was suggested
that one of the reasons for the existence of a gap between available air-
craft and an adequate accompanying support system is "self-contained
vs. cooperative air-ground electronics."
Whenever possible the desire to "go it alone" with airborne "self-contained"
electronics devices acquired by the operator rather than "cooperative" devices
requiring cooperative, matching ground installations installed by others seems
to prevail.
However, the complexities of purposely bringing aircraft into the proximity
of one another, to achieve maximum use of the airspace is an effective ATC
system, may not be fully achieved by this concept since centralized ground
authority is challenged by air-derived authority.
Adoption of air-to-air collision-avoidance equipment would in essence place
the burden of safe air traffic operations oh the back of the individual air-
craft.'39
In any reorganization of the present ATC system, one of the basic
objectives must be increased coordination rather than continued independ-
ence. Not only must planners become concerned for the development of
a domestic coordinated system, for the overall benefit of air safety, but
consideration must also be given to the creation of a system which will
intermesh and cooperate with the ATC systems of foreign nations. The
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and other international
representatives of aviation have suggested the adoption of bilateral arrange-
ments leading to the creation of such coordinated systems." °
Before any modification of ATC may be undertaken, general aviation's
impact on the system must be considered. Although both segments are
essential to the continued growth of the industry, the relationship between
general aviation and the scheduled airlines seems to be one of antagonism.
ATA's proposals for an improved ATC system carry with them the "un-
derstanding" that general aviation's use of terminal areas should be greatly
restricted; "1' and general aviation's reaction is understandably to the con-
trary.' General aviation interests contend that, because of the scheduled
airline's powerful lobbying groups, the public as well as the nation's legis-
'3 Supra note 134, at 8.
139Supra note 134, at 8-12.
"0 First Report of the ICAO Legal Committee's Subcommittee on the Liability of Air Traffic
Control Agencies, ICAO LC/SC/LATC No. 19, at 16 (1946); Larsen, Air Traffic Control: A
Recommendation for a Proof of Fault System Without a Limitation on Liability, 32 J. AIR L.
& COM. 3 (1966). The International Air Transport Association (IATA) is another representative
of international aviation and has also recognized (at 15) that the development of a coordinated
domestic system is at the very heart of any international system:
Up to the present there appears no reasonable possibility of developing a successful,
self-sufficient and non-cooperative system. Such a system, if developed, would provide
complete protection for all aircraft equipped with it, even against unequipped air-
craft. Therefore, work is directed towards developing a cooperative system in which
all aircraft would have to carry at least a minimum amount of equipment, such as
a transponder which would be light and cheap enough for the bulk of general
aviation.
141 Supra note 8.
142 Supra note 10.
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lators have been misled to believe air safety's present unfortunate condition
is wholly a result of general aviation. The Aircraft Owners and Pilot's
Association (AOPA), in its policy statement regarding recent proposals
to bar or restrict general aviation's use of terminal area airports, has made
the attempt to place some of the many considerations into proper perspec-
tive.' At the very heart of the controversy is the question of who is en-
titled to use an airport. There are nearly 10,000 airports in the United
States, but the scheduled airlines operate out of only 525 with more than
68 percent of their business at only 22 airports. Yet, AOPA contends, the
implication seems widespread that general aviation has overrun airports
that were built for the airlines. "Major metropolitan public airports can
be reasonably compared with public highways in that both were built with
tax dollars, both are owned by the public, and both are intended for the
transportation needs of all who desire to use them."'" The federal tax
dollar contributed to the development of the airport system now approxi-
mates $70,000,000 annually. "General aviation interests have provided
more than 6,400 privately owned airports to serve general aviation. The
airlines own no airports and depend entirely on the public airport system
to meet the needs of their profit-making operations.''. In addition, AOPA
suggests that the 110,000 general aviation aircraft provide service between
the airports, comprising 95 % of the whole, not served by the scheduled
airlines 2,300 aircraft.
While AOPA makes a logical argument regarding general aviation's
right to unrestricted use of all public airports, the organization's position
regarding ATC seems incorrect. In the policy statement it was observed:
[O]ur traffic control system was designed primarily to keep aircraft separated
only in bad weather when pilots were not able to see each other.
The airline's insistence on using the air traffic control system even when
weather does not require it is an attempt to shift some of the responsibility
for avoiding other traffic to the Federal controllers. 4 '
In the early 1930's, during the existence of Air Traffic Control, Inc. and
shortly thereafter, such was the primary objective of ATC"'4 but to sug-
gest that today's system should be so limited seems most questionable.
The authority of ATC and the requirements it imposes on aircraft in its
traffic can only increase as a result of any extension of the system, partic-
ularly if added coordination is to be considered a basic objective. No longer
can "see-and-be-seen" traffic avoidance be permitted in our terminal areas,
and it follows that use of these areas will require additional instrumentation
by much of the general aviation fleet. In addition, when all factors are
weighed, it is likely that general aviation's free access to all airports may
be severely limited for the benefit of the entire system.
The plight of general aviation has not gone unrecognized by Congress;
14' Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association, The Truth About General Aviation (Feb. 1968).
114Id. at 9.
15Supra note 143, at 11.
146 Supra note 143, at 14.
147 Supra text at 3.
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recent hearings of the Aviation Subcommittee to the Senate Committee
on Commerce have considered in detail the problems raised by representa-
tives of general aviation. While the Committee recognized that general
aviation has criticized extensively and unfairly that mass media has often
placed responsibility for system shortcomings upon general aviation and
that general aviation has often been treated as the "black sheep" of the
industry without regard to its importance or right to utilize the system,
it was agreed that a large degree of the severe congestion which presently
exists is a result of the increasing use of small, general aviation aircraft.
The Committee urged that, "The ideal and ultimate solution is the pro-
vision of separate and equal airport facilities for general aviation in major
hub areas." ' In 1961, the Federal Airport Act was extended to this end
by providing for $7-million annually for reliever airport construction.
However, this proposal offers only a long-term solution to the problem
which plagues the system today. The Committee concluded by observing:
There can and must be achieved a better utilization of the existing airport
system even though it may require a break with past traditions or philoso-
phies about the free and unlimited access to airports. The cost of an airport
development program based on free and unlimited access to all airports by
all segments of aviation would far exceed the price that State, local, and
Federal Governments can or will pay. Better utilization of existing airports
and construction of separate and equal general aviation airports at sub-
stantially smaller cost is a more reasonable and desirable course.'49
With very few exceptions, controllers are highly trained, highly skilled
and most concerned about ATC's ability or inability to handle present and
future demands, for to speak of Government liability is, in many cases, to
speak in terms of the human errors of controllers, often a result of factors
they cannot wholly control. The National Association of Government
Employees (NAGE), which represents the interests of FAA controllers,
has recently appealed to Congress for a complete revision of present
policies.' "The general position of the National Association of Govern-
ment Employees is that the Federal Aviation Agency is seriously under-
equipped, under-manned, under-compensated and under-administered-all
to a point of public peril ..... Observing that what ATC in the United
States needs today is the kind of jolt Ralph Nader gave automotive safety,
NAGE went on to point out many of the deficiencies that presently exist
in the FAA regarding manpower, particularly as such deficiencies play a
part in the shortcomings of the system already discussed. Illustrative of
the exploding growth of aviation, in terms of increasing workloads and
decreasing numbers of controllers, is the traffic load growth experienced at
the Los Angeles ATC Center over the last several years: In the month of
September, 1965, 47,066 operations and a staff of 285; and in September,
1966, 56,594 operations and a staff of 285.'" In the absence of great
148 Supra note 135, at 8.
149 Supra note 159, at 9.
0 National Association of Government Employees, Statement to Congress Relative to the Critical
Need to Improve Facilities and Add Personnel to the Federal Aviation Agency (1967).
1511d. at 1.
152 Supra note 150, at 9.
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technological advancements, there is nothing to suggest that this trend will
not continue. NAGE suggested that technological advancements have been
limited, to a great extent, as a result of the FAA's present "cost-cutting,
penny-squeezing policies," as evidenced by the recent widely publicized
letter from President Johnson to the FAA Administrator:
I have noted with satisfaction the excellent work which you and your asso-
ciates at the Federal Aviation Agency have been doing in reducing costs and
manpower while absorbing additional workload and improving service to the
public.
I have taken particular note of your cost reduction program under which
you saved $47 million during the 1966 fiscal year. These savings have been
accompanied by a reduction in Agency employment of more than 3,500
employees-eight percent since 1963."a
NAGE believes that this policy lies behind the fact that while demand on
the system has increased 30% to 50% in the last few years, the number
of controllers has decreased by 2 5 % to 40%. Private industry is under-
standably a more attractive employer for prospective controllers, as a result
of increasing workloads, lack of time-off, low pay and the mental strain
that accompanies the $100,000,000 plus in damages presently being sought
against the Government for ATC-related crash cases. NAGE concluded its
appeal by urging that, as a further result of present fiscal policies, the FAA
is following an arbitrary budgetary constriction permitting of just so
much safety and no more.""
V. CONCLUSION
Over the last several years hundreds of studies have been made concern-
ing the many complex aspects of air safety; and the viewpoints presented
have varied from complete support to complete condemnation. None of
the articles and viewpoints surveyed here were intended to represent any
"correct" approach. Rather, they serve to reflect some of the most recent
thinking on the subject by diverse elements of the aviation industry. Cer-
tain recommendations have been made which will surely play an important
role in any reorganization of ATC:
1. "Flyways" systems of positive air control.
153 Id.
154 Supra note ISO, at 11. At 16 NAGE concluded by urging that Congress consider the
following:
1. The immediate enactment of legislation authorizing a 20% increase of Controller
staffing at all Air Traffic Control Centers, Air Traffic Control Towers, Flight Service
Stations.
2. The enactment of legislation authorizing a 20% increase in the electronic and
technician field as it related to Airway Facility Branch activities.
3. An immediate cessation of the arbitrary "phase out".of vital electronic devices
at Air Traffic Control Stations.
4. Congress enact legislation implementing an "ad hoc" standing committee com-
prised of active journeymen Air Traffic Control specialists who will be assigned a
continuing role of submitting recommendations concerning air traffic control pro-
cedures to Congress yearly.
5. We recommend that legislation be enacted whereby all air traffic electronic com-
puters, control systems, and their allied equipment will be inspected and maintained
on a continual "preventative maintenance" system rather than the present system
which requires equipment failure prior to maintenance being performed.
6. Congress approve additional funds for the updating and purchase of modern
Radar and Electronic equipment for all types of Air Traffic Control.
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2. Improvement of air-ground communication through the develop-
ment of a data link system.
3. Development and use of commercial "automatic" landing systems.
4. Creation of a nationally-coordinated scheduling system.
5. Development of a ground-coordinated collision avoidance system.
6. Added coordination at all levels of system development.
7. Construction of separate but fully equipped general aviation airports.
8. Reconsideration of FAA employment policies.
The FAA is presently working to improve the system as quickly as
possible, but a lack of funds presents the largest single obstacle to any
modification of the present system. A modification as vast as here described
could cost in excess of $100,000,000, and such funds are simply not avail-
able from present Department of Transportation appropriations. Vying for
the available Government transportation dollar, the aviation lobby must
compete with other groups seeking improved highways or shipping pro-
grams. How, then, can the needed funds for such a modification be
acquired? If the necessary funds are not available from the Federal Govern-
ment, consideration next turns to the users of the system. The availability
of this source of funds has been recognized:
When the Administration's air safety proposals go to Congress next month,
they will have price tags attached. The price of en-route safety, as well as
of better terminal area safety, will be spelled out in a supplemental appropria-
tions request for the FAA.
The price will also be spelled out in terms of new and increased user charges.
These may take the form of a raise in the 5 percent ticket tax, and a similar
increase in the fuel tax for general aviation aircraft.
A federal head tax is not likely to be part of the financing package. It is
possible, however, for local airport authorities-with federal encouragement-
to pay for needed improvements that cannot be financed through the Federal
Aid to Airports Program."'
While such a proposal is certainly a step in the right direction, the
authors suggest that more should be done. If adopted, general aviation
will bear more of the growing costs of the system through increased
fuel taxes, and passengers will be required to share in the costs through
additional ticket taxes; but the scheduled airlines would not be required
to participate. Unless the scheduled airlines are prevented from passing
on some of the costs directly to passengers by limiting profit margins, a
valuable and ready source of funds will be lost. Furthermore, the authors
suggest that funds should be acquired through the implementation of
some form of ATC use fee, not unlike present airport landing fees. The
growing mobility of the citizens of the United States calls for the placing
of a new emphasis on the transportation industry. A vital element of that
system is ATC, which will surely undergo a great modification in the next
several years. Its users should be required to bear a large portion of the
costs.
Joan T. Winn d€ Milton E. Douglass, Jr.
'55 AIRLINE MARKETING & MANAGEMENT, Mar. 1968, at 95.
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Bankruptcy - Equitable Liens - Notice
On 27 August 1961, a Navy jet crashed into a business establishment
known as Bargain City, U. S. A., Inc. Bargain City brought a claim against
Arkwright Insurance Co. (under a policy insuring the rental value of its
buildings, including damages suffered by impact of aircraft), which Ark-
wright held in abeyance while Bargain City sought recovery against the
United States Government under the Military Claims Act.' Bargain City
and the Navy reached agreement, but, because the total was over $5,000,
a Congressional appropriation was needed. In March 1962, Bargain City
requested and received a $100,000 "advance" from Arkwright, which
was to be repaid with part of the fund appropriated by Congress for the
settlement of the Bargain City claim.
Seven months later, on 19 November 1962, Bargain City filed a debtor's
petition under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Arkwright's advance
of $100,000 was placed on Schedule A-3,' while the claim against the
Government was placed on Schedule B-3.' On Schedule A-3 was a nota-
tion that the $100,000 was an advance on the claim against the United
States Navy. (Though creditors are to be notified within ten days after
the filing of the petition, Arkwright did not receive notice until 23 Jan-
uary 1963, two months later. Arkwright made neither formal appearance
nor claim during the remainder of the proceedings.) After Congress ap-
propriated the money for the claim, Arkwright asserted its claim in district
court and sought a temporary restraining order to prevent Bargain City
from distributing the funds.
The district court found that although it had advanced $100,000 to the
insured in anticipation of reimbursement from funds obtained by a claim
against the Government, Arkwright obtained no assignment; it also failed
to perfect its claimed lien under state law. The case was appealed; the
asserted error was failure to find an equitable lien. Held, affirmed: Assum-
ing arguendo that there was an equitable lien, Arkwright's inaction during
the remainder of the Chapter XI proceedings changed both the equities and
the legal result in the case, i.e., even if there had been an equitable lien,
it would have been extinguished by Arkwright's inaction. Arkwright
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bargain City, U. S. A., Inc., 373 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir.
1967).
The specific area of concern is equitable liens, their nature, development,
and the part they play in arrangement proceedings. Numerous amendments
to the Bankruptcy Act, originally passed in 1898,' deal with this problem
in the context of Section 60 (a) of the Act.'
' Military Claims Act of 1956, as amended, 1958, 10 U.S.C. S 2733 (1964). Bargain City could
also have proceeded under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964).
"Creditors Whose Claims Are Unsecured" is the title of Schedule A-3.
3 "Choses in Action" is the title of Schedule B-3.
' Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (also called the Nelson Act) 30 Stat. 544, Title 11 U.S.C.
$Bankruptcy Act S 60(a), 64 Stat. 24, 11 U.S.C. S 96(a) (1964).
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I. THE NATURE OF AN EQUITABLE LIEN
An equitable lien arises generally in two ways. First, it may arise from
an express written executory agreement often called an equitable assign-
ment. There may be an assignment of a chose in action or of future
acquisitions, but to be an effective "equitable assignment" there must be an
absolute appropriation of the debt or fund sought to be assigned by the
assignor (debtor). The equitable lien upon the specific property enables
the assignee (creditor) to obtain satisfaction of his debt by resorting
to the debtor's property over which he has established a charge, i.e., it gives
the creditor a security interest. Second, the equitable lien may be implied
by a court of equity out of general considerations of right and justice as
applied to relations of the parties and circumstances of their dealings.
The equitable lien differs from the common law lien in two significant
characteristics: (1) in the former possession remains with the debtor or
the person holding the proprietary interest, while in the latter possession is
with the creditor; and (2) in the former no notice is required for validity,
while in the latter some manner of recording is necessary for its validity.
The two indispensable elements of an equitable lien are (1) the intent
of the parties to give and take security and (2) the identification of
property.' In establishing intent the time at which the security is estab-
lished must be distinguished from the time at which the goods upon which
there is an equitable lien come into existence. Thus, an agreement that
takes the form of one to given security in the future may fail because the
idea of future action destroys the evidence of present intent. However, if
the property to be charged by the equitable lien is a fund to come into
existence in the future, or a crop yet to be harvested, this future action
does not destroy an equitable lien if there is a present intent to establish
security. Yet in every case, there is the question: What facts will give the
creditor a claim upon the property still in the control of the debtor?'
Obviously, the shaky nature of equitable liens rests upon a delicate ap-
praisal of the facts.
Because the obligation in equity is ethical rather than jural, i.e., the
good conscience considers all things, the equitable lien has an amorphous
nature. Thus, it is not extraordinary that the existence of an equitable
lien has often been determined by its economic justification.' Many times
the creditor (lienor) is willing to risk that the goods on which he has a
lien may be sold to an innocent purchaser; he may even authorize such a
sale. He holds his equitable lien for the sole reason of protection in case
'BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 632-33 (4th ed. 1951).
'Britton, Equitable Liens-A Tentative Analysis of the Problem, 8 N. C. L. REv. 388, 389
(1930).
'Id. at 393.
Old. at 399-400. "It is a question of the development of an economic justification for a series
of situations where security interests not based in possession or record are enforced against third
parties and the reconciliation of these results with a policy which clashes fundamentally with it-
the policy of enforcing security interests against third parties when based on possession or record.
No amount of legalistic refinement can obscure the fact that we are presuming contradictory
policies."
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the debtor becomes insolvent. While the debtor remains solvent the col-
lision of economic interests is not evident; the catalyst is insolvency.
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
Of importance is the Uniform Commercial Code and its relation to the
Bankruptcy Act. Article 9 of the Code consolidates into one security
device, known as a "security agreement," all prior conventional forms of
security instruments." The approach of the Bankruptcy Act, passed two
years earlier, is to determine whether creditors are secured or unsecured,
and if unsecured, whether they are entitled to a priority. In doing this,
the traditional terms of equitable lien, legal lien, or phrases covering such
things as chattel mortgages are used. The different approaches of the Code
and the Bankruptcy Act provide some anxiety when Section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act is mated with Article 9 of the Code.
The original Bankruptcy Act of 1898 had subsequent revisions in
1903," 1910,' and 1926,' all of which sought to strike down so-called
"secret transfers," which were transfers executed but undisclosed by re-
cording or change of possession until immediately before bankruptcy."
In conflict with this anti-secret transfer policy of the Bankruptcy Act
is the "equitable lien doctrine" which holds that equity will give effect
to an agreement that purports to create a charge on or interest in the prop-
erty, but which agreement lacks some act or is not otherwise sufficient to
create a legal charge thereon. The case law never resolved the dilemma-
never accomplished both the Congressional intent to strike down secret
transfers and yet satisfy the commercial necessity for an unimpeded flow
of credit partly through the use of equitable liens.
Equitable liens normally become involved in bankruptcy proceedings
through an agreement to pledge certain property as security for a loan
without actual delivery of possession to the creditor. Local law determines
whether an immediate right was created by such an agreement. If a right
were not created, no equitable lien existed, and completion of the pledge
by delivery within four months before the filing of the petition amounts
to a preference that may be avoided by the trustee. But, if the agreement
fixed an immediate right as to specific property then there was an equit-
able lien. Next, it must be decided whether this was a "good" or a "bad"
equitable lien. If "good," the lien may be completed by a transfer of
possession even within four months, because actual taking of possession is
merely the exercise of a right which existed from the time of the agreement
" The security agreement is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties unless signed by
the debtor and it contains a description of collateral. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-203 (1).
11 Bankruptcy Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 797-801.
52 Bankruptcy Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 838-42.
1 Bankruptcy Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 662-68.
I" Usually, the creditor with the incumbrance perfected it as far as possible shortly before
bankruptcy.
15 An examination of 5 60(a) (6) will show that there are two classes of equitable liens, both
"good" and "bad." Only those where available means of perfecting egal liens have not been em-
ployed are "bad," i.e.,- will be- invalidated. See 2 E. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PIERSONAL
PROPERTY, 5 45.7 (1965).
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when actual transfer of the "interest" took place. As long as the agreemient
created a present charge or interest in the property involved (more than
four months before), it is not necessary that the property be in existence at
the time of the agreement." The most important considerations are Sections
60(a) (2) and 60(a) (6). It must be determined: (1) whether there is
a legal lien or (2) whether there is an equitable lien that with some overt
action could have become a legal lien.
If the transfer gives rise to a "legal" lien as in the case of the ordi-
nary chattel mortgage, it is governed by 60(a) (2)," 7 and its preferential
nature is to be judged as of the time it was prefected against subsequent
lien creditors."8
Under 60(a) (6)" a transfer that creates an equitable lien is not per-
fected, i.e., is a "bad" equitable lien, if the creditor fails to take some
overt action-recording or delivery of possession-as required by state
law that could have qualified it as a legal lien."0 Thus, of the two categories
of equitable liens delineated 'in 60 (a) (6)-"good" and "bad"--only the
latter are invalidated. In the case of after-acquired property (similar to
the situation in the present case"), there usually is a means of perfecting
" The distinction has been drawn, some feel with great difficulty, between agreements that give
rise to a present charge and those that merely constitute a promise to later execute a lien or create
a charge on the property, regardless of the specificity of identification. In the instant case, careful
examination of the language of the agreement allows such a distinction to be drawn. Arkwright
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 221, 224-26 (1966). Some trouble has
been caused by the confusion of the liened property coming into existence in the future with
whether the present charge or security comes into existence in the future at the same time. The se-
curity may exist before the property on which there is a charge, i.e., before the chose of action is
converted into a money judgment.
" Section 60(a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act provides: For the purposes of subdivisions a and b
of this section, a transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed to have been made
or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property
obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the
rights of the transferee. A transfer of real property shall be deemed to have been made or suffered
when it became so far perfected that no subsequent bona fide purchase from the debtor could create
rights in such property superior to the rights of the transferee. If any transfer of real property
is not perfected against a bona fide purchase, or if any transfer of other property not so per-
fected against such liens by legal or equitable proceedings under this Act, it shall be deemed' to
have been made immediately before the filing of the petition.
183 W. COLLIER, ON BANKRUPTCY 1 60.50 (14th ed. 1967).
"Section 60(a) (6) of the Bankruptcy Act provides: The recognition of equitable liens where
available means of perfecting legal liens have not been employed is hereby declared to be contrary
to the policy of this section. If a transfer is for security and if (A) applicable law requires a
signed and delivered writing, or a delivery of possession, or a filing or recording, or other like overt
action as a condition to its full validity against third persons other than a buyer in the ordinary
course of trade claiming through or under the transferor and (B) such overt action has not been
taken, and (C) such transfer results in the acquisition of only an equitable lien, then such transfer
is not perfected within the meaning of paragraph (2). Notwithstanding the first sentence of para-
graph (2), it shall not suffice to perfect a transfer which creates an equitable lien such as is
described in the first sentence of paragraph (6), that it is made for a valuable consideration and
that both parties intend to perfect it and that they take action sufficient to effect a transfer as
against liens by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract: Provided, however, That
where the debtor's own interest is only equitable, he can perfect a transfer thereof by any 'seans
appropriate fully to transfer an interest of that character: And provided further, That nothing
in paragraph (6) shall be construed to be contrary to the provisions of paragraph (7).
'0 What must be watched carefully is when in sections 60(a) (2) and 60(a) (6) a lien-legal
or equitable-must be good against only subsequent lien creditors and when it must be good
against bona fide purchasers other than trade customers, i.e., full validity against any third person
other than a buyer in the ordinary course of trade. Each must be satisfied so as not to be ruled
a preference which may be avoided by the trustee.
ai With Arkwright Insurance, the new account came into existence after Bargain City's bank.
ruptcy.
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a legal lien, e.g., the execution of a supplemental assignment or chattel
mortgage when the new accounts, new crops, or after-acquired mer-
chandise comes into existence or into the debtor's ownership." If some-
thing remains to be done that could have made the equitable lien a legal
lien (i.e., a "bad" equitable lien) it will be invalid, just as the legal lien
that falls short of its prerequisites is invalid.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DECIsION
The district court was correct in concluding that no equitable lien
existed in favor of Arkwright, but was incorrect when it assumed that
if there were .an equitable lien it was a "bad" equitable lien under the
Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code. Though the Code would re-
quire that a financing statement be filed before a security interest could
be perfected," the Code would exclude the Arkwright case from its cover-
age because it was an insurance case and a tort action." There being no way
to perfect a legal lien (security interest) under the local law, the Arkwright
lien could have been a "good" equitable lien if it had met the basic re-
quirements of present intent and specific property.
The court of appeals recognized this mistake of the district court, and
yet sidestepped the primary question-the existence of an equitable lien-
which, if confronted, should have been answered in the negative. Although
there was proper identification of the property supposedly charged-the
Congressional appropriation-it is submitted that the agreement did not
give rise to a present charge on the property. It merely set forth a promise
to execute or create such a lien in the future.2
But assuming arguendo, as the circuit court did, that there was an equit-
able lien, the court erred when it found the lien ineffective to give secured
creditor status to Arkwright and required notice for its effectiveness. First,
unsecured creditors are those who have extended credit to the bankrupt
on open account but secured creditors, in the bankruptcy sense, have an
interest in the property of the bankrupt. Either a legal lien or an equitable
22 3 W. COLLIER, ON BANKRUPTCY 5 60.50 (14th ed. 1967). In practice this means that unless
an equitable lien, that could have been perfected into a legal lien, has full validity under state
law as against all the world except trade customers, the preferential character of the transfer will
be determined as of the time it was perfected as a legal lien, without "relation back," or if not
so perfected into a legal lien before bankruptcy, as if the transfer had been made contemporane-
ously with the filing of the petition, and thus avoided by the trustee.
The application of 60(a) (6) is also subject to possible variance depending upon the effect of
a state's recording acts. If recording of an equitable lien that is supposed to cover after-acquired
property does not give constructive notice against both lien creditors and bona fide purchasers other
than buyers in the course of trade, subsequent perfection of the supposed lien, would be termed
preferential if the requisite elements (of a voidable preference) were then present. Another possi-
bility is that if an assignment of future accounts of future funds creates under state law an
equitable lien, invalid against bona fide purchasers but which later becomes a legal lien, the transfer
will be considered a voidable preference if all elements were later present. It is now generally
thought that equitable liens are for the most part, but not completely, eliminated in bankruptcy
by various provisions of the present act. If section 60 does not void the equitable lien, it still may
be dispensed with under sections 67, 70(c) and (e).
23 Uniform Commercial Code 5 9-302.
24 Uniform Commercial Code 55 9-104(g) and (k).
"S It is not the future creation of the property charged but the lack of intent in the words of
the agreement to show Arkwright had a present interest in the fund to be acquired. Supra, note 16.
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lien (if recognized by 60(a) (2) or 60(a) (6) respectively) gives an
interest in the property of the bankrupt to the creditor. Therefore, only
unsecured creditors must file and prove their claims, and secured creditors
with valid liens on a debtor's property are not so affected by the confirma-
tion of the arrangement as to lose their rights to recover their liened
property, unless actively participating and accepting a plan modifying
their rights."
Second, Arkwright's equitable lien could have remained unaffected by
the arrangement proceedings for the additional reason that since the 1958
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act," a debtor can alter arrangement pro-
ceedings after confirmation if he will be unable to pay the consideration
called for- which is the case if Arkwright removes $100,000 from the
distributable assets by its equitable lien-if there is a retention of the
jurisdiction by the court-which is necessary here with the Congressional
appropriation following the arrangement proceedings. Thus, notice to the
trustee during the proceedings seems unnecessary to the maintenance of
an equitable lien.
The Third Circuit seemingly departed from previous decisions in de-
claring that actual notice is required for an equitable lien and that this
notice is to be given during arrangement proceedings. Because an equitable
lien can be implied by a court of equity from general considerations of
right and justice as applied to particular parties and their relations, the
court most likely felt that they should for the same considerations deny
effectiveness to such a lien in absence of notice during the proceedings.
But Arkwright thought it was a secured creditor, and felt no need to par-
ticipate in the proceedings. Therefore, to require actual notice of an
equitable lien holder who occupies the position of a secured creditor and
not to require the same from a legal lien holder does not seem to con-
tribute to clarification of the doctrine of equitable liens."
It is submitted that the court should have found that there was no
equitable lien at all, i.e., that the instruments conveyed upon the advance-
ment of the $100,000 to Bargain City did not create a present right in
"
6J. T. Sinclair v. Baker Coal, 249 N.W. 13 (Sup. Ct. of Mich. 1933). Also see C. NADLER,
THE LAW op BANKRUPTCY, S§ 563-66 (2d ed. 1965). The secured creditor has three choices:
(1) he may disregard the bankruptcy proceeding entirely and decline to file a claim, relying on his
security; (2) he may surrender or waive his security entirely and prove his claim as an unsecured
creditor; or (3) he may avail himself of his security and share in the general assets as to the unse-
cured balance. To follow the second alternative the secured creditor must give up to the trustee the
entire security and prove his claim entirely as an unsecured creditor. This is what Arkwright
probably meant to avoid because of the limited resources available to be dispersed and thus decided
to follow the first alternative, the third not being applicable to the situation. Besides, who would
ever take less than the full amount if they could have all by retaining his equitable lien by not
entering the arrangement proceedings?
27Bankruptcy Act, S§ 363, 368, and 387, 72 Stat. 820-22, 11 U.S.C. SS 763, 768, and 787
(1964).
" The time of notice in a legal lien is at the time of the creation of the lien, usually by
recording or change of possession, in most cases under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Under the reasoning of the Third Circuit, the time of notice (actual and not constructive
as would be allowed in legal liens) for equitable liens would be during the arrangement proceed-
ings. Yet, in the past, notice has been considered an element that distinguished legal from equitable
liens, with only legal liens requiring notice. Therefore, requiring actual notice for contin'ued ex-
istence of equitable liens shatters this well-worn distinction.
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Arkwright, in the form of an equitable lien on the future Congressional
appropriation, but constituted merely a promise to execute or create such
a lien in the future. Hence, Arkwright's "lien" did not fail because the
property was to come into being in the future, nor because of a lack of
notice, but simply because the agreement did not manifest an intention to
create a present security. Even today, the clarity that noted authorities
have called for since the 193 0's does not exist though there have been major
changes in the Bankruptcy Act and subsequent case law. Perhaps the
stumbling block today is that the semantics and conceptual approach of
Article 9 of the UCC on security interests cannot be reconciled with the
Bankruptcy Act passed in 1950.29 In attempting this reconciliation, the
Third Circuit has thought it wise to require notice of equitable liens to
be given during the course of arrangement proceedings.
John H. Germeraad
29 See 2 E. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, 5 45.7 (1965).
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Air Freight Forwarder - Civil Aeronautics Board
Authorization
A petition was brought by eight scheduled airlines including the six
largest domestic carriers, by all-cargo carriers, by air freight forwarders
and by industry representatives seeking review of the CAB's authorization
for four long-haul motor carriers to enter into the air freight forwarding
market. The authorization for an experimental period of five years was
a result of the January, 1966 Motor Carrier-Air Freight Forwarder In-
vestigation in which the Examiner observed that, "the applicants, by pro-
viding sophisticated management, personnel, and equipment and devoting
their well-financed experienced organization to the generation and trans-
portation of cargo by air, will contribute a substantial benefit to the
public."1 The findings of the Examiner were subsequently adopted by the
Board, which concluded that authorization of such long-haul carriers to
act as air freight forwarders "should increase the intermodal carriage of
freight by air and truck;" it regarded its decision "a real breakthrough in
opening up the most hopeful avenue for increasing intermodal transporta-
tion of freight by surface and air." The Board also thought that, "The
participation ... of motor carriers like the applicants may well be neces-
sary to achieve the full promise of air cargo."2 In the instant petition for
review, the question was raised "whether the Board has established a policy
of entry for all truckers who want to act as air freight forwarders or has
merely granted the four applications that were before it . . . ," Held,
order vacated and cause remanded for further proceedings: "Reading the
opinion [of the Board] as a commitment to grant authorizations to all
comers, we find it wanting in careful investigation, the substantial evidence
and the rational explication that are demanded before an expert agency
may lawfully embark on a new course apparently so fraught with danger
to the industry Congress has confided to its regulation and seemingly so
opposed to the general policy Congress has long decreed." ABC Air Freight
Co., Inc. v. C.A.B., 36 U.S.L.W. 2577, 10 Av. Cas. 17,775 (2d Cir. 1968).
In order to understand the significance of this decision and the CAB
attitude it seemingly reflects, it is necessary to consider in detail the nature
of an air freight forwarder, as well as the previous Board policy regarding
authorizations.
Air freight forwarders, like their surface counterparts, are common carriers
who consolidate individual shipments into bulk lots for transportation. In
addition, they perform certain other services, such as picking up freight at
the point of origin, delivering it to its ultimate destination from air terminals,
1ABC Air Freight Co. v. CAB, 10 Av. Cas. 17,775, 17,776 (2d Cir. 1968).
2 10 Av. Cas. at 17,777.
3 Id.
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and planning the routing of shipments. Forwarders do not themselves perform
the basic transportation; this is done by an underlying air or surface carrier."
Air freight forwarders occupy a unique status when compared to other
forms of carriage. Pursuant to Sec. 296.11' of the Civil Aeronautics Board's
Economic Regulations they are exempted from the certificate provisions
of Sec. 401' of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, but must obtain letters
of registration or authorization. Although they operate no aircraft, air
freight forwarders are classified as indirect air carriers by Sec. 101 (3) of
the Act, which defines as an air carrier anyone who undertakes, directly
or indirectly, to engage in air transportation and further provides that
the CAB may exempt air carriers "not directly engaged in the operation
of aircraft in .air transportation from such provisions of the Act as it
finds to be in the public interest."7 No certificate of public convenience
and necessity has been required and the Board has followed a policy of
purported "free entry" by all desirous comers, leaving to competitive
factors the narrowing of the market and the establishment of rates.
At the same time that the air freight forwarder escapes the regulation
of the CAB, it also remains unregulated by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC). Normally, all movement of property in interstate com-
merce by motor vehicles is regulated by the ICC, but authority over air
cargo pickup and delivery is limited by Sec. 203 (b) (7a) of the Inter-
state Commerce Act. This section exempts from economic regulation all
motor vehicle transportation "incidental to transportation by aircraft."
The Commission continues to maintain the position that motor transporta-
tion is "incidental" to air transportation when that motor transportation
"is limited to a bona fide collection, delivery, or transfer service within
the reasonable terminal area of the air carrier."8 Such exempted service
has generally been limited to strictly inter-city service within a twenty-
five mile radius of the air terminal.! Without ICC certification, motor
vehicle transportation normally within the purview of the Commission's
regulatory powers is prohibited beyond this point, either by the air freight
forwarder or in conjunction with another motor carrier. However, it has
been suggested that the twenty-five mile limitation has an unfair and
detrimental competitive effect upon the air freight forwarder industry
and serves only to benefit the certificated motor carrier."
A cursory survey of applicable statutory materials would indicate that
entry into the air freight forwarder industry is almost wholly unrestricted.
4 National Air Freight Forwarding Corp. v. CAB, 197 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
5 CAB, Economic Regulations § 296.11 (1967).
672 Stat. 754, as amended, 76 Stat. 143, 49 U.S.C. 5 1371 (1964).
(a) No air carrier shall engage in any air transportation unless there is in force a
certificate issued by the Board authorizing such air carrier to engage in such trans-
portation.7 Comment, Intermodal Transportation and the Freight Forwarder, 76 YALE L.J. 1360, 1369
(1967).
8 Note, Regulation of Air Freight, Pickup and Delivery, 76 YALE L.J. 405 (1966).
8Note, Administrative Law-Indirect Air Carriers-Interagency Conflict, 32 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 273 (1966).
'Snow, Air Freight Forwarding: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 485,
492 (1966).
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If this were the case, it is apparent that the instant decision of the Board
would not be subject to question. However, an examination of various
authorization proceedings before the Board clearly indicates that entry into
the market is not such a simple matter as one might assume and that a very
great limitation exists (or has existed). The present viability of this limita-
tion is the principle matter here under consideration.
It has long been the practice of the Board to deny authorization for
entry into the air freight forwarder market by applicants controlled by
interests significantly competing with air carriers. This limitation to "free
entry" serves as the very formidable "stumbling block" which any appli-
cant must overcome and is evidenced by both Board determinations and
decisional law in review of same. In the Airfreight Forwarder Investiga-
tion1 a number of authorizations were granted on the ground that "the
introduction into airfreight forwarding of organizations having exten-
sive experience and facilities in the field of surface freight or practices or
techniques which contribute to the attractiveness of the service or the
efficiency with which it can be rendered ...is consistent with our policy
which will stimulate the growth of airfreight and its utility to the public.""'
However, in passing upon the applications of other parties to the Investiga-
tion, the limitation above described played an important role.
We agree with the examiner's disapproval of the application of Air Cargo,
Inc. (ACI), for airfreight forwarder authorization .. . .We do not find it
necessary to reach the question, posed by the examiner, whether such an
authorization would involve the 23 airlines who own ACI in violation of
section 404 of the act. We agree with the examiner that this application
should be denied as not in the public interest because of the tendency to
lessen competition among the airlines which its approval would involve. In
addition, denial will avoid placing ACI in a position of special advantage
over independent forwarders, which ACI as a forwarder would occupy as a
result of its various agency functions for the airlines, and will avoid the
probable adverse effect of such an authorization upon the certificated all-
cargo carriers who are not shareholders in ACI."
Another example of Board investigations involving the limitation is the
Air Freight Forwarding Case," in which seven direct motor carriers, all
applicants being common carriers of household goods, applied for domestic
and international air freight forwarder authority. The Examiner deter-
mined that "the conduct of such operations by the applicants will not be
inconsistent with or adverse to the public interest, and will not result in
creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain competition or
jeopardize another air carrier not a party hereto .... "" The finding of
the Examiner was adopted by the Board principally due to the fact that
it was recognized that very little household goods are carried by air;
hence, there would be no diversion from air carriers. In reaching his de-
termination, the Examiner recognized that:
" 21 C.A.B. 536 (1955).
12 Id.
13 21 C.A.B. at 546.
14CAB Docket No. 12193, CAB Order No. E-21056 (10 July 1964).
15 Id.
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The Board has prohibited entry by surface carriers into the airfreight for-
warder field where it appeared that such conflicts of interest would arise
between air and surface operations as to result in material diversion of traffic
from air to surface transportation and deprive the applicants of sufficient
incentive to conscientiously promote and develop airfreight forwading.6
The policy of the Board has been repeatedly recognized and followed by
courts reviewing Board decisions. In American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB"
it was observed that "the board [has] refused to approve the control of
air freight forwarders by railroads because of the dominant position such
air forwarders would thus secure in relation to independent air forward-
ers."18 In National Air Freight Forwarding Corp. v. CAB" the decision was
against petitioners who sought review of a Board finding "that (1) Air
Freight would have a competitive advantage over air freight forwarders
resulting from its railroad connections and (2) because Air Freight was
controlled by powerful railroads, an incentive to divert potential air freight
traffic to the railroads would exist.""8 Perhaps most reflective of the Board's
policy regarding air freight forwarder authorization is the position it has
repeatedly taken on the numerous applications of Railway Express Agency,
Inc. In Railway Express Agency, Inc.-Application to Operate as Inter-
national Air Freight Forwarder" it was stated:
As the largest nongovernment carrier of small package traffic, the Railway
Express Agency's entry into international air freight forwarding might
provide a useful service. However, this factor is insufficient to override the
probable adverse impact upon the existing international air freight forwarders
and the potential effect upon. air freight transportation arising from control
of REA as an international air freight forwarder by the railroad industry."
In light of the avowed and long-standing policy of the Board to re-
strict authorization where an applicant's entry into the market would
have adverse competitive effects, the reaction of the court in the instant
matter is not surprising. Although the Board stated that, "Our purpose
in instituting this investigation was to determine whether our traditional
restrictions on surface carriers have become outmoded for motor carriers
like applicants,"" the court believed that the agency almost completely
failed to examine the effect that entry of large numbers of motor carriers
would have upon the structure of the air forwarding industry. The Board
discounted any possible adverse effect on the grounds that (1) the "inde-
pendent freight forwarders" are in an "impregnable" competitive posi-
tion at the present time and that (2) "the demise of some of the weaker
air freight forwarders may be hastened by the competition provided by
applicants." The court questioned the final impact upon the air freight
forwarding industry if the Board readily admitted that the entry of only
16 Id. at 4.
17 178 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1949).
" 178 F.2d at 909-10.
19 Supra note 4.
20 Supra note 4, at 387.
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the four applicants would bring about "the demise of some of the weaker
air freight forwarders." In 1965, of the 120 air freight forwarders the
ten largest accounted for 72.8 percent of total revenue and earned $7.2
million in pre-tax profits; the remaining 110 suffered a net operating
deficit of $1.1 million. Emery Air Freight has consistently been the leader,
earning $5.2 million and capturing 30 percent of the market, but when
compared to the long-haul motor carrier market, even Emery seems infant.
During the same period there were 50 truckers with gross revenues exceed-
ing$25 million and 20 with gross revenues of some $40 million or more.
"It is obvious as anything can be that the effect on the existing air freight
forwarders will be very different if the permission here accorded is utilized
by all long-haul carriers, almost all, many, or only four."'
While the court recognized that the Board is free to change its policy
regarding economic regulation, the court concluded that the Board's de-
cision does not measure up to the standards of clarity required by Sec. 8 (b)
of the Administrative Procedure Act.' As a result of insufficient and in-
complete findings what was done here was not modest expansion of the
existing limitation on authorizations but a total and unexplained reversal
of policy.
If the decision of the Civil Aeronautics Board in this authorization
investigation truly reflects the Board's opinion that "traditional restrictions
on surface carriers have become outmoded," it must follow that it has
been determined that the present air freight forwarder industry is suffi-
ciently strong to withstand any competition long-haul truckers can offer.
However, this does not seem to be the case when the financial backgrounds
of the two are compared. Consolidated Freightways, one of the four
applicants, is one of the most powerful long-haul carriers in the nation
and has amassed revenues more than three times as large as the air freight
forwarder industry leader-Emery. If the Board is ready to permit direct
competition of this magnitude then it must follow that a reexamination is
needed of other segments of the transportation industry-notably of the
railroad dominated REA, which has long and unsuccessfully sought
authorization. It would not seem to do harm to what has been proposed
here to suggest that the air freight forwarder industry is also strong enough
to withstand the competitive impact of the railroad industry. Obviously,
these are matters of great importance, the determination of which requires
detailed and well-considered deliberations. If the Board does desire to re-
verse its policy, the entire future of the air freight forwarder industry will
be deeply affected. The reviewing court was correct in requiring more of
the Board than its initial deliberations reflect, and it is suggested that a
24 10 Av. Cas. at 17,778.
25 60 Stat. 236, 5 U.S.C. S 1001 (1964), as recently construed in Northeast Airlines, Inc. v.
CAB, 331 F.2d 579, 586 (list Cir. 1964).
Courts ought not have to speculate as to the basis of an administrative agency's
conclusion. Indeed, to prevent just such speculation S 8(b) of the Administrative
Procedure Act .. . provides that all agency decisions shall include not only the
appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief or denial thereof, but also findings and con-
clusions "as well as the reasons or basis (emphasis added) therefor, upon all the
material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record."
[Vol. 34
1968 ] CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS 303
detailed analysis will reveal the air freight forwarder industry's present
inability to withstand free and complete competition from all segments
of the transportation industry.
Milton E. Douglass, Jr.
Judgments-Collateral Estoppel - Non-Mutuality of Parties
Plaintiff's decedents were passengers on a commercial airliner that col-
lided with a National Guard jet in Maryland in 1958. Other passengers
instituted actions against the United States in the District of Columbia,
where they received a favorable judgment in 1966. On the basis of this
earlier judgment against the United States, the plaintiffs moved for sum-
mary judgment; they asserted that the United States was collaterally
estopped to deny the alleged negligence of its employees. The United
States replied that the doctrine of collateral estoppel could not be invoked
because the plaintiffs were not parties to the District of Columbia litiga-
tion. Held, motion stayed: until completion of appellate disposition of
the District of Columbia cases. However, as to collateral estoppel, the court
stated that mutuality of parties was unnecessary when the party against
whom the plea was asserted had a fair and complete opportunity to be
heard on the issue. State of Maryland for the Use of Gliedman v. Capital
Airlines, Inc. d United States, 267 F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967).
"Collateral estoppel" means that a judgment in one action operates, in a
subsequent suit on a different cause of action, to establish conclusively all
issues litigated and determined in the first action.1 It is based on the public
policy consideration of putting an end to controversies! and protecting
private litigants against the necessity of litigating the same cause of action
or issue more than once.'
Historically, collateral estoppel has required a mutuality of parties, i.e.,
that the parties in the second litigation be the same or in privity with the
parties to the earlier litigation. This requirement of mutuality of parties
has long been criticized as a rule without reason. In 1922, Justice Cardozo
stated, "The formula had its origin in an attempt to fit the equitable
remedy to the needs of equal justice. We may not suffer it to petrify at
the cost of its animating principle."' Then, in 1942, the "widest breach in
the citadel of mutuality was rammed"' by the Supreme Court of California
in Bernhard v. Bank of America.' There the administratrix first sued the
qualified executor for an accounting and then later sued the Bank of
America to recover a deposit on the grounds of an unauthorized with-
drawal. After finding the controlling issue in both cases to be the same, the
administratrix-plaintiff was held to be collaterally estopped, even though
the defendant was not a party to the first suit for an accounting. The court
found no compelling reason why the bank should have to be in privity to
'Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
'Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942).
l 1B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 0.412[l] (2d ed. 1965).
4 Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490, 494, 135 N.E. 861, 862 (1922).
'Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954 (2d Cir. 1964).
Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d.,807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
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plead the doctrine; instead it set out three tests for the application of col-
lateral estoppel: (1) "Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action in question?" (2) "Was there
a final judgment on the merits?" (3) "Was the party against whom the
plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudica-
tion?"
A growing number of states" and federal9 courts have agreed with Bern-
hard and hence do not require mutuality of parties. They reason that
"one fair day" in court is enough to satisfy the constitutional requirement
of due process" and thus "the requirement of mutuality must yield to
public policy."'" This policy is especially important in view of today's
crowded dockets." Also, it prevents the anomalous results that occur when
a party is submitted to conflicting determinations on the same point. For
example, an indemnitor who has received a favorable judgment could still
be liable on his duty of indemnification if the indemnitee cannot collater-
ally estop a plaintiff-creditor in a second action because of a requirement
of mutuality of parties.
However, Bernhard's elimination of mutuality has not been entirely
accepted, e.g., its language has been criticized as too broad and permissive.
One critic feels that Bernhard should be limited to its facts and plead only
defensively,N because he foresaw absurd results if the Bernhard theory
were plead offensively in multiple-claimant situations. To illustrate, sup-
pose fifty passengers are injured in an airplane mishap, and all file separate
injury suits in a variety of state and federal courts. Suppose further that,
in the first twenty-five actions, the airline prevails, but that passenger
number twenty-six wins his action. Does this mean that the remaining
twenty-four passengers can plead plaintiff number twenty-six's judgment
as conclusively establishing the airline's negligence, but that the airline
cannot plead its favorable results in the first twenty-five cases?"0 The
critic says no and suggests that mutuality of parties be required when the
7Id. at 809, 122 P.2d at 894-5.
'United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev. 1962), aff'd sub nom.,
335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Gorski v. Com-
mercial Ins. Co., 206 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Wis. 1962); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D.
Ohio 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960); People v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 232 F.2d 474
(10th Cir. 1956); United Banana Co., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 172 F. Supp. $80 (D. Conn.
1959); Barbour v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 143 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. I1. 1956); Woodcock v.
Udell, 97 A.2d 878 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953); Gammel v Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d
364 (1955); De Polo v. Greig, 338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441 (1954); Israel v. Wood Dolson
Co., i N.Y.2d 116, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 134 N.E.2d 97 (1956); Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland, 249
N.C. 167, 105 S.E.2d 655 (1958); Harding v. Carr, 79 R.I. 32, 83 A.2d 79 (1951).
'Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965); Zdanok v. Glidden Co.,
327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964); Haddad v. Border Express, Inc., 300 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1962);
Davis v. McKinnon & Mooney, 266 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1959); People of State of Colo. v. Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co., 232 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1956); Gibson v. United States, 211 F.2d 425 (3d Cir.
1954); Hurley v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 183 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1950).
1"Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965); But see 1B J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 0.412[1] 1809 (2d ed. 1965).
"Coca'Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 172 A. 260, 63 (1934).
"2Gliedman v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967).
" Note, Developments in the Lau-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818 (1952).
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plea is asserted against a party who did not have the initiative in the prior
action.
Some jurisdictions have adopted this view,"6 but others have have in-
stead looked to the reason for the rule, i.e., basic fairness in each individual
case."
The courts have not justified this pessimistic view of their duty and func-
tion; instead they have willingly inquired into the circumstances of the actual
case, and time and again they have allowed the plea against a party not
having the initative in the former action whenever they have been satisfied
that the party against whom the former judgment was invoked in fact had
a realistically full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the former
action [Emphasis added.]. 8
Fairness can arise in different forms, e.g., the danger that a sympathetic
jury might bring in a verdict against a wealthy corporate defendant
without realizing its effect on later valid claims,'" or the possibility of a
small compromise verdict that would force a defendant to appeal. Thus,
non-mutuality of parties could create more, instead of less litigation."
If collateral estoppel is applied to inherently unfair conditions, the result
will likely constitute a violation of due process under the Constitution of
the United States."
In order to ascertain whether parties have had their full and fair day
in court, all of the circumstances of the case must be considered. In United
States v. United Air Lines,"' a case almost identical with the present one,
the survivors filed suits in eleven jurisdictions. Twenty-four actions
brought in the Southern District of California were consolidated for trial
and resulted in a jury verdict for the plaintiffs on the issue of negligence.
Then, in another district court, other plaintiffs moved for a summary
judgment on the ground that the California judgment was determinative.
The court followed Bernhard and rejected the requirement of mutuality
because,
[N]o constitutional right is violated where the thing to be litigated was
actually litigated in a previous suit, final judgment entered, and the party
against whom the doctrine is to be invoked bad full opportunity to litigate
the matter and actually did litigate it [Emphasis by the Court.].'
United States v. United Air Lines was followed by Zdanok v. Glidden
Co.' where the court approved Bernhard and then considered whether
there was fundamental fairness. It found that, "While the Alexander
plaintiffs were not parties to the Zdanok action, it is clear that' everyone
16 Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 302 (1961).
17Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25 (1965).
'1Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 900 (4th Cir. 1965).
"Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299 (1928).
'"Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1965).
" Vestal, The Constitution and Preclusion-Res Judicata, 62 MICH. L. REV. 33 (1963).
"2 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev. 1962), aff'd sub nom., United Airlines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379
(9th Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
23id. at 725-26.
24327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
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expected their rights to be governed by the court's interpretation of the
[labor] contract in that test case [Emphasis added.]." '
Courts subscribing to Bernhard require mutuality when the first liti-
gation is not fair and complete. In Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac.
Airlines, Ltd.," the plaintiffs argued that the defendant, BCPA, was col-
laterally estopped from relitigating the question of liability for "wilful
misconduct" under a Warsaw ticket because of a prior judgment involving
a different passenger killed in the same crash. The court held for the de-
fendant because of a lack of mutuality and stated, "We think it would be
unfair in this case to use the result of the second Holmes trial to the dis-
advantage of BCPA."' 7 In the previous litigation, BCPA won the first
trial, but upon retrial it suffered a relatively small judgment. The court
reasoned that BCPA did not appeal from the small judgment because of
the possibility of suffering a much larger judgment. Thus, the first litiga-
tion was taken as a settlement by BCPA, and it was surely not intended
as full and complete litigation on the issue of liability. Similarly, in
Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States,"8 the court decided
that collateral estoppel should not apply to patent litigation because of
the lack of compelling public policy and the possibility of unfairness,
viz. (1) a person who was a stranger to prior litigation is neither harassed,
put to additional expense, nor compelled to relitigate an issue, (2) due
to the intrinsic nature of the subject, previous litigation can be incom-
plete or wrong, and (3) patent litigation raises issues that are significant
to the public as well as to the parties. The court approved of Bernhard
when fairness is present, but decided "no more than one day in court"
should not dominate the principle of collateral estoppel.
In the present case the court followed United States v. United Air Lines:
"There seem to be no compelling reasons for requring that the party assert-
ing the plea of collateral estoppel, even affirmatively as in this case, must
have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation."'"
The court then stated that four questions must be answered affirmatively
before collateral estoppel can be applied. The first three questions are the
tests set down by Bernard and followed in United States v. United Air
Lines and Zdanok v. Glidden Co. The fourth question goes to fairness, i.e.,
"Was the party against whom the plea is asserted given a fair opportunity
to be heard on the issue?"' The court's conclusion was that the issue of
negligence was fully and completely litigated in the previous action.
Thus, the court made "a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue" a
specific prerequisite to ascertainment of whether mutuality of parties can
be eliminated. Past courts have either (1) disregarded fairness, (2) used
it as a basis for upholding the requirement of mutality, or (3) considered
it as a question of due process. Making fairness to be heard a definite test
'1d. at 953.
26346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1965).
27 Id. at 540.
28 372 F.2d 969 (Ct. C1. 1967).
29 267 F. Supp. at 303.
.. ld. at 304.
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will increase other courts' awareness of the requirement, which should in
turn affect a precise and thorough inspection of the previous litigation.
Thus, the solidification of the requirement will better safeguard the
parties from the possible dangers of non-mutuality until joinder and class
action rules are broadened to permit complete litigation in a single action,
and simultaneously assist fulfillment of the policy behind non-mutuality.
James Lee Irish, III
RECENT DECISIONS
Wrongful Death-Conflict of Laws-
Significant Contacts vs. Lex Loci
On 3 November 1964, four passengers were killed when their chartered
airplane crashed into a mesa near Kim, Colorado. A wrongful death action
was brought in Texas, and the district court held for defendant air charter
service on the issue limiting recoverable damages. On the appeal, which
affirmed the lower court decision, appellant argued that the Texas law al-
lowing unlimited recoverable damages should apply because Texas was the
state of the most significant contacts with the action. The appellate court
felt, however, that it was bound by stare decisis in construing the relevant
Texas conflicts statute and accordingly applied the theory of lex loci delicti,
the law of the place of the forum, limiting recoverable damages in accord-
ance with the applicable Colorado statute. Error was granted to the Texas
Supreme Court. Held, affirmed: the law of Colorado, the place of the acci-
dent, shall be followed and applied. Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc.,
10 Av. Cas. 17,896 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1968).
Petitioner argued that this action was a Texas controversy, that Colorado
had little concern with the accident because the passengers were returning
to Texas on a business trip in behalf of a Texas based commercial activity,
and that respondent was a Texas corporation whose negligent pilot was
also a Texas resident. The Texas courts have repeatedly held that Article
4671' does not have extraterritorial effect, and the subsequent enactment'
of Article 4678 does not purport to give this force to the Texas wrongful
death statute. "Its purpose was simply to provide that a right of action
5 TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN., art. 4671 (1952) provides, in part:
An action for actual damages on account of the injuries causing the death of any person may
be brought in the following cases:
1. When an injury causing the death of any person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect,
carelessness, unskilfulness, or default of another person, association of persons, joint stock company,
corporation . . . his, its or their agents or servants, such persons . . . shall be liable in damages
for the injuries causing such death ..
2. When an injury causing the death of any person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect,
carelessness, unskilfulness, or default of the proprietor, owner, charterer or hirer of any industrial
or public utility plant, or any railroad, street railway, steamboat, stagecoach, or other vehicle for
the conveyance of goods or passengers, or by the unfitness, wrongful act, neglect, carelessness,
unskilfulness or default of his, their or its servants or agents, such proprietor, owner, charterer or
hirer shall be liable in damages for the injuries causing such death ...
2TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 4678 (1952) provides:
Whenever the death or personal injury of a citizen of this State or of the United States, or of
any foreign country having equal treaty rights with the United States on behalf of its citizens, has
been or may be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another in any foreign State
or country for which a right to maintainan an action and recover damages thereof is given by the
statute or law of such foreign State or country, such right of action may be enforced in the courts
of this State within the time prescribed for the commencement of such actions by the statutes of
this State. The law of the forum shall control in the prosecution and maintenance of such action
in the-courts of this State in all matters pertaining to the procedure.
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arising under the laws of a foreign state or country for the wrongful death
of a Texas citizen could be enforced in the Texas court."'
In Richards v. United States" the United States Supreme Court said:
Where more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact in the ac-
tivity in question, the forum State, by analysis of the interest possessed by the
States involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the
law of one or another state having such an interest in the multistate activity.'
Petitioner argued that a state can adopt a statute having an extraterritorial
effect; however, Richards is not a mandate to the state courts. The instant
cause of action was created wholly by statute and was thus outside the
court's common law domain. In the area of statutory construction, the doc-
trine of stare decisis has its greatest force. Changes in remedies are to be
brought about by the process of legislative amendment, and the legisla-
ture's non-action does not authorize judicial action in legislative matters.
W.O.W., III
Insurance-Exclusionary Phrase-Civil Air Patrol Observer
An insured was killed while participating as an observer on a simulated
search and rescue mission of the Civil Air Patrol. The group accident pol-
icy in question contained the following exclusionary language:
This policy does not cover any loss, fatal or non-fatal, caused by or
resulting from:
(4) accident occuring while the Insured Person is operating, or learning to
operate, or performing duties as a member of the crew of any aircraft...
[Emphasis added.].
The Civil Air Patrol manual refers to the pilot and observer as making up
the "air crew." However, the observer's principle function is visual ob-
servation, and he has nothing to do with the aircraft's operation. The in-
sured contended that the court erred in its instruction in confining a
"member of a crew" to one taking part in the operation, maintenance, or
upkeep of the aircraft. Held, affirmed: The trial court did not err in its
instruction. Further, there was no error in the trial court's refusal to give
the instruction requested by the insurer that a member of the crew "shall
be taken to mean any person present in the aircraft for the performance of
some specific task, assignment or duty connected with the purpose of the
particular flight." American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania
v. Mitchell, 10 Av. Cas. 17,854 (8th Cir. 1968).
The court decided that the word "crew" referred to the crew of an air-
craft rather than the two-man crew engaged in a Civil Air Patrol mission.
3 10 Av. Cas. 17,896 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1968).
4369 U.S. 1 (1962).
5 id. at 15.
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Thus, if the insurer feels that it must have the protection of a broader ex-
clusion, it must use language such as "any duties whatsoever aboard such
aircraft while in flight"' which would clearly provide the desired result.
J.L.I. III
Erie Doctrine - Lex Fori - Inter-Spousal Immunity
A pilot and his wife, both residents of Pennsylvania, were killed in a
Virginia airplane crash. The plaintiff, administrator of the wife's estate and
also a Pennsylvania resident, filed a wrongful death complaint against
Beech Aircraft Corporation in the United States District Court of Dela-
ware. The plaintiff alleged that the accident was caused by the negligence
of defendant's agents, and resulted from a breach of warranty by defend-
ant to the husband, who had purchased the plane from defendant. Juris-
diction in, the federal court existed by diversity of citizenship.
The defendant, Beech, filed a third-party complaint against Continental
Bank and Trust Company, administrator of the husband's estate. The
complaint alleged that the crash was proximately caused by negligence in
maintaining or flying the aircraft. Continental moved to dismiss the third-
party-complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b) (6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Held, third-
party complaint dismissed: The Erie doctrine requires that the appropriate
Delaware law be applied. The administrator for the deceased pilot was im-
mune to the third-party claim asserted against it by Beech, even though
both administrators and spouses were citizens of Pennsylvania, where inter-
spousal immunity is not recognized. Dunn v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 271 F.
Supp. 662 (D. Del. 1967).
Beech, using the argument that the domicilliary state has primary con-
cern for its residents' marital relations, urged that the law of the domicile
of the spouses would be the proper law to apply. This would be Pennsyl-
vania law, which does not recognize the inter-spousal immunity rule.' The
court rejected Beech's argument by applying the Erie doctrine6-that a
federal court, in a diversity suit, must follow the substantive law of the
state in which the court sits.
The Superior Court of Delaware held in Perez v. Short Line, Inc.' that
the lex fori (law of the forum) determined whether a defendant could
maintain a cross-action for contribution against the spouse of the plaintiff.
In Perez, the cross-action for contribution was deemed to be remedial and
not substantive. The district court in Dunn, however, held that in applying
Erie it was not bound by the state court's determination of whether a mat-
'Smith v. Prudential Ins. Co., 300 S.W.2d 435 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1957).
'Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955).
2 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'Perez v. Short Line, Inc., 231 A.2d 642 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967).
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ter is procedural or substantive. If the law to be applied substantially af-
fects the outcome of the decision, it will be termed '!substantive."' The fed-
eral court must determine if the state law is outcome-determinative. There-
fore, even though Delaware has characterized the right to contribution as
remedial,' the federal court was not bound to accept that characterization.
Because the applicability or non-applicability of the inter-spousal im-
munity rule to Beech's cross-claim for contribution was outcome-deter-
minative, Erie required the federal court to follow Delaware law. Since
Delaware recognizes inter-spousal immunity,' Continental was immune to
the third-party claim asserted by Beech.
J.T.W.
Administrative Law-Show Cause Order-
Aircraft Accident Report
George Farrell, complainant, represented the widow and children of a
United States Marine Corps Reserve officer who died in the crash of a jet
plane while on active duty for training. Farrell requested that the Depart-
ment of the Navy, pursuant to the Public Information Section of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,1 furnish him with a copy of the complete air-
craft accident report. The Navy furnished some information, but refused
to furnish the entire report. After unsuccessfully appealing the refusal to
provide the entire report, the complainant obtained an order requiring the
Secretary to show cause why he should not be ordered to produce a com-
plete copy of the aircraft accident report.' Held: The order to show cause
was vacated and the proceeding dismissed. Farrell v. Ignatius, 10 Av. Cas.
17,834 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The respondent, Secretary of the Navy, cross-moved to dismiss the ac-
tion for lack of jurisdiction. He contended that no complaint had been
filed in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' and
'Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 758 (lst Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650.
5231 A.2d 642.
'Saunders v. Hill, 202 A.2d 807 (Del. 1964); Ferguson v. Davis, 48 Del. 299, 102 A.2d 707
(Del. Super. Ct. 1954).
'Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (June 5, 1967), "amending' 5
U.S.C. S 552 (Supp. 1966), formerly Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966). Except under
certain exceptions,
[E]ach agency, on request for identifiable records made in accordance with pub-
lished rules stating the time, place, fees to' the extent authorized by statute, and
procedure to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person.
On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the
complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency
records are situated, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency
records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld
from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the-matter de novo
and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action . . . [Emphasis added.].
For a discussion of this amended Act, see 33 J. Amp L. & COM. 490 (1967).
2 rd.
a FED' R. Civ. P. 3.
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since there was no action commenced or pending in the court, it had no
jurisdiction. Complainant argued that the judicial review proceedings un-
der Section 552 of the Administrative Procedure Act intended some form
of special summary proceeding merely by the show cause order, and com-
pliance with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
not needed. In reaching its decision, the court noted that Section 552 ex-
pressly provides that the district court shall have jurisdiction on com-
plaint.! The court further stated that on complaint meant the filing of an
action, and an action does not start by securing an order to show cause.'
The Federal Rules provide the manner for commencing an action, and
there was neither "justification nor authority for carving out an exception
to the uniform and regular civil procedure laid down by the Federal Rules
in this case."
C.F.P.
Eminent Domain- Inverse Condemnation-Jet Noise
The city of Los Angeles, California initiated condemnation proceedings
to acquire property for the expansion of existing airport facilities. The
defendants, residents of an ocean side community to the north and west of
the airport, counterclaimed, alleging that the noise of takeoffs and "warm-
ups" had interfered with the use and enjoyment of their property and had
caused an incident depreciation in property values. They sought to dem-
onstrate that, by this jet noise, the city had acquired air easements to the
property and had thus taken or damaged the property for public use.' At
the trial it was shown that no aircraft passed over parcels belonging to
defendants either on takeoff or landing and that property values had in-
creased at a rate approximating the appreciation in comparable areas in the
county. Held: the defendants' claims were not compensable because there
was no depreciation in value. City of Los Angeles v. Mattson, 10 Av. Cas.
17,632 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1967).
While careful to explain that it was not "intending to infer that such
noise ... was pleasant or to be desired," the court held that the noise to
which the defendants were subjected was not "of a substantial nature"; the
noise was not bad enough to constitute a taking or damaging in the con-
stitutional sense. The test applied in federal courts for a "taking" is whether
there have been frequent, low-level overflights amounting to a direct in-
'Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (June 5, 1967), amending 5
U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1966), formerly Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
3New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 362 U.S. 404, 406-08 (1959); Warren v. Arzt,
18 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); In re Market Basket, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
6Farrell v. Ignatius, 10 Av. Cas. 17, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
'CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14 provides in part, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation having first been made to . . . the owner . . " [Emphasis
added.]. There is a similar provision in the United States Constitution in the Fifth Amendment,
made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, but allowing compensation only for
a taking. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
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vasion of airspace over the property; yet in some state jurisdictions, jet
noise which causes a depreciation in property value has been considered to
be a constitutional taking or damaging.! There was no indication towards
which test the court here leaned; in fact, the issue was left undecided. Since
there had been an actual appreciation in property values, the court did not
feel constrained to decide whether depreciation caused by aircraft noise
amounted to a taking or damaging for which compensation could be given.
In the decision there was considerable discussion of a study conducted by
an independent research company in which it was shown that the "Per-
ceived Noise Level" near an airport, measured in PNdb (the average per-
son's subjective response to aircraft noise), becomes intolerable above 100
PNdb; the noise level at the property in question was below 95 PNdb. Al-
though it appeared that the court might be relying on a new test, based on
a PNdb measurement, to determine whether compensation in inverse con-
demnation could be given for jet noise, this position was never enunciated.
The opinion closed with a guarded explanation of the public policy rea-
sons which might preclude recovery in any event, noting that the airplane,
in becoming an integral part of modern life, required of the city dweller a
certain toleration of unpleasantness and that until the inconvenience se-
verely outweighed the utility, there could be no recovery.
B.L.A.
2For a more extensive discussion of the problems and decisions in this area, see 63 MIcH. L.
R~v. 1373 (1965).
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